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ABSTRACT 
This thesis enquires into the vexed issue of the relation between the criticism 
of orality and the criticism of writing in Plato’s works. The main aim is to 
argue that this relation, often read as an opposition, is grounded on a more 
ontological level of analysis which is exemplified by the ontology of the 
image as it is expressed throughout the entire platonic production. Analysing 
the structure of the ontology of the image it emerges that both the criticism 
of orality and the criticism of writing are inessential and have more points of 
convergence than divergences. The theme of mimesis is the leading thread 
of this work and it is addressed as a “mechanism” which progressively 
reveals the continuity and co-dependency between the opposition 
orality/writing and the ontology of the image (itself based on the relation and 
co-dependency between eidos and eidolon). 
The work engages with an open-ended conclusion which suggests the 
possibility of further enquiring. The conclusive theme dealt with is the 
platonic conception of beauty. The occurrences of beauty in Plato’s works 
exhibit a singular relation between eidos and eidolon, a relation that 
overcome the mimetic mechanism and points to an erotic conception of life 
and philosophy. 
The afterword which closes the dissertation aims to show the relevance of 
this study for a more aware understanding of some of the contemporary 
phenomena which challenge our way to analyse, communicate and elaborate 
the visual world in which we have anthropologically shifted. 
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“This tablet shouts aloud  
terrible, dreadful words. 
Where can I run to, where 
can I escape this crushing weight, this pain? 
I’m dead. I am destroyed. 
This song, the writing’s voice 
is venom to my eyes.” 
 
Euripides, Hippolytus (vv. 971-977) 
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PREMISES 
This study aims to analyse some elements of a broad and vexed issue in the contemporary 
interpretation of Plato’s philosophical heritage. In general terms, the issue can be referred 
to as the debate around the relation between orality and writing in Plato’s philosophy. 
Various approaches and manifold perspectives coexist in this philosophical debate. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to include most of them in this discussion, a circumstance 
which occurs frequently while dealing with an author, such as Plato, who is a starting 
point and also a milestone in the philosophical consciousness of western culture. The 
relevance of the aspects excluded could be considered more striking and fortunate 
compared to the themes analysed. This does not mean that the main interpretations are 
underestimated; it rather declares an acknowledgement of the vastness of the issue and 
the need to draw precise limits to this research. 
The ambition of this work is not to trace the history and the nature of contemporary 
approaches to the platonic orality/writing issue, neither to assert the supremacy of one 
interpretative paradigm over the others. These aspects, in fact, have been widely and 
accurately investigated by many contemporary studies. Moreover, beneath this thesis lies 
the firm belief that to read Plato’s works adopting only one interpretative paradigm is a 
methodological choice which, at the same time, narrows the possibilities of 
comprehending the original platonic texts and does not respect the multi-layered nature 
of Plato’s expression. Hence, it is preferred to connect and integrate different paradigms 
and, by their confrontation, to consider the limits and the strengths of different 
hermeneutical approaches to the platonic works. 
This investigation into the field of orality/writing occurred firstly as an outcome of 
enquiring into the value of poetry and the role of beauty in some of Plato’s works. Then, 
in a second moment, the importance of the orality/writing issue revealed itself to be 
propaedeutic to a correct understanding of poetry in Plato and to be somehow connected 
to the ontology of the image. The aesthetic lens is then the main filter through which the 
relation between orality and writing has been read, but it is not the exclusive focus of this 
research. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to criticise the partial inappropriateness of talking about 
Aesthetics in regards to Plato’s philosophy. Aesthetics is a quite young discipline, its 
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development is collocated in Modern Philosophy: the first time the term occurred as an 
independent philosophical category was in the mid eighteenth century.1 Thus, it is evident 
that an anachronism is displayed in talking about “platonic Aesthetics”; the anachronism 
uses a Modern category for interpreting an Ancient author. Even if these circumstances 
do not strictly prevent one from applying an aesthetic reading to Plato’s Philosophy, 
nevertheless, this operation must be done carefully. Seemingly, the field of “platonic 
Aesthetics” is challenged by a hermeneutical dilemma. Plato, in fact, deals with themes 
which pertain to Aesthetics such as beauty and the arts, hence, if someone nowadays 
wants to analyse these themes, inevitably her/his research will be labelled as “Aesthetics” 
even if this discipline did not exist at that time. In order to circumvent this interpretative 
conflict, it is necessary to trace at least two hermeneutic boundaries around the application 
of the Modern/Contemporary “Aesthetics-label” to Plato’s Philosophy. Firstly, there is 
not in Plato a specific and autonomous reflection on arts, nor on beauty. Instead, the 
reflections on beauty and the arts, in Plato’s work, are always interwoven with other 
themes and they aim towards wider topics such as education, politics, and psychology.2 
Secondly, our contemporary sensibility around beauty and the arts does not fit with 
Plato’s perspective. At the root of this distance there are many elements; in this context it 
suffices to say that there is mainly a semantic gap. As a matter of fact, for the Ancient 
Greeks the “arts” (technai) meant something based on skills and techniques which were 
relegated to specific social contexts,3 while the term “beauty” (kalon) was linked to the 
ideals of proportion and harmony.4 More specifically, Plato did not have great 
 
1 Conventionally, the first time that the word “Aesthetic” has been used to mean a philosophical reflection 
upon the arts, Beautiful and Taste, was in the work by Alexander Baumgarten, Aesthetica, 1758. It was 
Immanuel Kant to denounce this specific use of the term by Baumgarten, in his second edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, 1787. Kant himself in this work uses the term in a different way, related to its 
etymological meaning (from Ancient Greek, aisthesis: sensation, sensorial perception). In the Second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes: The Germans are the only people who currently make 
use of the word “aesthetic” in order to signify what others call the critique of taste. This usage originated 
in the abortive attempt made by Baumgarten, that admirable analytic thinker, to bring the critical treatment 
of the beautiful under rational principles, and so to raise its rules to the rank of a science. But such 
endeavours are fruitless. The said rules or criteria are, as regards their chief sources, merely empirical, 
and consequently can never serve as determinate a way by which our judgment of taste must be directed. 
(Kant, 1998, p. 173, footnote). 
For the contemporary use of the Ancient terms Aesthetics and Beauty (kalon), cf. also: the introduction to 
the Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, “Aesthetics Today” (Kivy, 2004, pp. 1-11); and Hyland, 2008, pp. 3-5.  
2 The use of the term psycology in Plato cannot be associated to the contemporary discipline that deals with 
human mind and behaviours. This term, instead, has to be meant in its etymologic sense: “structure” of the 
soul. 
3 On the meaning of the term techne in Ancient Greece, cf. Roochnick, 1996, pp. 20-21; on the use of the 
term in Plato’s works cf. Ivi, pp. 89-177. 
4 Konstan, 2014, pp. 101-131. 
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consideration of the arts and artists, as he decided to banish them from his ideal city,5 and 
he related the concept of beauty more to the idea of the Good than to aesthetic pleasure. 
Some of these issues are deepened and clarified in the Second Chapter. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, being aware of the inexhaustible nature of Plato’s 
philosophy, the main effort of this work consists in respecting this variety as much as 
possible. The favoured approach consists in reading attentively Plato’s own words and 
trying not to misinterpret them by using hermeneutic keys which would probably fit, but 
would inevitably constrain, the fluid and indefinite nature of his written works. More than 
one contemporary philosopher and more than one interpretative paradigm is called upon 
to deepen the issue at different stages, but there is no intention to privilege any precise 
key reading and, at the same time, it is not possible to involve all of them. 
A pure philological approach has not been considered due to a lack of expertise in this 
specific field and also, this would possibly limit the original aim of the research. 
Nevertheless, a personal reading of the Greek text has a priority over the interpretations 
given by any contemporary philosopher. 
Some of the most relevant Greek terms involved in this research are quoted in Ancient 
Greek, transliterated and italicised. This choice aims to indicate not only the difficulty in 
translating adequately these terms but also to respect the specific plurality and lack of 
precision in meaning that many Ancient Greek terms have. As anticipated earlier, there 
is not simply a huge temporal gap between Ancient Greece and the actual times, but there 
is also a huge cultural gap which expresses itself in the evolution of language and its 
determinacy. Citing these terms in the original Greek, it has been tried to respect these 
differences and restores the richness of the “undefinition” intrinsic in these terms 
themselves. Among the terms left in Greek there is also the word mimesis; this word does 
exist in English too, however, it is italicised throughout this research to highlight its 
original meaning in Ancient Greek. In fact, the English term “mimesis” means primarily 
“imitation”; while the Ancient Greek term mimesis means primarily “representation”. 
Originally mimesis related to the sphere of poetic composition and performance (from 
archaic poetry to classic theatre). Technically, it is a representation of a model through its 
 
5 Republic, 607b. 
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reproduction, although this representation is never identical to the model. The main 
feature of what is reproduced is that its representation is visible.6 
Throughout this dissertation, the representation of the reproduced model is addressed 
mainly as “mimetic mechanism”. The use of the term “mechanism” wants to underline 
the constant relation between reproduction and representation as to say that behind a 
representation there is a mechanism of reproduction, hence a constant reference back to 
the original model. 
The Greek texts by Plato are quoted following the Oxford version edited by J. Burnet; 
while the numbering system and the abbreviation of the dialogues’ titles refers to the 
widely used layout by the humanist Henricus Stephanus. The translation from Ancient 
Greek follows the edition of the complete works by Plato edited by John Cooper, 1997. 
The translation is occasionally modified, when considered necessary.
 
6 Palumbo, 2008, p. 11, n. 7. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relation between orality and writing appears problematic in Plato’s work, not only in 
terms of the comparison between the two poles but also independently from the 
comparison. It is a twofold problem in which each face has a contradictory nature in itself. 
Plato, in fact, criticised the oral tradition as a means of transmitting knowledge, but he 
also clearly stated that writing is an inadequate means of transmitting knowledge. Since 
these two elements are in opposition, the very first consequence of the double critique is 
to be caught in a vicious circle in which each face refers to the other face. The circular 
dichotomy is even more exacerbated by the fact that Plato himself is a writer, but he is 
not a “conventional” philosophical writer in the way “philosophical-writing” is 
considered nowadays. In fact, he did not write philosophical treatises, neither doctrines – 
as he warned he would never do, in the Seventh Letter –7 but dialogues. The tradition 
stated that he wrote thirty-four dialogues, one monologue (Apology) and few letters.8 
Thus, his philosophical insights are deposited mainly in written dialogues which resemble 
an oral exchange. Once again, the mutual referring of orality to writing and of writing to 
orality comes up. 
One could think that the critique of writing, mainly exposed in the Phaedrus,9 is to be 
ascribed to the main character of Plato’s dialogues: Socrates. As a matter of fact, Socrates, 
considered to be the first western philosopher, did not leave any written trace behind him 
and firmly believed in the practice of philosophy through oral dialogue. Nevertheless, this 
interpretation would not suppress the contradiction, firstly because it is an ambitious and 
almost unachievable task to distinguish precisely platonic and socratic elements in Plato’s 
works – a task not undertaken here. Secondly, even if it were possible to assert that the 
critique of writing in the Phaedrus is genuinely socratic; then, how does one interpret the 
platonic statement, in the biographical Seventh Letter, that he would never leave any 
written text about his philosophy? In addition, to whom is to be ascribed the critique of 
orality contained in Ion and Republic? If this last critique is ascribed to Plato, then it 
would clash with his biographical statement, if it is ascribed to Socrates then it would 
 
7 VII Ep. 344c. 
8 Here it is considered the edition, styled on the first century A.D., by Trasyllus. Trasyllus was a 
Grammarian and Philosopher from Alexandria and he organized the works by Plato in nine tetralogies, not 
following a chronologic order. 
9 Phaedrus, 274b-278d. 
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clash with the Phaedrus. As predicted, the contradiction between orality and writing 
would start over again. 
Some interpreters, passing over this opposition between orality and writing, minimised 
the relevance of one of the two sides. In fact, the critique of writing is better argued and 
finds more evidence than the circumscribed critique of orality. This does not mean that 
the role of the written dialogues has been denied, but that simply it has been reduced in 
favour of the oral transmission which, supposedly, was the privileged way of expressing 
philosophical truths to a small, elected audience.10 On the other side, some other 
interpreters minimised the critique of writing, or at least underestimated it as an effect of 
the innovative introduction of a new technology for transmitting knowledge, namely: the 
writing skill. In a culture based on oral transmission, as it was in Greece between VIII 
and V centuries BCE, the use of writing to transmit knowledge appeared as something 
that would weaken memory, but then gradually replaced oral transmission and 
furthermore made it possible to develop philosophy in a more systematic way. 
It is evident here that posing the issue in terms of a polarity makes the contradiction 
stronger and unresolvable.11 Also, it is believed that minimising one side of the critique 
does an injustice to the platonic dialogues. The contradiction is there and it needs to be 
considered seriously in all its parts. For this reason, the approach chosen for this research 
aims to overcome the contradiction. In fact, a kind of reading which maintains the 
opposition would probably end up being partial and sterile. Instead, it has been tried a 
strategy that seemingly works better, and it consists of finding the essential points of 
contact between the two poles. Following this strategy, it comes out that the critiques are 
different parts of one critique and this explains why one side always refers to the other. 
As a result, it is also shown that the opposition is not simply between orality and writing, 
it is rather between deceptive speeches (historically performed by sophists and poets) and 
true discourse (the speciality of the philosopher) both in oral transmission and in writing 
transmission. 
 
10 This kind of interpretation was proposed as a “new paradigm” by the Tubingen-Milan School, cf. Reale 
2010. 
11 Ruth Finnegan has shown that posing the issue of “orality/writing” in terms of polarity can be useful only 
as a strategy to define the features of the two poles. But this polarisation would not reflect the real use of 
these media which are usually mixed together in most of the human cultures as Goody (1968) has 
documented. Cf. Finnegan, 1988, pp. 139-174. 
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Undertaking this interpretation involves mainly the well-known platonic condemnation 
of the arts, especially poetry,12 as something deceptive that can corrupt the soul. While 
the opposition to Sophistics is addressed only partially in this dissertation – with the wish 
of undertaking it at a later date. Following the thread of the “ancient quarrel between 
poetry and philosophy”, it is necessary to deal with the consolidated paradigm of the 
image (eidos-eidolon) which frequently occurs in Plato’s dialogues. In fact, the critique 
of the arts, in general terms, is based on the assumption that they produce multiple, false, 
sensual images (eidola) far removed from truth; while truth is a process through which 
multiplicities are gathered together into intellectual unity (eidos). 
There is neither the intention, nor the interest in reassessing the classic dichotomy of sense 
and intellect in Plato’s philosophy. To prevent this reading, this research engages with an 
open-ended conclusion in which it is shown that there is, in Plato’s works, a unique 
“event” that goes over this effective but simplistic distinction between senses and 
intellect, eidos and eidolon, orality and writing. This event is beauty. Beauty is in fact the 
most powerful event in Plato’s works because it shines forth suddenly as any other 
eidolon would do, but through its perception, it is possible to be led to its eidetic nature 
which is almost identifiable with the idea of the Good. Beauty always shows this double 
nature, and its capacity to elevate the soul makes it the most extraordinary event in Plato’s 
dialogues. 
In order to do develop this research, the work is divided in three chapters. The first and 
second chapters are devoted respectively to the critique of writing and to the critique of 
orality as they appear in Plato’s works, and also as they have been read by some 
interpreters who privileged one aspect of the dichotomy over the other. The third chapter 
attempts a resolution of this opposition also through a comparison with the paradigm of 
the image in Plato and offers an “open-ended” conclusion – as already mentioned. In fact, 
the final part of the dissertation focuses on the theme of beauty and its relevance, but the 
impact of the theme of beauty on the latest Plato’s production and the connected theory 
of the immortality of the soul are not analysed here; however, these topics might represent 
a further field of investigation to which this thesis can provide a basis. The final 
Afterword to this work aims both to show the relevance of such investigation for the 
understanding of some of the most effective phenomena which challenge our 
 
12 Republic, 595-608. 
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contemporary way of communicating; and it grounds the philosophical frame for further 
enquiries. 
The theme of mimesis is the thread connecting and interweaving the entire work. This 
central theme is dealt with using an ascending climax; in fact, at first, it is introduced 
contextually while, at the end of the work, it is analysed ontologically. In the first chapter, 
mimesis is considered mainly for its epistemological value; in the second chapter, mimesis 
appears as a psychological, hence political, threat; in the last chapter mimesis is unrooted 
and displayed for its ontological nature. 
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FIRST CHAPTER  
The critique of writing in Plato’s works 
 
The platonic critique of writing is conventionally located in two areas of Plato’s works: 
towards the end of the Phaedrus, when Socrates discusses the myth of Theuth, and in a 
few lines of the autobiographical Seventh Letter. 
The first two sections of this chapter aim to analyse these two platonic passages. 
Respectively, the first section focuses on the critique of writing in the Phaedrus, while 
the second section deals with the critique of writing in the Seventh Letter. Some excerpts 
from the Plato’s works are quoted in order to offer an interpretation as coherent as 
possible with the original text. Nevertheless, the remarks of some contemporary authors 
on these passages are integrated in the dissertation in order to support and explain further 
some issues dealt with and sometimes also to challenge the traditional reception of these 
same issues. 
The main contemporary author referred to in the first section is Jacques Derrida, whose 
deconstructive reading of the Phaedrus emphasises both a more complex sense of the 
critique of writing and a need for unity in interpreting the themes of the whole dialogue. 
In the second section, the main contemporary author referred to is Hans-Georg Gadamer 
whose epistemological reading of the Seventh Letter suggests focusing more on the 
problem of the transmission of knowledge as such, rather than on the medium chosen to 
transmit knowledge. One of the most relevant aspects emphasised by Gadamer’s reading 
of the Seventh Letter is the weakness of the human logoi (words/speeches) which is a 
recurrent and central theme throughout this entire dissertation. The leading theme of the 
dissertation, mimesis, makes its first apparition in these two sections, setting out the bases 
for further analyses. 
The third and fourth sections of this chapter expose the main traits of the most established 
contemporary position about the criticism of writing in Plato’s philosophy. This position 
is represented by the Tübingen-Milan School which is composed by German and Italian 
scholars mainly active in academia between 1980s and 1990s. The main claims of these 
scholars are exposed by exploring the philological and philosophical arguments that build 
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up the thesis of a firm platonic rejection of writing in favour of an oral and exclusive 
transmission of higher knowledge. Although these theories elaborated by the Tübingen-
Milan School offer good arguments, in this dissertation they are rejected with 
counterarguments taken from Plato’s dialogues but also from some of the most 
distinguished contemporary interpreters of Plato’s works. 
Given the reasons to reject the theses of the Tübingen-Milan School, the last section of 
this chapter reassesses, in general terms, an interpretation of the criticism of writing in 
Plato more coherent with the dialogues themselves and functional to the development of 
the main following themes of this dissertation. 
The titles chosen for the sections of this chapter are Plato’s own words. These are 
quotations taken sometimes from the Phaedrus and sometimes from the Seventh Letter. 
This choice is due to the figurative eloquence of these quotations, but also because with 
these quotations it is aimed to stress, ironically, one of the typical contradictions in the 
platonic criticism of writing: it is a criticism of writing elaborated on in writing. 
 
1.1. “I have discovered a potion for memory and for wisdom.”13  
The passage of the Phaedrus in which the critique of writing is exposed, has often 
appeared as an unnecessary appendix that makes the dialogue even more unorganised and 
fragmentary.14 If so, it would be highly ironic. In fact, in the dialogue Socrates shows his 
mastery in the theory and in the practise of composing well-structured discourses. 
Furthermore, he also harshly criticises the speech by the rhetorician Lysias for being 
composed of parts which appear to have been thrown together at random.15 
Why would Plato let Socrates criticise a deficiency in Lysias’ speech in a dialogue written 
by himself with the same deficiency? It cannot be assumed that Plato does not know the 
rules of composing a systematic discourse. 
Even if this ironic contradiction is quite striking, it is not alone convincing enough to 
deny that the Phaedrus has a fragmentary structure. For this reason, in this Section, other 
 
13 Phaedr. 274e. 
14 In regard to the main theories about the composition and chronology of the Phaedrus, cf. Robin, 1908, 
pp. 63-120; Brandwood, 1990; Khan, 1998, pp. 42-48. 
15 Phaedr. 264b. 
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reasons are offered for believing that the “trial of writing” is actually a relevant, 
intentional and nonetheless complementary part of the dialogue. 
In this regard, it is worth recalling a few lines of one of the most established contemporary 
interpretations of the Phaedrus, the interpretation by Jacques Derrida: 
 
That entire hearing of the trial of writing should some day cease to appear as an extraneous 
mythological fantasy, an appendix the organism could easily, with no loss, have done 
without. In truth, it is rigorously called for from one end of the Phaedrus to the other.16 
 
This observation is quite relevant as it establishes a relation of mutual interdependence 
between the final appendix of the trial of writing and the more systematic rest of the 
dialogue. This not only means that the trial of writing is a complementary part of the 
work, but also that it would not be possible to fully understand the section of the trial 
without integrating it in the entire dialogue. As an evidence for this, immediately after the 
attribution of randomness to Lysias’ speech, Socrates explains that a well-composed 
speech is like a human living body, that is a harmonised whole.17 Since Socrates seems 
well aware of how a proper speech has to be structured, it should be doubted whether the 
trial of writing is just an avoidable appendix. It would be more advantageous, rather, to 
understand how this part relates to his speeches and to the whole dialogue. 
As an interpreter of the Phaedrus, Derrida uses a different metaphor to point out the same 
necessity of unity in the dialogue. In the place of the comparison with the harmony of the 
body’s parts, Derrida talks instead about a symploke18 (a weaving). Consequently, the trial 
of writing would be like a thread interwoven in the fabric of the entire dialogue. 
Keeping with this metaphor, it is arguable that there is not only one central theme in the 
dialogue, but that there are also other themes around which further themes are developed. 
On the contrary, in the Phaedrus each theme is built and developed thanks to the others, 
 
16 Derrida, 1981, p. 67. 
17 Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without 
head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and 
to the whole work. (Phaedr. 264c) 
18 Derrida, 1981, p. 67. Even if in the Phaedrus Plato does not use explicitly the term symploke, this is 
anyway a recurrent term in other Plato’s dialogues. Derrida refers specifically to a passage from the 
Statesman (Pol. 277-278). 
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in a structure that works only if the themes dealt with are interpreted in connection one 
with each other. This hermeneutical approach is valid, and it works mainly from the 
perspective of the interpreter who wants to read the dialogue attentively; or else, 
metaphorically, this approach works to understand how the threads of the fabric are bound 
together in a finished product. From the perspective of the composer of the dialogue – 
Plato, the organic unity of the creation is guaranteed by an underlying movement of 
division into parts and reunification into an ideal unity.19 It means that there has to be a 
common direction in the structure and in the development of the themes; or, 
metaphorically, it means that the weaver has to know, not only his technique, but also 
which are the colours, the shape and the purposes of the fabric that he is creating. 
The Socratic metaphor, however, is more focused on the perspective of the composer. A 
well-structured speech has different parts harmonised in a unity, as the parts of a living 
human body are harmonised. However, there is an implicit element in this metaphor, and 
it is probably the most important one. In fact, Socrates is talking about a living human 
body. The element that gives unity to this body cannot be the body itself – this would be 
a circular reasoning, but it is supposed to be the breath of life in the body that is the psyche 
(the soul). It might be deduced that speeches, as well as human bodies, have souls that 
guarantee harmonised unity. The liveliness of the speeches and their capability to respond 
is what makes them authentically philosophical. This assertion is still unclear at this stage, 
but it assumes a more clarity towards the end of this dissertation, with the progressive 
examination of other aspects of Plato’s criticism. 
These preliminary evaluations serve as a basis to argue that the single “thread” of the trial 
of writing participates in the unity of the dialogue’s “fabric” and they have to be read in 
connection. It is believed that there are many links between eros, maniai, rhetorike, 
destiny of souls, paideia, psychagoge and discovery of writing –to mention some of the 
main themes of the Phaedrus. The part of the Phaedrus in which the myth of the discovery 
 
19 Here it is alluded the dialectical movement of diairesis (division) and synagoge (collection) that is 
constantly recalled in the dialogue. Just to quote one explicative passage: 
Well, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be able to think and to 
speak and if I believe that someone else is capable of discerning a single thing that is also by nature capable 
of encompassing many, I follow “straight behind, in his tracks, as if he were a god.” God knows whether 
this is the right name for those who can do this correctly or not, but so far I have always called them 
“dialecticians.” (Phaedr. 266b-c). 
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of writing is laid out, namely the myth of Theuth, can now be read in a unifying 
perspective. 
Towards the end of the dialogue, Socrates recounts to Phaedrus the supposedly well-
known myth that attributes the discovery of writing to the Egyptian daimon Theuth.20 
Socrates heard about the Egyptian myth from someone else who heard it from some 
ancients that held it as truth. It means that there is not a valid epistemic source behind this 
myth; nevertheless, its value of truth is not diminished. In fact, Plato, in emphasising that 
the myth does not have a verifiable source, is not claiming that Socrates has to be trusted 
blindly, nor, he is giving a preeminent role to oral transmission of myths. Rather, it is 
possible that Plato is offering an interpretative key that is also a leitmotif of the dialogue: 
it is possible to use and rely on any source if there is constant awareness that what matters 
is neither the source in itself, nor the plot of the myth, but the capability of giving a 
“correct” account of it. For this reason, to justify and convince Phaedrus21 about this way 
of using myths, Socrates recalls another myth after the exposition of Theuth’s story: 
 
But, my friend, the priests of the temple of Zeus at Dodona say that the first prophecies were 
the words of an oak. Everyone who lived at that time, not being as wise as you young ones 
are today, found it rewarding enough in their simplicity to listen to an oak or even a stone, so 
long as it was telling the truth, while it seems to make a difference to you, Phaedrus, who is 
speaking and where he comes from. Why, though, don’t you just consider whether what he 
says is right or wrong? (Phaedr.275b-c) 
 
Hence, a platonic reader is warned – before and after the brief myth of Theuth – that a 
literal reading is not worthwhile.22 
Another interpretative element needs to be called into question at this juncture, regarding 
the role of opinion (doxa) in the process of gaining knowledge. If human beings could 
 
20 It is not graspable the reason for referring to an Egyptian myth, while there is a Greek version of it, which 
is the myth of Prometheus as inventor and spreader of writing amongst mortals. Cf. Aeschylus’ Prometheus 
Bound. Theuth appears also another time in Plato’s dialogues, cf. Phil. 18b. 
21 Phaedrus seems to suspect that Socrates is inventing the myth of Theuth: Socrates, you’re very good at 
making up stories from Egypt or wherever else you want! (Phaedr. 275b) 
22 This warning is actually quite similar to the one at the very beginning of the dialogue. When Socrates 
was referring to Phaedrus the myth of Borea, he made a distinction between some intellectuals who waste 
their time trying to rationalise the myths, and himself who believes the myth as they are spread. In fact, 
Socrates seems to be primarily concerned in knowing himself rather than criticise and dissect the myths. 
(Phaedr. 229c-230a) Cf. Griswold, 1996. 
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access truth straight-forwardly, they would not be interested anymore in the opinion of 
other human beings,23 because they would not need to undertake a quest for truth. This 
means that, in order to develop knowledge, it is valuable to trust ancient opinions and 
myths, even if it is not possible to verify their sources, or even if the sources are 
considered to be oaks and stones. The trust in any sort of account (opinions, myths, 
stories, metaphors etc.) is a preliminary requirement in order to be engaged in the quest 
for truth; but blind trust in logoi (discourses) is not enough. When the quest is undertaken, 
then the dialectical method24 will shed light on the right path towards knowledge.  
Seemingly, Plato suggests here relying on opinions and also on the myths referred to by 
Socrates, who, in turn, is playing the role of a rhetorician. In fact, he is tailoring a speech 
which should perfectly fit with Phaedrus’ soul for this occasion.25 
One, amongst the many, interesting aspects of this very short myth told by Socrates is 
that its plot is presented mainly as a dialogue within the dialogue – a frequent occurrence 
in Plato’s works. Plato, probably, believes that, in order to reach the core of the myth, it 
does not suffice to let Socrates simply talk about the discoveries by Theuth and their 
spreading through human beings. In fact, the dialectical expedient of representing a myth 
through “a dialogue within the dialogue” succeeds in displaying – by contrast – some 
determinant dualisms such as medicine/poison, remembering/reminding, 
opinion/wisdom and appearance/reality. 
The myth is actually a brief exchange between Theuth and Thamus, the Egyptians’ King. 
Theuth goes to visit Thamus at his court to show him seven technai (arts/techniques): 
number, calculation, geometry, astronomy, the game of chess, the game of dice, and, 
above all, writing that he himself discovered, and that, he believes, all Egyptians should 
learn. Thamus wants to know the use of each art of each specific art or technique. Then, 
the daimon and the King discuss for an extended period each art, and Thamus makes 
some appraisals as well as some criticisms of them. Socrates skips this whole discussion, 
 
23 Phaedr. 374b. 
24 Cf. note 19. 
25 Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul, whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know 
how many kinds of soul there are. Their number is so-and-so many; each is of such-and-such a sort; hence 
some people have such-and-such a character and others have such-and such. Those distinctions 
established, there are, in turn, so-and-so many kinds of speech, each of such-and-such a sort. People of 
such-and-such a character are easy to persuade by speeches of such-and-such a sort in connection with 
such-and-such an issue for this particular reason, while people of such-and-such another sort are difficult 
to persuade for those particular reasons. (Phaedr. 271d). 
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because it would require too much time to expose it all, and he just focuses on the 
technique of writing. This is the dialogical exchange between Theuth (who claims that 
writing will make Egyptians wiser and will improve their memory – in fact, he compares 
his invention to a potion [pharmakon] for memory and for wisdom); and Thamus who 
believe that Theuth, being the affectionate “father” of the discovery of writing, cannot be 
objective in judging his “son” and for this reason attributes to it positive effects. In fact, 
Thamus considers writing in this way:  
 
It will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using 
their memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and depends on 
signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, completely on their 
own. You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for reminding; you provide 
your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality. Your invention will enable 
them to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that they have 
come to know much while for the most part they will know nothing. And they will be difficult 
to get along with, since they will be wise only about opinions instead of really being wise. 
(Phaedr. 275a-b) 
 
The dialectical agon between Theuth and Thamus is played out mainly on the ground of 
memory. On one side, Theuth believes that writing is a healing medicine (pharmakon)26 
which improves memory, hence it improves also wisdom; on the other side, Thamus 
pinpoints that writing is a dangerous poison (pharmakon) which weakens memory, 
although it may help in reminding. 
This contrast is usually characterised by its striking contents. One, eventually, agrees 
more with the objections of the wise King; but behind the contents there is still something 
relevant that is worth noting. It seems, in fact, that in his statements about writing Thamus 
over-interprets the sense that Theuth attributes to his invention. Furthermore, the myth is 
 
26 The Greek word pharmakon which is a vox media (meaning at the same time medicine and also poison) 
recurs often in the dialogue: starting from the allegory in the myth of Borea (229c) to the metaphor of being 
convinced of going out of the city (229d) and ending up in the constant recalling in the myth of Theuth. Cf. 
also Derrida, 1981, pp. 65-75 and pp. 95-117. 
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concluded with those objections by Thamus, and it is not possible to know how Theuth 
would defend his “son”. 
Thamus argues as if writing were a mnemonic device. This criticism, however, does not 
apply to writing in its essence; in fact, in the oral tradition there were already many other 
devices and techniques for reminding. The originality of Theuth’s invention is that it can 
improve the ability to memorise and (hence) it can make the Egyptians wiser. The 
speciality of the invention is not that it should be used instead of other forms of 
transmitting knowledge, but that it can help to remember even more in terms of quantity, 
so consequently, it allows to know more, always in terms of quantity. Thamus instead 
goes over and beyond, imagining the extreme situation in which writing substitutes any 
other form of transmitting knowledge and thus wisdom would move from the valuable 
inside of the soul to the ephemeral exteriority of written traces. 
At stake here is not solely an opposition between reminding (hypomneme) and 
remembering (mneme), but clearly there is also an opposition between two ways of 
considering wisdom. The wisdom considered by Theuth is: the more you can remember, 
the wiser you are; instead, the wisdom for Thamus is: the deeper you can remember, the 
more your wisdom is valuable. Pharmakon (potion), mneme (memory) and sophia 
(wisdom) have different connotations if considered from Theuth’s perspective or from 
Thamus’ perspective. 
As shown, the critique of Thamus over-interprets Theuth’s invention and leads to an 
extreme hypothesis: writing would become a privileged mean of transmitting knowledge. 
In the dialectic relation that goes on in this myth, Thamus has to be drastic in order to 
show all the boundaries of the new discovery. Moreover, he has a formal responsibility 
toward the Egyptians that also explains why he foresees all possible consequences taken 
to their extremes. Thus, if on the one hand Theuth is simply a witty inventor who wants 
to persuade Thamus about the advantages of his discovery, on the other hand, Thamus 
appears conscious that those advantages hide many dangers beyond the mere technique 
of writing. In fact, through Thamus’ words it is possible to read not only a concern for 
the weakening of memory and knowledge, but also an implicit and bitter 
acknowledgement that, once discovered, the technique of writing will develop without 
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stopping – as in fact happened.27 Thamus seems to know that a technique is never 
innocent in itself, it is not only a vehicle for content. In fact, any new technology, while 
promising many improvements, contains also a contrary power like a medicine 
(pharmakon) that both cures and poisons at the same time. 
This acknowledgement should sound quite familiar nowadays: the constant invention and 
upgrade of new technologies, in a sense improves human skills, but at the same time 
modifies the way we relate to each other, the way we communicate, the way we interpret 
the world and thus the way we think.28 
On the basis of this myth, Socrates and Phaedrus carry out their own evaluations of the 
writing tool and Phaedrus eventually agrees with Socrates’ criticisms. In order to define 
the epistemological and psychological drawbacks of writing, Socrates associates the 
technique of writing with the realm of mimesis, more specifically he mentions the art of 
painting.29 A few paragraphs later, Socrates also associates the technique of writing with 
the function of rhythmic verses, namely the art of rhapsody.30 Firstly, written words as 
well as painted images stand silently in front of us and, if questioned, they are not able to 
answer. Furthermore, if a written speech is criticised, it would not be able to defend itself 
and it will always need to ask help from “its father” (the composer of the speech) who 
has to make its defence. Secondly, as rhythmic verses, written discourses cannot be taken 
seriously. As an evidence, the performances of rhapsodists aim only to persuade, and they 
cannot teach anything, because they are composed without discernment. 
The point that Socrates wants to assert in his criticism of the writing technique appears 
even clearer after these two comparisons between writing and painting, and writing and 
rhapsody: these are just tools which may help in remembering, but they are not alive, not 
responsible and most of all they are not fertile as the connected metaphor of the seeds 
points out.31 By contrast, the only valuable kind of speeches is the fertile one, the one that 
is able to write into the soul about what is right, beautiful and good.32 This is the idea of 
 
27 Ruth Finnegan discusses the related idea that a new media, once adopted, drives out older-established 
ones. She refers mainly to the polarity “orality/literacy”. Cf. Finnegan, 1988, pp. 142-143. 
28 For further evaluations on these themes cf. Gunkel, Marcondes Filho and Mersch, 2016. 
29 Phaedr. 275d-e. 
30 Phaedr. 277e-278b. 
31 Phaedr. 276b. 
32 Phaedr. 278b. 
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speech that is used as a righteous and comparative model in Socrates’ criticisms of 
writing. 
These last arguments aim to underline again the negative aspects of writing, but beyond 
this evident scope, it is interesting to note the recurrent and unfavourable association 
between painting and poetry in Plato’s dialogues, especially when it comes to the themes 
of education and care of the soul. 
At this stage of the study, it would suffice only to mention the main traits of the well-
known critique of arts in the Republic,33 as well as the critique of rhapsody in the Ion.34 
These themes are analysed further in the next chapter. 
The critique of painting and the critique of poetry in general terms, find their link in the 
same pivot: the issue of mimesis.35 Mimesis appears to be multifaceted in Plato’s works. 
It can be considered from different philosophical perspectives: from an epistemological 
point of view; an educative point of view; a psychological point of view; a poietic point 
of view. All these aspects are considered in Plato’s critique, but what really matters is the 
mechanism behind it. The mimetic mechanism always implies an imitative reproduction 
of something which stands first as an original model. This model is not a model and is 
not “original” until the mimesis comes into play to reproduce something that looks like it, 
but it is actually just a copy. 
Three determining features in this intuitive mechanism need to be underlined. As these 
features are relevant throughout this whole dissertation hence, it is useful to state them 
now. 
First, mimesis is presented as an imitative re-production strictly connected to the ontology 
of the image. This is clear even considering only the semantic area chosen by Plato when 
dealing with this issue.36 Furthermore, the element on which Plato insists is that the copy 
has to look like, or else, has to resemble the shape of the original. It can be a depicted 
image or a movement of an actor, or the explication of a concept, but it has to have a 
 
33 Resp. 373b-c; 377b-e; 603b-sgg. 
34 Cf. Ion, 535a-b. 
35 To retrace the use of this term in Plato’s Republic cf. Havelock, 1963, pp. 20-35; to retrace the history of 
the term from Plato to Gadamer, cf. Sallis, 2015; to retrace a complete history of the term in the field of 
Aesthetics from Plato to modernity, cf. Halliwell, 2002. 
36 To talk about the relation between the model and its copy Plato uses terms related to vision. The main 
conceptual couple referred to in this dissertation is eidos-eidolon which it is analysed in details in the Third 
Chapter. 
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visual shape. In fact, the terms used to talk about the things reproduced by mimesis refers 
mainly to the semantic area of appearance. 
Second, mimesis reproduces but does not produce. It means that what comes out from this 
mechanism is something unanimated that is dependent on the original model, in fact, it 
would not exist if not as a derivation of the original. This is also an aspect of the 
drawbacks of writing that Socrates points out: written speeches, as depicted images, 
cannot respond, they need someone to look after them as they are not responsive and 
responsible for themselves. 
Third, it is an evaluative aspect introduced by Plato who states that the copy which 
emerges from the mimetic reproduction is false, while the original is true. In addition, 
every stage of reproduction would augment the distance from the original and true model 
causing wider deceptive effects. 
To understand this last feature, it is advisable to compare the example of the bed and the 
table in Republic.37 At this point, it would suffice to recall only the introductory part of 
this example, which is the analogy of the mirror. 
This brief analogy allows to exemplify the three features just exposed:  
 
SOCRATES: Tell me, do you think that there’s no way any craftsman could make all these 
things, or that in one way he could and in another he couldn’t? Don’t you see that there is a 
way in which you yourself could make all of them? 
GLAUCON: What way is that? 
SOCRATES: It isn’t hard: you could do it quickly and in lots of places, especially if you 
were willing to carry a mirror with you, for that’s the quickest way of all. With it you can 
quickly make the sun, the things in the heavens, the earth, yourself, the other animals, 
manufactured items, plants, and everything else mentioned just now. 
GLAUCON: Yes, I could make them appear, but I couldn’t make the things themselves as 
they truly are. 
SOCRATES: Well put! You’ve extracted the point that’s crucial to the argument. I suppose 
that the painter too belongs to this class of makers, doesn’t he? 
 
37 Resp. 596b. 
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GLAUCON: Of course. But I suppose you’ll say that he doesn’t truly make the things he 
makes. 
SOCRATES: Yet, in a certain way, the painter does make a bed, doesn’t he? 
GLAUCON: Yes, he makes the appearance of one. 
SOCRATES:  What about the carpenter? Didn’t you just say that he doesn’t make the Form 
– which is our term for the being of a bed – but only a bed? 
GLAUCON: Yes, I did say that. 
SOCRATES: Now, if he doesn’t make the being of a bed, he isn’t making that which is, but 
something which is like that which is, but is not it. So, if someone were to say that the work 
of a carpenter or any other craftsman is completely that which is, wouldn’t he risk saying 
what isn’t true? 
GLAUCON: That, at least, would be the opinion of those who busy themselves with 
arguments of this sort. 
SOCRATES: Then let’s not be surprised if the carpenter’s bed, too, turns out to be a 
somewhat dark affair in comparison to the true one. (Resp. 596d-597a) 
 
The centrality of the visual image is explicit in this comparison: the mirror can make 
everything, but only the images of everything. In fact, as Glaucon points out: the mirror 
can make things appear, but they are not real, they are not alive. Lastly, the appearance 
of things is so deceptive and negative that even a carpenter can be considered as someone 
who is involved in a “dark affair.” 
The theme of mimesis and its link with the arts, is going to be set aside temporarily, and 
it will be developed further in the Second and Third Chapter. This discussion in fact, for 
now, would distance the dissertation from the issue of the critique of writing. However, 
it has been relevant to recall it in this context, in virtue of its strong impact on the 
arguments against writing developed by Socrates. 
Still, before moving on, it is worthwhile to show two different kinds of approaches that 
have arisen around the issue of art and mimesis in the Phaedrus. On the one side, there is 
an approach similar to the one just adopted, which tends to connect the critique of mimetic 
images in the Phaedrus to the critique of mimesis in the Republic. On the other side, there 
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is an approach that denies any link between the critique of mimetic images in the 
Phaedrus and the critique of mimesis.  
The first side can be considered the reading Derrida offers in his Plato’s Pharmacy. 
Derrida throughout his work establishes a link between the deception caused by the 
mimetic image and the deception of writing in Plato’s works. His focus is mainly on the 
critique of writing in the Phaedrus, but when the theme of mimesis comes up, he mainly 
refers to the Republic. Derrida uses as arguments against writing the same three features 
of mimesis just outlined, which are easy to detect in Plato’s critique of the Arts. He notices 
that the original kernel of Socrates’ arguments against writing is that this is not a good 
techne since it is not able to produce something alive, but it just re-produces. Furthermore, 
it reproduces something far from the eidos of the aletheia (the shape of truth).38 Based on 
these reasons, Derrida states that writing and painting are related; in fact, the images that 
they represent are mere simulacra, stubbornly mute.39 In line with his original reading of 
the Phaedrus, Derrida offers another element of connection between writing and painting 
that is the use of the term pharmaka in the Republic and the polyvocal use of the term 
pharmakon in the Phaedrus. In the Republic, the term pharmaka means the colours of the 
painter,40 while in the Phaedrus, writing itself is considered to be a pharmakon – it has 
been already shown the ambiguous meaning of this vox media in the Egyptian myth of 
the discovery of writing recalled by Socrates. 
This last evidence offered by Derrida strengthens his general point on the value of 
mimesis in Plato: any mimetic art is negative because it is far removed from the truth. 
Derrida discusses the theme of artistic mimesis as he believes that the mechanism behind 
it is applicable as well to writing, with the aggravating circumstance that “the written 
word gives itself as the image of the speech.”41 Eventually, this mimetic mechanism is so 
well accomplished that it disappears: 
 
A perfect imitation is no longer an imitation. If one eliminates the tiny difference that, in 
separating the imitator from the imitated, by that very fact refers to it, one would render the 
 
38 Derrida, 1981, 134-135. 
39 Ivi, 136. 
40 Resp. 420c. 
41 Derrida, 1981, p. 137. 
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imitator absolutely different: the imitator would become another being no longer referring to 
the imitated.42 
 
In Derrida’s account of the Phaedrus, this is the main charge against the written word: 
firstly, it imitates the original, but then it substitutes itself the original. The reason for 
involving Derrida’s reflection on mimetic arts in the Phaedrus is to show that there is an 
actual link between arts and writing in Plato’s work. This link is the mimetic mechanism. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that there is no reason to establish a link between 
the critique of writing and the critique of mimetic images (painting and poetry) in Plato’s 
work. 
Franco Trabattoni holds that the theme of mimesis is not discussed at all in the Phaedrus.43 
As a matter of fact, the main charge that Socrates formulates against written speeches 
concerns their immobility and their incapability of responding. The pre-eminence of this 
charge finds evidence not only in the Phaedrus about written words,44 but also in other 
platonic passages in which this same charge is reiterated and not linked with the theme of 
mimesis.45 
The reasons for sustaining such a position are strong. In fact, Trabattoni rejects the 
mimetic mechanism because it would exacerbate the polarisation between oral speech 
and written speech; while he wants to argue that this polarity is inessential. Stating that 
writing resembles the mimetic mechanism of the Arts, it could imply the simplistic 
equivalence that oral speech is the original, while written speech is a copy. 
Trabattoni’s wariness in avoiding that simplistic equivalence is well-founded,46 but it 
does not necessarily mean that the theme of mimesis has no place in the Phaedrus. Indeed, 
Trabattoni’s position on the dichotomy orality/writing is one of the favoured 
interpretations in this dissertation, since he demonstrates that the opposition between oral 
speech and written speech is a misleading one, which obscures a more determining issue 
 
42 Ivi, p. 139. In the footnote, Derrida recalls the passage 432b-c from the Cratylus. 
43 Trabattoni, 1993, p. 31 cf. in particular note 74. 
44 Phaedr. 275d. 
45 Cf. Prot. 329a-b; VII Ep. 341d. 
46 As an evidence, Thomas Szlezák interprets the critique of writing in the Phaedrus as if Plato argues that 
written speech is simply a copy, or an image, of the oral speech; hence, it is less valuable when measured 
to the oral exchange. Cf. Szlezák, 1999, p. 30. 
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for Plato: the role of persuasion, in any kind of speech. Nevertheless, it does not seem 
possible to deny the relevance of the theme of mimesis in the Phaedrus. 
Just to give one, incisive example, mimesis is intentionally performed by Phaedrus 
reading Lysias’ speech at the very beginning of the dialogue. Phaedrus originally wanted 
to perform the speech trusting in memory, but when Socrates notices Phaedrus hiding the 
written version of the speech by Lysias under his cloak, he wants him to read it. This is a 
kaleidoscopic mimesis that can be understood following the mimetic model traced by 
Derrida: the written speech (re-enacted orally) is a copy and hence a substitution of the 
original oral speech by Lysias, who probably first wrote the speech and then performed 
it orally. It is difficult to determine here whether the written speech or the oral speech 
comes first, and this would partially support Trabattoni’s position, but it is not enough to 
deny the relevance of mimesis in the dialogue. 
Mimesis is a determining theme of the Phaedrus, its relevance takes part mainly in the 
relation between oral speech and written speech; but this same relevance has to be limited 
to the role of its mechanism (re-producing) and not to its content (oral is not the original 
as written is not the copy). If there is a polarisation it is not between oral speech and 
written speech, but between production of speeches (dialectic) and reproduction of 
speeches (mimesis). 
 
1.2. “If the author really cares about, this book does not contain his best 
thoughts.”47 
The other platonic passage, in which writing is criticised, is in the Seventh Letter (324a-
344d). This platonic testimony against writing has often appeared controversial to many 
interpreters. In fact, the main statement against writing is a linking passage between the 
first part of the letter, in which Plato narrates some personal events, and the second part 
of the letter, in which Plato outlines a general theory about human knowledge. The fact 
that personal events and rigorous philosophical reflections are bound together in the same 
letter has raised some suspicions about the authenticity of the letter itself. The two parts 
have, in fact, different styles and at first glance, their continuity can be questioned. A 
 
47 VII Ep. 344c. 
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deeper assessment may show, instead, that the biographical elements are themselves 
philosophically relevant, as well as the philosophical section being based on 
autobiographical beliefs. However, this does not suffice to drive away the doubts about 
the authenticity of the letter. 
A discussion about the authenticity of the Seventh Letter is not at stake in this study and 
it can be avoided, not only because it has been analysed much more and much better than 
it can be repeated here; but also because it is almost fruitless to question its authenticity 
or not, while it has been studied and integrated for centuries into platonic hermeneutics, 
such that it has become an essential part of the reflection upon Plato’s philosophy and its 
reception. The Seventh Letter, authentic or not, is part of our hermeneutic horizon.48 
Nevertheless, it is not possible to disregard the debate around the authenticity of the letter 
with such ease, at least, not in a study that deals with the issue of orality/writing in Plato. 
In fact, nodding silently in favour of the authenticity of the letter, it could be read as an 
indirect assistance to the determined position of those interpreters who consider the 
Seventh Letter not only authentic, but the most authentic text by Plato. These interpreters, 
supporters of the existence of Unwritten Doctrines through which Plato transmitted his 
real philosophical thoughts, consider the Seven Letter the most important evidence of 
their theory. They sustain that Plato in the letter clearly exposes his rejection of writing 
and, supposedly, also affirms the existence and the superiority of his Unwritten 
Doctrines.49 Hence, it is necessary to specify here that there are good reasons to believe 
that the Seventh Letter is authentic,50 but these reasons do not necessarily imply that there 
were esoteric, oral teachings that Plato held only for a few, elitist students. This thesis 
will be considered and examined in the next section. 
As a matter of fact, the passage about the critique of writing, whose style and terminology 
are more technical and scholastic, if compared to the rest of the letter, can be considered 
 
48 On the value and impact of philosophical, epistolary writing in Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, cf. 
some remarks by Mathilde Cambron-Goulet in Scodel, R. ed. by, 2014, pp. 148-175. 
49 This is the general position of the Tübingen School. 
50 The letter has to be dated after the death of Dion, 353 BCE and, in fact, following stylometric parameters 
and analysing its contents, the Seventh Letter is well integrated with the later works by Plato such as Laws. 
Cf. Adorno, 2008, pp. 235-240 and Ross, 1951, pp. 139-141. Nowadays the majority of the interpreters 
considers it authentic with few exceptions, cf. Trabattoni, 1993, note 1, p. 200. 
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an independent epistemological excursus about the nature of knowledge.51 Nevertheless, 
it is not possible to dissect the letter and simply extrapolate this passage as an independent 
platonic (or pseudo-platonic) theory of knowledge. In fact, it is evident from the letter 
that Plato is not concerned with tracing a theory of knowledge for its own sake; he is 
rather focused on how to transmit true knowledge. The concern about the transmission of 
knowledge is related to the critique of writing as a method of transmitting knowledge and, 
in its turn, the critique of writing is related also to some events contingent to Plato’s 
political-pedagogical mission in Syracuse narrated in the letter. 
The detailed autobiographical elements on Plato’s journeys in Syracuse may sound like a 
chronicle about personal frustrations and also like an excusatio non petita for the failure 
of his pedagogical-political project. However, nobody should rush to conclusions about 
the poor philosophical value of these autobiographical accounts. 
It is undeniable that the critique of writing and the connected theory of knowledge are so 
poignant here that they seem to be the central issues of the letter. Consequently, the 
autobiographical elements of the letter may appear almost as a narrative frame, or else as 
a personal defence. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that the references that Plato makes 
to writing, in the letter, are completely contingent on the personal events that he is 
narrating, and if there is but one central philosophical issue in the letter, it is to proclaim 
how difficult and demanding is the philosophical path. This is something that Plato 
experienced himself as a pupil, later as a teacher, and also as a citizen with a political 
view. 
In the Seventh Letter, Plato wrote that he would never write anything about his 
philosophy because: 
 
For this knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; but after 
long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the object, suddenly, 
like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightway nourishes 
itself. (VII Ep. 342c) 
 
51 Hans-Georg Gadamer conjectures that this epistemological excursus can be a kind of institutionalised 
introduction that Plato was used of making beforehand to the students in his Academia. This would explain 
the technical and scholastic style of it. Cf. Gadamer, 1993, p. 115. 
It is important to specify that Gadamer’s interpretation of the letter excludes that Plato refers to any esoteric 
theory. Gadamer simply suggests that the excursus can be a sort of formula or usual exemplifying teaching 
made by Plato in the Academia, a teaching that is coherent with some epistemological evaluations that can 
be also found in other dialogues of the same period. Cf. Gadamer, 1980, p. 97, note 10 and p. 98. 
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In fact, he never wrote treatises nor made any clear statement on his own philosophical 
insights, as did his pupil and new Syracuse’s Tyrant, the Young Dionysius. The reason 
why in the Seventh Letter Plato refers to the practise of writing philosophical content is 
that Dionysius and some unknown scholars besides wrote a few philosophical books 
based on what they heard about Plato’s teachings. This is, claims Plato, the utmost 
evidence that Dionysus has not the right attitude for philosophy, because he is sure to 
have already had enough knowledge about many philosophical issues so as to avoid 
Plato’s further teachings and so as to write an approximate book on these.52 
Plato takes distance from the content of these books for two kinds of reason. First, the 
implicit but evident kind of reason: he does not want to be associated with the 
philosophical ideas and political behaviour of Dionysius; hence, he declines any 
responsibility for the way in which Dionysus interprets Plato’s teaching. Second, the 
explicit and more essential kind of reason: Plato has a deep motivation for not considering 
it possible to write on the questions about which he cares and this is intrinsically related 
to its conception of the nature of human knowledge.53 
The first genre of reasons can be left aside, as what has been said for the moment suffices 
to understand why Plato wants to take distance from those books. The discussion about 
this point will return later under another perspective, concerning the relation between 
responsibility and mimesis. 
About the second genre of reasons, it is worth starting from the evidence that there are 
things about which Plato is concerned, or better, there are questions about which he really 
cares.54 These questions cannot be written down by anybody. If it had been possible to 
write them, says Plato, he would have spent his entire life writing about them. Hence, no 
one who has written down these problems has understood them.  
It cannot be concluded that by this, Plato means that these problems are secrets to be 
revealed only orally. In fact, their inexpressibility depends on the way human knowledge 
is articulated and transmitted; it does not depend on their content. There is no essential 
 
52 VII Ep. 341a-b. 
53 VII Ep. 342a. 
54 VII Ep. 341c. 
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philosophical truth that can be written systematically, nor systematically expressed orally, 
because human logoi are weak as Plato declares in the epistemological excursus. 
The epistemological excursus, systematically written by Plato, is a teaching he admits to 
have already expounded orally many times. According to this platonic teaching, any 
object of knowledge has three features that make knowing it possible: name (onoma), 
logos and image (eidolon). Through these three features, someone can actualise the 
knowledge of the object (episteme). Episteme is the fourth element of the knowing 
process; it does not pertain to the object, but to the soul of the subject who is knowing. 
Fifth and last, comes the object of knowledge in itself, “the truly real being” (nous). The 
fifth element of knowledge does not follow spontaneously after the fourth, or better, it 
could, but its spontaneity is not guaranteed, it is sudden and it requires an intense 
philosophical activity. The captivating metaphor of the light flashing before a fire, 
recalled above, gives an image of how the nous can be reached. Furthermore, once 
reached, it is difficult to communicate this nous because of the weakness of the logoi. 
The weakness of the logoi is a determinant stigmatization in this excursus, but its 
relevance is clearly stated although it is left unexplained. Hence, a first question may be 
raised: why are the logoi weak and how does this affect knowledge? While a second 
question may be: why is only the logos, within the other elements of knowledge, 
considered weak? 
In finding an answer to the first question, it has to be noticed that here the term logos has 
not been translated intentionally. This term can have polyvocal meanings (such as word, 
language, discourse, reason, etc.). In this context, it may work to translate it as 
“definition”. In fact, Plato, in this letter, refers to it as a “composition of name and 
verb”.55The weakness of logos seems to depend on the approximate delimitation that 
occurs in the composition of names and verbs. Every definition is, in fact, a delimitation, 
which at the same time explains better and excludes more. This finds confirmation in the 
frustrating Socratic practise of asking “What is it?”  identifiable in the early platonic 
dialogues. As known, this latter definitional question is destined not to be answered 
precisely.56 It can stimulate further philosophical investigations but it cannot be answered 
because of the same weakness of the logoi. The logos has its weakness in its strength 
 
55 VII Ep. 342b. 
56 Cf. Fronterotta, 2001, pp. 33-39, 47-56. 
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since, in effect, any attempt to define will try to catch the essence, but will miss it because 
it cannot be delimited by words. 
There is a very clear comparison that Plato uses in the Seventh Letter to exemplify the 
process of knowledge. This is the comparison of the circle. This example is not repeated 
here, but it is possible to say that trying to catch the essence of an object of knowledge 
with the logos is like trying to square a circle.57  
What has already been said is enough to understand both why logoi are weak and why 
Plato would have never written the content of his philosophy: 
 
These things, moreover, because of the weakness of logoi, are just as much concerned with 
making clear the particular property of each object as the being of it. On this account no 
sensible man will venture to express his deepest thoughts in words, especially in a form which 
is unchangeable, as is true of written outlines. (VII Ep. 342e-343a) 
 
This conscious and motivated criticism about written words recalls also some aspects of 
the criticism in the Phaedrus, as pointed out earlier, mainly the fact that written words 
are immobile. But this kind of criticism still involves the problematic presence (or 
absence) of the mimetic mechanism. This issue about mimesis will be considered after 
trying to answer the second question raised above about the reason of the exclusive 
weakness of the logos. 
Concerning the weakness of the logos, it is worth considering the detailed reading of the 
Seventh Letter by Hans-Georg Gadamer.58 Gadamer points to the exclusive weakness of 
the logos in the letter, but he believes that this peculiarity of logos affects also the other 
elements involved in the process of knowledge (name, image, episteme) which aim to 
 
57 This same image is recalled also by Gadamer, cf. Gadamer, 1980, p. 106. Plato himself seems to suggest 
this equivalence: Every circle that we make or draw in common life is full of characteristics that contradict 
the “fifth,” for it everywhere touches a straight line, while the circle itself, we say, has in it not the slightest 
element belonging to a contrary nature. And we say that their names are by no means fixed; there is no 
reason why what we call “circles” might not be called “straight lines,” and the straight lines “circles,” 
and their natures will be none the less fixed despite this exchange of names. Indeed the same thing is true 
of the definition: since it is a combination of nouns and verbs, there is nothing surely fixed about it. (VII 
Ep. 343b) 
58 Cf. Gadamer, 1980, pp. 93-123. 
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reach the fifth (nous). The weakness of the logoi is, in general terms, the weakness of 
human knowledge itself: 
 
Plato leaves no doubt that even knowledge of the ideas, although it cannot merely be derived 
from language and words, is still not to be attained without them [the logoi] (Cratylus 433 a, 
438 b). The weakness of the logoi, which is the weakness of all four, is precisely the weakness 
of our intellect itself which depends upon them.59 
 
The sense of this statement becomes clearer when realising that Gadamer believes that 
the theory of knowledge in the Seventh Letter is indeed a theory of communication (of 
knowledge). Plato is not interested in defining a theory of knowledge for the sake of itself, 
but he is certainly concerned with how his teaching has been received and divulged. 
Under this perspective should be read also the connection that, in the quotation above, 
Gadamer establishes with the passages of the Cratylus60 where the necessity of the logoi 
is one with the necessity of learning and communicating them correctly. The Gadamerian 
interpretation confirms the hypothesis that the autobiographical section and the 
epistemological excursus of the letter are closely connected. The failure of the political 
mission in Syracuse is also the failure of the communication of philosophical teachings 
to Dionysius. This failure is two-sided as the relation between teacher and pupil is. In 
fact, the teacher fails also because of the philosophical indisposition of the pupil.61 This 
reinforces the belief that the Seventh Letter is an exceptional testimony about the 
difficulties of the philosophical path, a path that needs a guide but also a pupil honestly 
willing to be guided. Furthermore, the major challenge on the philosophical path is about 
the frustration and the incompleteness of each step and this depends, as said, on the nature 
of human knowledge, hence on the special status of the human soul. 
The soul plays a defining role in the theory of knowledge, but its relevance is not 
immediately graspable. A more detailed exploration of the elements of the 
epistemological excursus is necessary to understand both how the weakness of one 
 
59 Ivi, p. 105. 
60 Crat. 433a, 438b. 
61 The feeling of being defeated that comes out of this biographic story should sound quite familiar if 
compared to the relation between Socrates and Alcibiades. Cf. the entire Alciabiades I, Symp. 213e-222c; 
for an historical account of this relation cf. Plutarch, Life of Alcibiades, and De Romilly, 1997. 
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element – the logos – affects the other elements and the role that the soul has in this 
process.62 
The five elements in the theory of knowledge are listed one after one as if they are in a 
hierarchical structure. In a certain sense, they are hierarchical, as much as the weakness 
of the logoi can allow Plato to build a hierarchy. It is possible to see two nuances in this 
hierarchy: one is the temporal order of the elements; another one is the qualitative order 
of the elements. 
Starting from the consideration of the temporal order, it is necessary to presume that this 
succession of elements works only if this theory is considered as a theory of 
communication of knowledge and not as a theory of knowledge itself – as argued earlier. 
When one wants to communicate knowledge, this supposes that there is, on the other side 
of the knowing process, someone learning who is following the same passages. All 
knowledge about the object of knowledge is communicated starting from the name of the 
object, and then it will be given a definition of the object and also an image of it. After 
the communication of the elements related to the object, will come the fourth element, 
the episteme, which is a self-elaboration of the previous three by a subject (the one who 
is learning). Last comes the nous, the perception of the thing itself, the fifth element 
“which after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the 
object, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and 
straightway nourishes itself.”63  
In regard to the qualitative order of the elements, it may be said that there are three levels 
in the hierarchy. At the first level, can be placed the name, the logos and the image which 
pertain to the object of knowledge. At the second level, there is the act of knowing these 
three features by a human soul. At the third and last level comes, eventually, the 
perception of the thing in itself. Paradoxically one needs the first step to reach the last 
 
62 Gadamer considers that the weakness of the logoi is the weakness of all the four elements (name, logos, 
image, knowledge), but in his view the weakness of the knowledge realised by the soul has a peculiar status 
because it depends on the features and on the philosophical disposition of every single soul (Gadamer, 
1980, p.112). While Trabattoni disagrees on this interpretation by Gadamer, Trabattoni rather considers 
that the weakness of the soul depends on its interrelation with the name, logos and image which are weak 
themselves. Trabattoni holds that the fourth is the subjective reflection of the three elements of the object 
and this is why the fourth is weak too (Trabattoni, 1993, pp. 207-208). In this place I agree with Trabattoni’s 
interpretation, even if the singularity and the philosophical disposition of the souls has a decisive role in 
the Seventh Letter. Unfortunately, a discussion about the role of the soul in the process of knowledge, does 
not find space in this dissertation. 
63 VII Ep. 342c. 
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one, but the fulfilment of the last level is impeded by the persistence of the elements in 
the first level. 
The differences amongst these three levels are glaring and the distance between one and 
another level appears to be a huge gap in as much as the task of fully knowing something 
seems an impossible one.64 The first level has to do with the contingency of an object of 
knowledge and its definition (name, logos, image). On the second level, there is the 
immaterial elaboration of these elements by a soul whose structure should be receptive of 
logoi and transform them into knowledge (episteme). Last, there is the thing itself (nous), 
the ungraspable essence of the object of knowledge for what it is. It is something that 
transcends a particular soul, but at the same time can be grasped only by a soul; as well 
as something that has nothing to do with any contingency, but at the same time, the access 
to it originates with a contingent object of knowledge. 
The special status of the soul, in the process of knowledge, is to be an intermediate 
between the perceivable object and the object in itself. The transition can be possible only 
through the catalysing effect of the soul that has to reflect subjectively the structure of the 
first level and convert it into knowledge. This explains more about the weakness of the 
logoi, as in fact the first and the second levels represent a tragic blend of failure and 
necessity in the act of defining. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the last level is 
unachievable because of the failure of the previous levels. Indeed, Plato has never argued 
that knowledge is impossible; rather, it is difficult to grasp and it is not definitional, but 
it shines forth eventually, in such circumstances: 
 
By the repeated use of all these instruments [the four elements of knowledge], ascending and 
descending to each in turn, it is barely possible for knowledge to be engendered of an object 
naturally good, in a man naturally good; but if his nature is defective, as is that of most men, 
for the acquisition of knowledge and the so-called virtues, and if the qualities he has have 
been corrupted, then not even Lynceus could make such a man see. (VII Ep. 343e-344a) 
 
 
64 Franco Trabattoni compares fruitfully some peculiarities of this theory of knowledge both with the 
famous statement by Gorgias about the incommunicability of knowledge and with Protagoras’ 
acknowledgement about the difficulties of turning the contingent traits of an object into properties of a 
subject. Cf. Trabattoni, 1999, p. 110. 
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For the process of knowledge, the natural disposition of a soul seems as determinant as 
the will for engaging in the philosophical enterprise. Moreover, the special intermediate 
status of the soul manifests another aspect that finds its strength in the long-continued 
intercourse between teacher and pupil. This is the vitality of the soul, which clashes with 
the immobility and the silence of logos. Anything possessing a soul is alive; hence, it is 
able to respond and to be responsible for itself. The responsiveness of the soul shows its 
strength in the dialectical relation between teacher and pupil. In fact, a good philosophical 
relation is alive and productive: it produces true knowledge that keeps on disseminating 
its life. To use the famous metaphor of the Seventh Letter, true knowledge is like the light 
flashing from a fire when kindled; it is lively and sheds itself. This is the complete 
opposite of cold, mute and immobile words either written or orally performed. 
At this stage, it should be clear that this critique of writing does not mean that anybody 
can write about Plato’s thoughts (as indeed is happening here in this dissertation), nor that 
there are secret teachings that can be expounded only orally. An oral explanation, as well 
as a written account, have the same boundaries65 mainly caused by the weakness of logos 
that consists in defining without grasping the object of knowledge itself. The soul would 
be able to grasp the thing itself, but before reaching it, the soul needs logoi. Logos is 
necessary to know an object, but somehow it immobilises the liveliness of the object itself 
and this inhibits the lively soul reaching that nous. 
The exploration of this epistemological excursus is not taken further, as the main scope 
is to understand better the sense of the critique of writing in the Seventh Letter. The 
specific problem about writing is that it exacerbates the weakness of the logoi. The failure 
of the definition becomes over-exposed when it presents itself in the immobile shape of 
written outlines. 
The problem here is even more complex because, beyond its incontestable philosophical 
value, the critique of writing in the Seventh Letter is related to the particular event of 
Dionysius, and some scholars at his court, writing some books about Plato’s philosophy. 
In this problem, can be seen certain aspects of the articulated issue of mimesis. Clearly, 
the knot that binds the critique of writing and the communicability of knowledge is not 
that Dionysius wrote a book; but that he wrote a book on what he presumed to have 
 
65 Cf. Isnardi Parente, 1970, pp. 152-154. 
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learned from Plato’s philosophy and that he presents those contents as his own 
philosophy. There are at least three negative aspects in this episode. First, Dionysius 
assumed to have understood Plato’s philosophy, while he did not because of his lack of 
persistence in the effort that the philosophical path requires. Second, Dionysius wrote a 
book based on Plato’s teachings or better on what he supposedly heard and understood 
about Plato’s teachings. Third, Dionysius (as other unknown scholars did) presented the 
concepts of the book as his own philosophical ideas. 
In regard to this episode, Plato exposes his definite and ultimate opposition to the act of 
writing philosophical concepts: 
 
So much at least I can affirm with confidence about any who have written or propose to write 
on these problems, pretending to a knowledge of the questions about which I care, whether 
they claim to have learned from me or from others or to have made their discoveries for 
themselves: it is impossible, in my opinion, that they can have learned anything at all about 
the subject. There is no writing of mine about these questions, nor will there ever be one. (VII 
Ep. 341b-c) 
 
If one is writing about these questions, one is automatically demonstrating that one did 
not understand them.  
The theory of (communication of) knowledge that follows next in the letter, serves to 
explain why it is impossible to divulge to a multitude the questions about which Plato 
cares. True knowledge is hard to communicate and to be received; furthermore, it requires 
philosophically disposed souls, seriously engaged in the philosophical enterprise.  
It seems that a soul such as that of Dionysius cannot express any philosophical concept. 
He would be able to reproduce contents heard superficially by someone else and repeated 
without any awareness of the effort of getting to know something. Dionysius can 
reproduce a philosophical thought, but he cannot produce an authentic philosophical 
(dia)logos. Once again, behind this critique it is possible to glimpse the same mimetic 
mechanism explored earlier regarding the Phaedrus.  
It has been already pointed out that the critiques of writing in the Phaedrus and in the 
Seventh Letter have a same pivot, namely the mutism of written words, hence their 
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immobility and incapability to reply. Now it is possible to step forward and to make 
explicit something more that is disguised through metaphors and allusions. First, the 
anthropomorphism or even the animism of the logoi.66 Then, the “dialectic of the image” 
in which logoi are trapped.67 
The animism, in general terms, means that true logoi are alive and can transmit life, they 
are productive and they are displayed in a dialectical relation; while false logoi are half-
dead, they are reproduced and they are not able to reply. In this latter case can be 
recognised the case of written logoi. The range of this metaphor becomes wider when it 
refers to responsibility and responsiveness of the logoi. In fact, to say that logoi are alive 
means that they have a soul, this soul and this life that inhabit true logoi allude to the fact 
that there must be a generator, a father who gave life to them. The (exclusively male) 
anthropomorphism involved in these metaphors implies that if the logos (the son) cannot 
answer independently, then its father has to respond and be responsible for it. Only in 
regard to this aspect there is, if someone wants to find one, the superiority of oral 
exchange, that is the fact that the voice is alive and its bearer is alive, hence he must 
always be together with its logoi, so that they are never orphans as written logoi are. 
Going back to the Seventh Letter it is legitimate to ask now: who is the father of the logoi 
in the books written by Dionysius and by those unknown scholars? The harsh distance 
that Plato takes from them is also saying that he is not responsible (he is not the father) 
of them. The philosophical superficiality with which Dionysius has reproduced those 
logoi makes him unable to respond for them. Besides, Dionysius’ logoi, meshed in the 
reproduction of reproduction, are closer to death than life. Those scholars who believed 
it possible to write, to immobilise, to devitalise the questions about which Plato cares, 
cannot respond for these logoi since they almost killed them. It seems that these logoi 
about Plato’s philosophy are illegitimate, orphan and sterile. Nobody can really claim 
their paternity and even if there is still some trace of life in them, they cannot kindle any 
fire. 
As with the Phaedrus, in the Seventh Letter the paradigm of the image has a determinant 
role, but here it is mainly connected with the epistemological excursus. In the Phaedrus, 
 
66 These terms and the general approach to the metaphor come from the essay Plato’s Pharmacy by Jacques 
Derrida, in particular cf. Derrida, 1981, p. 143. The discourse about the responsiveness and liveness of the 
logoi is further analysed in the Third Chapter. 
67 Cf. Gadamer, 1980, p. 112. 
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the connection depends on the immobility of written words which is the same kind of 
immobility as that of painted images. In the Seventh Letter, this connection is not as 
explicit as it is in the Phaedrus. Earlier it has been argued, coherently with the 
interpretation by Gadamer, that the weakness of the logoi is, in truth, the weakness of all 
four elements of knowledge. It may seem circular reasoning if from this premise it follows 
that all four means are trapped in the dialectic of the image.68 Still, Gadamer does so when 
he implies that the dialectic of the image is the key of the entire excursus:  
 
All four means are trapped in the dialectic of the image or copy, for insofar as all four are 
intended to present the thing in and through themselves they must of necessity have a reality 
of their own. That which is meant to present something cannot be that thing. It lies in the 
nature of the means of knowing that in order to be means they must have something 
inessential about them. This, according to Plato, is the source of our error, for we are always 
misled into taking that which is inessential for something essential.69 
 
This statement by Gadamer is definitely adequate and coherent with the previous 
evaluations. However, it must be specified what “image” (eidolon) means here. Image is 
the second element listed by Plato in the process of knowledge described in the Seventh 
Letter. It could be said that is a deictic moment of the process of knowledge. It means that 
the image of an object of knowledge is this concrete thing that can be pointed to and it 
allows one to say: “X is this thing that I am pointing to and that you can see yourself – 
without any more definitional effort”. This image is true, real, but partial because while 
it shows the thing, at the meantime it hides the thing in itself (eidos). It is correct to say 
that this image that can be pointed to, is inessential, but at the same time, we cannot avoid 
it because it is all we can see. Human beings cannot see the essence, the eidos of the 
object, they can only see the copy, the eidolon. 
The sense to which Gadamer refers in the dialectic of the image is more generic and 
transcends the particular deictic moment of the excursus. Gadamer refers to the general 
mechanism of human epistemology about which essences (eide) are knowable only 
through appearances (eidola). This is true of every means we have to know, hence it is 
 
68 Ibidem.  
69 Gadamer, 1980, pp. 112-113. 
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applicable and it is valid for the entire epistemological excursus. Once again, it is the 
mechanism that has to be considered and not its mere content. 
Therefore, there is no circularity in saying that the weakness of the logoi is the weakness 
of all four elements and that, at the same time, the dialectic of the image (dialectic between 
eidos and eidolon) traps all four elements. To reinforce the sense of this thinking it is 
worth quoting a celebrated passage from the Phaedo: 
 
When I had wearied of investigating things, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the 
experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless 
they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed my mind, 
and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and 
tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in logoi and 
investigate the truth of things by means of words. However, perhaps this analogy is 
inadequate, for I certainly do not admit that one who investigates things by means of words 
is dealing with images any more than one who looks at facts (Phaed. 99e-100a). 
 
Logoi are a place in which human beings can take refuge and can evade the trapping 
dialectic of the image. Thanks to the logoi it is possible to give a limited account of what 
we try to know, it is possible to walk on the philosophical path, and it is possible to fail 
on it and start over again. At least, logoi give the chance to move, to evolve from the 
immobility of every eidolon toward the ungraspable eidos. However, dealing with logoi 
does not mean that the dialectic of the image is overcome and left apart. In fact, any 
definition (logos) is itself an eidolon met on the way toward the nous. 
The dialectic of the image is a central paradigm in Plato’s works and it will be shown 
later that its relevance plays a determinant role in the critiques of writing and orality as 
well. 
 
1.3. “If a man has nothing more valuable than what he has composed or 
written”70 
 
70 Phaedr.278d. 
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The first two sections of this chapter dealt, respectively, with the critique of writing in the 
Phaedrus and the critique of writing in the Seventh Letter. The reason for giving the 
greatest relevance to these two passages is that these are the only ones known in which 
Plato exposes directly his critique of writing. For this same reason, some interpreters 
consider these passages the most valuable evidence in favour of the supremacy of orality 
over writing in Plato’s philosophy. 
Stating that these two passages are the most valuable, because they come directly from 
Plato’s works, suggests that there is also other indirect evidence for the supremacy of 
orality over writing in Plato’s philosophy. There are, in fact, different testimonies to 
support this position. These indirect testimonies derive from some of Plato’s disciples and 
interpreters. Within the indirect testimonies, it would be functional to distinguish 
between: A. ancient evidence; B. contemporary interpretations. 
As ancient evidence, critics mean: A.1) passages from ancient works written by authors 
who were contemporary or relatively posterior to Plato; A.2) some obscurities that Plato 
seems to have intentionally left in his works. A few of those passages are going to be 
mentioned here in order of relevance. 
A.1) The most famous indirect testimony which supports the theory of the existence of 
Unwritten Doctrines by Plato comes from Aristotle. In the Book IV of the Physics (2, 
209b15) Aristotle writes clearly that “in the so-called Unwritten Doctrines” (en tois 
legomenois agraphois dogmasin) Plato gives a definition of matter and spatiality which 
is slightly different if compared to the definition exposed in the written dialogue Timaeus. 
This passage by Aristotle is extremely relevant for three main reasons. First of all, because 
of the relevance of the witness: Aristotle was, in fact, a direct pupil of Plato in his 
Academia for at least twenty years; hence, he was likely one of the most informed, direct 
witnesses of those oral teachings. Secondly, Aristotle seems to take for granted that there 
is something widely known as “Unwritten Doctrines”; thus, it is reliable that the existence 
of these teachings was somehow widespread, even if circumscribed to a few pupils. 
Thirdly, Aristotle states that there is a difference – at least in this case – between the 
Unwritten Doctrines and the written dialogue. 
The third point is definitive because based on this difference between written and 
Unwritten Doctrines, some have assumed that Plato held oral teachings that were 
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deliberately different from the theories that can be excerpted from his written works. 
Consequently, some have tried to outline the contents of these oral teachings believing 
that the most fundamental elements of Plato’s philosophy were communicated through 
those theories expounded orally. Furthermore, this belief is corroborated by the critique 
of writing that Plato himself stated both in the Phaedrus and in the Seventh Letter. 
Anyone, who is not yet influenced by the Wirkungsgeschichte developed around this 
topic, is able to detect some unnecessary cause-effect relations in this chain of reasoning. 
Starting again from the passage of the Physics, it seems possible to rely on Aristotle and 
infer that there existed official oral teachings held by Plato and that these might 
sometimes differ from some theoretical elements written in the dialogues. Nevertheless, 
from these accepted premises, it does not necessarily follow that there is a difference, 
intentionally imposed by Plato, between the contents of the dialogues and the contents of 
the oral teachings. Consequently, there is no necessity that should follow that the theories 
exposed orally were more authentic than the written ones. The difference that Aristotle 
denounces in regard to the Timaeus is a very detailed one. Some have argued that these 
kinds of discrepancies are likely due to the evolution of Plato’s thought in a lapse of time 
which probably occurred between the moment Plato wrote the dialogue, and the moment 
he exposed similar theories in some oral teachings.71 This last interpretation may be fairly 
convincing, but there is not enough evidence to support it. In addition, the fact that Plato 
held oral teachings should neither provoke any surprise, nor elicit the certainty that what 
Plato said orally was almost secret, highly inspired and exclusive. It is widely known that 
Plato established his Academia with the purpose of teaching philosophy and educating 
the souls of a few pupils. Surely, the selection of the students was quite strict and it was 
probably based on the philosophical disposition of their souls. Hence, the audience of 
Plato’s oral teachings was necessarily small and elitist. I cannot see any necessary reason 
for overestimating the Aristotelian passage of the Physics; least of all, there is no reason 
from this to infer that platonic oral teachings were the most authentic words by Plato and 
that these were intentionally secret. 
There are interesting philosophical positions that question the effective relevance of this 
passage by Aristotle. A very balanced position in this regard comes from Trabattoni. 
 
71 Among most of the contemporary interpreters, it is commonly accepted that the oral teachings by Plato 
occurred later in his lifetime. Cf. Nikulin, 2012, p. 7. 
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Trabattoni’s position starts from a general interpretation of Aristotle’s method of reading 
his predecessors. Aristotle tends somehow to translate the theories of his predecessors 
into his own philosophical language. This subtle and apparently innocent operation is 
fully evidenced in the very well-known I and XIII Books of the Metaphysics. In particular, 
in Book I of the Metaphysics, Aristotle delineates a draft of History of Philosophy in 
(thus-far-known) History of Philosophy; hence, he analyses and criticises chronologically 
the theories of his predecessors. Trabattoni, in this regard, makes a very good point 
claiming that Aristotle is not mainly interested in the History of Philosophy itself, but in 
truth.72 It means that Aristotle is not interested in reporting accurately the investigations 
on nature of his predecessors – Plato included; rather, he uses his predecessors as terms 
of comparison for testing or supporting his own philosophical theories. This is also the 
reason why Aristotle applies his filter retrospectively and often forces the theories of the 
predecessors into functional, but limited, categories.73 Trabattoni recognises a plausible 
existence of oral doctrines and admits the existence of discrepancies in Plato’s works, 
nevertheless he warns about the risk of misinterpreting Plato if these discrepancies are 
read under Aristotle’s perspective.74 As distinct from Aristotle, Plato was not interested 
in definite statements about first principles and truth and, yet again, it is important to 
underline that this was also a reason for not considering writing a sufficient tool to express 
truth and for not writing treatises – as Aristotle did. 
Harold Cherniss adopted, instead, a more radical position in regard to that passage by 
Aristotle. His position can be situated at the extreme opposite of the position of those who 
valued Aristotle’s testament as the most relevant indirect testament about the existence 
of Unwritten Doctrines by Plato. Cherniss, in fact, believes that Aristotle misinterpreted 
Plato’s thought; hence, he denies the existence of Unwritten Doctrines. Cherniss’ position 
can be considered neither a direct contraposition nor a reaction to the interpreters that 
support the theory of Unwritten Doctrines. As a matter of fact, Cherniss’ work about the 
Aristotelian misinterpretation of Plato was published before the theories of Unwritten 
 
72 Trabattoni, 1999, p. 43-sgg. 
73 This operation by Aristotle is actual and it is coherent not only with his idea of a chronological 
development of truth which lies beyond the historical part of the Metaphysics, but also with his inclusive 
way of structuring philosophical arguments as if a qualitative development of truth can be guaranteed 
thanks to analytic structures, categorisations and use of syllogisms. 
74 Trabattoni, 1999, p. 49. 
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Doctrines were elaborated by later interpreters.75 Cherniss analyses in detail and 
technically contradicts the criticism that Aristotle developed around the passage in the 
Timaeus.76 The reason why Aristotle misinterpreted Plato is due to very similar reasons 
to those given by Trabattoni. Cherniss too notices that Aristotle tends to translate Plato’s 
thought in his own terms and this cannot work positively. The difference in Cherniss’ 
position is that he is not interested in denying the existence of Unwritten Doctrines in the 
first instance; rather he is interested in showing the shortcomings of the Aristotelian 
interpretation of Plato. Even though he also minimises the relevance of the ancient 
indirect tradition77 and of the contemporary trend78 that, along with Aristotle, preserved 
the hypothesis of the existence of unwritten esoteric doctrines in Plato. 
Another relevant point, in continuity with Cherniss’ reading of the Unwritten Doctrines, 
is made by Wolfgang-Rainer Mann. Mann stresses that when Aristotle refers to the 
agraphata dogmata, is not positing a difference of content between the oral teachings and 
the written dialogues. Indeed, Aristotle seems to take for granted that there is doctrinal 
overlapping between these two. Hence, restating Cherniss’ position, Mann holds that 
Plato is saying the same thing both in the Timaeus and in the agraphata dogmata, even 
though he is probably expressing himself differently in the two contexts.79 
It has to be assumed that, the contemporary interpreters who asserted the superiority of 
the oral teachings were not so cursory as not to notice the narrowness of the “agraphata 
dogmata passage” from the Physics. They have, in fact, also based their evaluations on 
other indirect testimonies and other elements. 
Another of the most important testimonies in the discussion about platonic Unwritten 
Doctrines is the passage X 248-283 from the work Adversus Mathematicos by Sextus 
Empiricus (II Century) In this passage, Sextus Empiricus relates certain notions of 
Mathematics and Geometry to the platonic theory of the Ideas, but only as a brief mention. 
He writes also about the mathematical/geometrical relation between the One and the 
Indefinite Dyad, but he clearly assigns this theory to Pythagoras. Nevertheless, the 
 
75 The first publication of Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy by Harold Cherniss was in 1944; 
while the very first publications in regard to the theory of unwritten platonic doctrines appeared in the late 
fifties/early sixties (Krämer, 1959 and Gaiser, 1963). 
76 Cherniss, 1944, pp. 113-116. 
77 Ivi, pp. 564-566. 
78 He mainly refers to Léon Robin, Julius Stenzel and Eduard Zeller, cf. Ivi, Foreword. 
79 Mann, 2006, p. 378. 
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articulated theories expressed in the testimony by Sextus Empiricus have contributed to 
outline the contents of the supposed platonic Unwritten Doctrines elaborated on by the 
Tübingen School. For this reason, inevitably, a relevant issue about the reliability of this 
passage has been raised. In fact, the testimony by Sextus Empiricus appears very weak 
not only as reliable evidence to support the theory of Unwritten Doctrines, but even 
principally as a possible source of platonic teaching. 
A quite detailed analysis of the of the insufficiency of this passage as a valid testimony 
for the theory of Unwritten Doctrines, has been carried out by Gregory Vlastos in his 
review of Krämer’s work.80 Vlastos points firstly to a major shortcoming concerning the 
misuse of Sextus’ passage for supporting the Unwritten Doctrines theory: 
 
What is particularly surprising, in view of the vast evidential weight Sx [Sextus Empiricus] 
is expected to carry, is the complete absence of a Quellenkritik of this whole text. […] There 
is no serious confrontation of the problem raised by the fact that everything in Sx which is 
taken by K. [Krämer] as a disclosure of Platonic Philosophy is presented by Sextus as the 
teachings of Pythagoreans, except for a single parenthetical reference to Plato81 
 
Vlastos identifies also other more technical shortcomings that do not allow to use the 
passage by Sextus Empiricus as a reliable testimony. However, most of the supporter of 
the Unwritten Doctrines theory consider this passage a strong source for their position. 
Just to quote one last example about ancient indirect testimonies, it is worth recalling that 
the two ancient philosophers, Aristoxenus and Simplicius, reported in their works the 
existence of platonic Unwritten Doctrines. These testimonies refer to the same oral speech 
that Plato supposedly gave on the Idea of Good. 
In The Harmonics (II, 39-40 Da Rios), Aristoxenus of Tarentum (IV Century BCE), a 
direct pupil of Aristotle, narrates an episode about a Lecture on the Good during which 
Plato instead of talking about wealth, health, strength and happiness as many listeners 
were expecting, rather spoke about mathematics, geometry and astronomy leaving most 
of the audience surprised or even disappointed. Some centuries later, Simplicius, a 
 
80 Vlastos, 1973, pp. 379-398. 
81 Ivi, p. 385. 
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Neoplatonist who lived in the IV Century, in his commentary On Aristotle Physics (151, 
6-29 Diels), reports a similar episode adding that it is highly probable that Plato spoke 
about unity and duality as well on that occasion, being influenced by Pythagorean 
doctrines. 
Some other relevant testimonies about the existence of platonic Unwritten Doctrines have 
been collected by Hans Joachim Krämer82 as well as by Margherita Isnardi Parente.83 In 
the context of this dissertation, it has been preferred to give attention only to a few of 
these passages as most pertinent samples of testimonies. 
A.2) The last, ancient and indirect testimonies that are going to be considered here, are 
some omissions (also known as “platonic gaps”)84 that Plato seems to have intentionally 
left in his dialogues. Many passages could be considered as “omissions”, but it is reliable 
to consider only eleven of them as intentional omissions.85 By platonic omission, most of 
the interpreters mean a passage of a dialogue which is obscure and unclear. The obscurity 
might sometimes seem deliberate, because, in most of the occurrences it seems that Plato 
did not want to exhaust a reasoning. Usually the opacity of these passages relates to the 
philosophical content, but it may also be a recollection of something else – through a 
reference, an allusion or a promise to explore the issue on another occasion.   
Friedrich Schleiermacher has argued that these kinds of allusions and gaps are 
distinguishing traits of Plato’s style, aimed at making his writing more similar to oral 
expression.86 This position, which evocative, in any case, – as it calls into question the 
 
82 Ibidem. 
83 Isnardi Parente, 1997. 
84 The term Aussparungsstellen (generically translated as omissions) was coined and introduced for the first 
time by Thomas Alexander Szlezák in his work Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie (1985) 
translated in Italian, with the complacency of the Author, as Platone e la scrittura della filosofia. Analisi 
di struttura dei dialoghi della giovinezza e della maturità alla luce di un nuovo paradigma ermeneutico, in 
1988. 
85 The eleven passages listed by Hans Krämer are: Prot. 356e-357c; Men. 76e-77b; Phaed. 107b; Resp. 
506d-507a and 509c; Parm. 136d-e; Soph. 254b-d; Pol. 284a-e; Tim. 48c-e and 53c-d; Leg. 894a. Cf. 
Krämer, 1989, Appendix II. 
86 The work by Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogue of Plato, does not play a relevant role in this 
dissertation. Nevertheless, it is important to declare the strong impact of this work in the later “Unwritten 
Doctrines” issue. Schleiermacher’s work, in fact, is considered to be at the roots of the debate developed 
around this topic. His position denies the existence of any oral teaching by Plato. He believed that, even if 
oral teachings were existing, these did not add something more, nor something deeper to what has been 
said in the written dialogues. Schleiermacher rather argues in favour of a hermeneutics of the written text 
considering that the dialogues are autarchic and they themselves bear all of Plato’s philosophy. In this place, 
it should be denounced that Schleiermacher did not consider the Seventh Letter as an authentic work by 
Plato, that is why its contents have not been analysed by him. 
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relevance of choosing a certain writing style – has been reasonably opposed by Thomas 
Alexander Szlezák. His main motivation to oppose Schleiermacher’s position is grounded 
in the explicit platonic critique of writing. Indeed, as Szlezák notices, it is undeniable that 
the critique of writing by Plato necessarily pertains to everything that Plato himself has 
written. Hence, it can be assumed that if the platonic critique of writing is valid and has 
to be taken seriously, then the dialogues cannot be read hermeneutically – as 
Schleiermacher meant to do – and they cannot be considered the only valid source of 
Plato’s philosophy. Basing his view on a philological analysis, Szlezák states that the 
dialogues are “reliant on oral supplementation”, especially when Plato recalls “things of 
greater value” which can be expressed only orally.87 For this reason, Szlezák reads in 
detail the platonic omissions and detects different types amongst these.88 One type can be 
definitely identified with the frequent use of quotations and myths by Plato. Another type 
is connected with some allusion to higher truths or “higher archai” which would be 
completely obscure if not integrated with the theories developed by other contemporary 
interpreters, such as Konrad Gaiser. A third type of omission is not related to allusion, 
but has to do with a “dramaturgical device” which consists in interrupting the narration 
of the dialogue to signal that there is something relevant to be intended beyond this 
interruption; something that most of the time can be found in other dialogues. The last 
type of omission, listed by Szlezák, would refer to those occurrences when Plato, in a 
dialogue, alludes to something which was said, but not concluded earlier in the same 
dialogue (this can easily be the case with long dialogues such as Republic). 
The role of these omissions works very well in the frame of any interpretation that 
considers orality superior to writing in Plato’s philosophy, in fact, it offers the opportunity 
to believe that the issues which are often omitted in the written dialogues, were probably 
covered and integrated through the oral teachings. 
Even if the arguments by Szlezák are built on solid philological assumptions and on a 
careful reading of the dialogues, however, these are not probing enough to support the 
superiority of oral doctrines over the written dialogues by Plato. In this dissertation, the 
 
The reason for not involving Schleiermacher arguments in this dissertation is due to the attempt of 
circumscribing the history of the critics to a more contemporary trend which, however, includes elements 
of critique coming from Schleiermacher. 
87 Szlezák, 1999, p. 61. 
88 For a more detailed account of these types of omissions cf. Ivi, pp. 61-64. 
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omissions present in the dialogues are not considered eminent testimonies for the 
superiority of orality over writing, as they only denounce a general, platonic denial of 
exhaustive definitions and definite statements. As it has been argued earlier, Plato applies 
a fluid and dialectical form of reasoning to his philosophical insights and this is one of 
his reasons for criticising writing as a means of communication. Writing, indeed, is too 
rigid, it is sterile and it is not alive, as any authentic thought needs to be. Hence, the fact 
that Plato in his dialogues is often unclear and inconsistent about definitive contents, 
should not be read as a hint for other sources of communication (oral esoteric teachings); 
rather it should be interpreted as a denial of any stiff reasoning. Coherently, the means 
for transmitting knowledge, either orally or written, are relevant elements, but still 
secondary elements; while the nature of knowledge and of its expression and 
communication are at stake firstly for Plato. 
Nevertheless, many contemporary interpreters admirably managed to fill the gaps left in 
the dialogues, after having reshaped a plausible platonic theory of ideas interlaced with 
mathematics and geometry. 
B.) These interpreters are the indirect contemporary testimonies that have been mentioned 
at the beginning of this section. They tried to outline the contents of the Unwritten 
Doctrines integrating elements of ontology, geometry and mathematics to the incomplete 
theories exposed in the dialogues. In this regard, once again, a testimony by Aristotle has 
been determinant for these interpreters. In the XIII Book of Metaphysics,89 Aristotle 
declares that a theory of numbers was developed by Plato after the theory of ideas and 
that this was somehow a development of the same precedent theory of the ideas.  
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that Aristotle never expressed these theories as 
something learned directly from Plato. He explicitly makes deductions trying to clarify 
some obscurities that he found in Plato’s philosophy.90 Hence, the absolute validity that 
is attributed to Aristotle’s testimonies should be limited when it comes to his own 
deductions. However, the most widely accepted interpretation about this issue is that there 
are two stages of Plato’s life corresponding to two different stages of his philosophical 
development. At an early stage, Plato elaborated a theory of ideas which is detectable also 
in the dialogues; later he developed a theory of ideas and numbers which was divulged 
 
89 Metaphysics, 1078b9-12. 
90 Metaphysics, 987b31-33. For a more complete and detailed account cf. Trabattoni, 1999, note 70. 
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mainly orally to a few pupils.91 This set of testimonies (direct and indirect) definitely 
created a wide and strong enough ground to build the contemporary theory of the 
“Unwritten Doctrines”. 
The most determinant part of the story of this theory took place between the Universities 
of Tübingen and Milan around 1980. However, as pointed earlier, the roots of the 
criticism in support, or in opposition to the theory of the Unwritten Doctrines by Plato 
precede the 20th century and they date back to the 19th century with Schleiermacher, 
Eduard Gottlob Zeller, Léon Robin and Julius Stenzel – just to mention some of the most 
relevant names in the debate. This dissertation intentionally excludes an analysis of the 
early stage of this theory and, instead, privileges a focus on the stage that goes from the 
fifties to the nineties of the last century. The general reason for this specific focus depends 
on the majority of works published on this topic in those decades. The specific reason is 
that from these publications emerged an innovative paradigm to re-interpret Plato anew, 
based on the contents of the “Unwritten Doctrines”. The content of these doctrines and 
the new paradigm for the interpretation of Plato will be exposed in the following section. 
 
1.4. “Things of greater value” 
On the basis of some direct and indirect testimonies, of some omissions and some 
interpretations of Plato’s dialogues, certain contemporary interpreters were able to 
develop a presumed platonic theory of ideas, numbers and geometry. Paradoxically, this 
theory, which is only presumed and deducted, is considered to be more authentic and 
trustworthy than dialogues themselves which, indeed, are the only direct testimonies. 
Once again, it is important to underline that this presumed oral theory has been considered 
more valuable for two main reasons. First, because it is not written, hence it is exempted 
from the platonic critique of writing which instead involves all the dialogues (but also the 
critique itself, disputably). Second, because, presumably, this oral theory dealt with things 
of greater value (timiotera). In fact, in the Phaedrus, Plato writes that what makes a 
philosopher different from a mere writer is that the philosopher possesses something more 
 
91 Cf. Nikulin, 2012, Chapter 1, and Trabattoni, 1999, p.5. 
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valuable than written words, hence – deduced some interpreters – he possesses also an 
oral theory which deals with things of greater value. 
 
SOCRATES: Well, then: our playful amusement regarding discourse is complete. Now you 
go and tell Lysias that we came to the spring which is sacred to the Nymphs and heard words 
charging us to deliver a message to Lysias and anyone else who composes speeches, as well 
as to Homer and anyone else who has composed poetry either spoken or sung, and third, to 
Solon and anyone else who writes political documents that he calls laws: “If any one of you 
has composed these things with a knowledge of the truth, if you can defend your writing 
when you are challenged, and if you can yourself make the argument that your writing is of 
little worth, then you must be called by a name derived not from these writings but rather 
from those things that you are seriously pursuing.” 
PHAEDRUS: What name, then, would you give such a man? 
SOCRATES: To call him wise, Phaedrus, seems to me too much, and proper only for a god. 
To call him wisdom’s lover – a philosopher – or something similar would fit him better and 
be more seemly. 
PHAEDRUS: That would be quite appropriate. 
SOCRATES: On the other hand, if a man has nothing more valuable (timiotera) than what 
he has composed or written, spending long hours twisting it around, pasting parts together 
and taking them apart – wouldn’t you be right to call him a poet or a speech writer or an 
author of laws? 
PHAEDRUS: Of course. (Phaedr. 278b-e) 
 
Some interpreters worked around this suggestion about things of greater value until they 
reconstructed the presumed contents of Plato’s oral theory. 
In particular, Hans Joachim Krämer and Konrad Gaiser identified the contents of the oral 
theories with the contents of the oral teachings to which Aristotle refers. Both Krämer 
and Gaiser, Professors at Tübingen University, started to work on the interpretation of the 
“esoteric teachings”92 towards the end of the fifties of the last century. In continuity with 
 
92 That use of term “esoteric” excludes any reference to mysticism. It means that Plato destined those oral 
teachings only to the pupils in the Academia. In talking about esoteric teachings reverberates the classic 
and consolidated distinction in between Aristotle’s written works which are partly exoteric (destined to a 
large public of readers and that are not arrived to us) and partly esoteric (destined to the pupils in the 
Lyceum which are almost all the works by Aristotle arrived to us). Nevertheless, this parallelism is not only 
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this interpretation, starting from eighties of the last century, Thomas Alexander Szlezák 
from the University of Tübingen and Giovanni Reale from the Università Cattolica di 
Milano, reinforced the interpretation by Krämer and Gaiser. 
Krämer’s position on the interpretation of Unwritten Doctrines is largely based on 
Heinrich Gomperz’ interpretation.93 Krämer, like Gomperz did thirty years earlier, detects 
in Plato’s philosophy a dualistic and derivative system according to which things derive 
from Ideas, Ideas derive from Numbers and Numbers depend on First Principles (the One 
and the Indefinite Dyad). Supposedly, the platonic discussion on these First Principles, 
which Krämer considers to be the things of greater value mentioned by Plato in the 
Phaedrus, was exclusively destined to the oral teachings reserved for a small elected 
audience. 
Specifically, Krämer claims that the theories exposed in the early and middle dialogues 
(Republic included) are restricted to ethical-political themes, while some ontology is 
covered as an introduction in later dialogues (such as Parmenides, Sophist). While, the 
real ontological and essential contents of Plato’s Philosophy were exposed on an 
advanced level only orally in the Academia.94 In the frame of this interpretation, the 
written dialogues are simply propaedeutic to true philosophy, as Gaiser himself argued in 
the same years.  
Gaiser believes that the distinction between esoteric and exoteric teaching was present in 
Plato as it was already in the Pythagoreans. In particular, Gaiser states that the dialogues 
(exoteric) were just an introduction to philosophy as it comes out from the Second Letter 
by Plato. In this letter, Plato admits that the dialogues were simply a recalling of Socrates’ 
teachings which were preliminary to real Philosophy: 
 
 
inappropriate but it is also misleading, not only because Plato and Aristotle’s philosophies are different in 
their intents, but mainly because the use of writing and the teaching systems of the two philosophers cannot 
be compared. Aristotle never criticised writing, on the contrary he used to write systematically the contents 
of his lectures. While Plato criticised writing especially as a means to transmit knowledge. Schleiermacher 
already used this language to point out this distinction in Plato and to remark that esoteric teachings have 
no authority. Cf. Mann, 2006, p. 354-357. A clear disambiguation of the term esoteric in relation to Plato’s 
teachings, can be found in Szlezák, 1988, p. 484 and 1999, pp. 85-86. 
93 Cf. De Vogel, 1986, pp. 13-16. 
94 Krämer, 1989, pp. 211-213. 
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Keep this in mind and take care that you have no occasion in the future to feel remorse for 
now exposing these doctrines unworthily. The best precaution is not to write them down, but 
to commit them to memory; for it is impossible that things written should not become known 
to others. This is why I have never written on these subjects. There is no writing of Plato’s, 
nor will there ever be; those that are now called so come from an idealized and youthful 
Socrates. Farewell and heed my warning; read this letter again and again, then burn it.95 
 
Even though Gaiser’s reading of Plato may result partial and biased by the will to sustain 
a theory of Unwritten Doctrines, nevertheless, he acknowledges that the critique that Plato 
makes in regard to writing involves orality as well. In fact, both orality and writing are 
simply “reproductive” – as any other way of communicating knowledge.96 Hence, the 
superiority of the oral doctrine over the dialogues, does not consists in a better 
“communicability” of the teachings and not even in the contents of the teachings, but in 
the fact that oral teachings were more systematic and scientific in comparison to the 
theory exposed in the dialogues. Furthermore, Gaiser denies the sharp parallelism 
between orality and academic teachings on the one side, and literary, written teachings 
open to a wider public, on the other side. He sees instead an interaction between oral 
teachings and dialogues in the Academia, as well as he acknowledges that most of the 
oral teachings were open to a wide public as presumably was the Lecture on the Good 
mentioned by Aristotle. Considering all this, Gaiser’s position on the transmission of 
knowledge by Plato appears quite balanced between orality and writing; but his position 
actually turns to be in favour of orality for what concerns the philosophical quality of the 
contents of Plato’s teaching. Since Gaiser claims that the oral teachings were more 
systematic and scientific, he somehow asserts the superiority of orality over writing in 
terms of the quality of concepts expressed through oral teachings. For this reason, even if 
with a cautious respect toward writing, Gaiser ends up in holding the same position as 
many other interpreters who believe that through esoteric, oral teaching Plato expressed 
“things of greater value”. 
Interpreters worked deeply around “things of greater value” that might have been 
expressed in Plato’s oral teachings. Eventually they agreed that these things are all related 
to the underlying existence of two fundamental principles which work as opposite powers 
 
95 Ep. II, 314 b-c. 
96 Gaiser, 1994, pp. 10-11. 
54 
 
 
permeating each other. For this permeation of opposites being possible on an ontological 
level, it is necessary to detect an analogous structure in all the existing entities.97 This 
structure is identified with mathematical principles, as these interpreters can detect a 
binding connection between Ontology and Mathematics in Plato’s philosophy.98 
The works by Krämer and Gaiser have been decisive, not only because, for the first time, 
they tried to outline systematically the contents of the presumed Unwritten Doctrines by 
Plato, but also mainly because in doing so they provided a collection of documents (direct 
and indirect testimonies) to support their arguments. Anybody else who, after them, tried 
to support or to oppose the theory of Unwritten Doctrines, had somehow to refer to a pre-
set frame drawn by the two philologists from Tübingen. 
A few decades later, Thomas Alexander Szlezák, Professor at Tübingen University and 
director of the “Platon-Archiv” in the same University,99 himself held the theory of 
Unwritten Doctrines, but he based his interpretation on different assumptions and argued 
it with a different method from Krämer and Gaiser. Szlezák, in fact, does not focus 
primarily on the Unwritten Doctrines and their presumed content; he rather works on the 
written dialogues by Plato to support the existence and the superiority of the oral 
teachings over the written dialogues. The element that supports this, more than others, is 
that often the dialogues appear incomplete on relevant points and sometimes they seem 
to ask, through gaps and omissions, for a supplementation that can be likely found in the 
oral teachings. The things of greater value have to exceed the written text – believes 
Szlezák, hence dialogues contain less valuable truths. This is due especially to the 
different quality of communication that can be performed orally and through writing. 
Plato, in fact, condemned writing as a means of communicating and very probably, he 
preferred oral, dialectical exchange as it is lively and as it permits to choose the 
interlocutor. This is undeniably clear in the final part of Phaedrus where Plato not only 
criticises writing, but also says that things of greater value necessarily exceed writing and 
that they need support (boetheia). This support for the written words has to be found 
outside the dialogues, thus, can be probably detected in the oral teachings. Szlezák’s 
 
97 Gaiser realises a detailed schema of couples of principles for each kind of relevant opposition in Plato’s 
ontology. Ivi, p. 25. 
98 Gaiser analyses in details the relation between Ontology, Mathematics and Geometry in Plato in his work 
first published in German in 1962 (It. trans. 1994). Cf. also Gaiser in Nikulin, 2012, pp. 83-120. 
99 The previous director was Gaiser, Szlezák followed him after his death in 1988. 
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method seems to be the most convincing criticism of writing and support for the theory 
of Unwritten Doctrines: it convinces in virtue of his earnest and detailed approach to what 
it is criticised. Before saying that the dialogues do not contain things of greater value, 
Szlezák reads them carefully and looks for the essence of Plato’s philosophy in them. It 
could be said that he uses the same method as Schleiermacher, but ends up with opposite 
conclusions, and he does so intentionally, as it emerges in an appendix on the modern 
theory of the written dialogue toward the end of his main work on Plato.100 
Giovanni Reale, Professor at Università Cattolica di Milano, during the late eighties, 
intentionally collocated himself in this tradition started with Krämer and Gaiser. His 
works on the Unwritten Doctrines are the most detailed and systematic on the topic and 
his monumental book Per una nuova interpetazione di Platone (originally published in 
1984), has been translated in several languages (German, English, Spanish, Czech et alia). 
All this makes of him the most motivated exponent of this theory. Furthermore, he 
realised a meta-philosophical operation: while he intentionally joined this tradition, at the 
same time he defined the name and the common traits of this tradition. Hence, he has 
been not only an exponent of the tradition, but also the one who, more than other 
exponents, was aware of the common traits between different interpreters and of the 
potential impact of this innovative hermeneutic paradigm. In fact, he did not name this 
interpretative approach the “Unwritten Doctrines Theory”, he rather called it “The New 
Hermeneutic Paradigm”. Reale originally studied at Marburg under the influence of the 
Neokantian interpretation of Plato. His first explicit approach toward the theory of the 
platonic Unwritten Doctrines was early in the eighties when he had the chance to meet 
Krämer. After this meeting, Reale translated and edited a vast work by Krämer on the 
Unwritten Doctrines.101 After this publication, many other publications on this theme 
followed. In the Università Cattolica di Milano, Reale also established the “Centro di 
Ricerche di Metafisica” where he was surrounded by a small group of students and 
scholars who came out with other relevant publications on the theme, as to create the 
effective circumstance to talk about a new hermeneutic paradigm on Plato’s 
interpretation, held by the Tübingen-Milan school. This alliance was made official during 
a meeting in Tübingen on the 3rd of September 1996 when Krämer and Szlezák met with 
 
100 Cf. note 84. 
101 The work by Krämer is Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics, this work was originally published 
in Italian for the first time in 1982, the book was translated edited and introduced by Giovanni Reale. 
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Reale, some of his scholars and other relevant philosophers.102 The main guest of this 
meeting was Hans-Georg Gadamer with whom Reale had already long-term links, since 
1986. In previous and successive occasions to the meeting Tübingen,103 Reale tried to 
outline the common aspects of Gadamer’s reading of Plato and “The New Hermeneutic 
Paradigm” on Plato’s interpretation. Doing so, Reale was looking for a stronger support 
to the theory of Unwritten Doctriness, but honestly, this support was never fully found in 
Gadamer who never adhered to the theories of the Tübingen-Milan school. The only valid 
link which has been confirmed by Gadamer, is the idea that Plato was in a sense 
anticipating the concept of “hermeneutical circle” in his critique of writing exposed in the 
final section of the Phaedrus. According to Reale, when Plato affirms that the written text 
is not autarchic and it needs support (boetheia), Plato means that oral dialectic should 
supplement the written text; and also that, without a set of pre-concepts and pre-
knowledge, it would not be possible to understand any philosophical text.104 These two 
elements related to the critique of writing in Plato are the link with Gadamer’s own 
hermeneutics – as Reale pointed out and Gadamer seemingly agreed.105 It does not seem 
possible to equate Gadamer’s interpretation of Plato with the interpretation by the 
Tübingen-Milan school. In fact, the few connections that have been found by Reale are 
about Gadamer as philosopher and writer of Truth and Method and not to Gadamer as a 
philologist and interpreter of Plato. This comes out in the transcription of the conversation 
during the meeting in Tübingen on the 3rd of September 1996.106 The transcription gives 
the impression that Gadamer did not really fit in that theoretical context as he disagreed 
openly with the theory of the Unwritten Doctrines. Specifically, in the introduction to the 
volume that contains this transcription, Gadamer says that Gaiser and Krämer had the 
merit of reinvigorating the contemporary debate around the interpretations of Plato, but 
he disagrees with the deductions (about the connections between Ontology, Geometry 
and Mathematics)107 that the two philologists developed from the presumed platonic 
 
102 It is worth recalling also the participation of Maurizio Migliori, Giuseppe Girgenti, Günter Figal, Klaus 
Oehler, Ramón Arana, Rémi Brague, Jens Halfwassen and Dominique Richard. 
103 There are interviews that Gadamer released to Reale in occasion of their meeting in Tübingen in 1996 
and in Heidelberg in 2000. 
104 Cf. Introduzione all’edizione Bompiani in Reale, 2010, pp. XIX-XXI. 
105 Girgenti, a cura di, 1998, pp. 10-11 and pp. 133-134. 
106 The transcription of the meeting has been edited by Giuseppe Girgenti and published in 1998 with the 
title La nuova interpretazione di Platone. The introduction of the volume has been written by Gadamer and 
at the end of the volume there is also an interview that Gadamer released to Reale in occasion of the meeting 
on 1996 in Tübingen. 
107 Girgenti, 1998, p. 20. 
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Lecture On the Good mentioned by Aristotle and his disciples. Gadamer also asserts that 
by no means, as an exponent of Hermeneutics, could he be convinced that the omissions 
in Plato’s dialogues are a sending back to an esoteric oral doctrine.108 Hence, Gadamer 
does not support this theory, but he is willing and open to the participation to the debate, 
as he believes that Plato’s philosophy is always open and cannot be reduced to determined 
resolution.  
Gadamer denies the tension between an oral theory and a written theory in Plato: he 
believes that there were oral teachings by Plato, but at the same time, he defends and 
sustains Schleiermacher’s tradition to which he belongs. Moreover, Gadamer holds that 
Plato was aware of the failure of definition, as no philosophical concept can be fully 
determined nor orally neither by writing.109 Under this perspective, Gadamer reads the 
critique of writing in the Phaedrus not as an affirmation of the superiority of orality over 
writing, but rather as a platonic solicitation to look for the truth through the lively soul 
and not through external supports as writing.110 
It is relevant that in this dissertation, place and consideration have been given to the 
Theory of Unwritten Doctrines and its main exponents. First, because their works are 
really detailed and incisive, particularly concerning the ontological analyses carried out 
in order to draw a more systematic reading of Plato’s philosophy. Secondly, because they 
represent a determinant and revolutionary phase in the contemporary history of Plato’s 
interpretation.111 Thirdly, and especially, because this position is considered not 
sustainable in this dissertation, hence it has been necessary and fair to expose at least its 
main traits to highlight better the reasons for disagreeing with this position itself. 
 
 
1.5. “He will sow gardens of letters for the sake of amusing himself”112 
 
108 Ivi, p. 21 and p. 118. 
109 Ivi, p. 36. 
110 Ivi, p. 32. 
111 A determinant feature of Reale’s work, which has not been declared yet, is the relevance of the 
epistemological ground on which he intentionally builds his theory (and consequently drags on it the entire 
Tübingen-Milan School). This ground is explicitly Thomas Kuhn’s Theory of Scientific Revolution. Reale 
believes that Kuhn’s theory explains the revolutionary compass and the obvious rejections of the New 
Hermeneutic Paradigm in the interpretation of Plato held by the Tübingen-Milan School. There have been 
many criticisms about the New Hermeneutic Paradigm and also about its epistemological ground. Reale 
tries to defend his position and his use of Kuhn’s Theory in the final appendix of his 2010 edition; in the 
appendix there are also a collection of Articles by Krämer and other scholars who defends the same position. 
112 Phaedr. 276d. 
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Bearing in mind the evaluations above, it seems appropriate to come back to Plato’s 
writing itself and try to consider his criticism of writing in its general sense, before to 
move on to the next chapter. 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter – Plato in the Phaedrus gives directions on 
how to compose good speeches (both oral and written). First of all, there is an advice to 
follow: 
 
I am not forcing anyone to learn how to make speeches without knowing the truth; on the 
contrary, my advice, for what it is worth, is to take me up only after mastering the truth. 
(Phaedr. 260d) 
 
This is for what concerns the content of the speech, while for what concerns the structure 
of the speech it has to be an organic and ordinated structure, like a living body, as said 
earlier: 
 
Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be 
neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are 
fitting both to one another and to the whole work. (Phaedr. 264c) 
 
The fact that the good discourse has to be like a living body is a determinant aspect, not 
only for the platonic theory of speech-composition, but also for the structure of the 
dialectic method. The organic and living unity of a speech cannot be simply dismissed as 
a trick of the successful rhetorician; in fact, the last main feature of the good speech, 
detected by Plato, consists in the composition of speeches able to direct the soul.113 This 
means that the logoi are designed around the soul of the listener/reader, hence around 
something that is alive and gives life to a body; but it means also that the direction of the 
soul (psychagoge) is the accomplishment of a good dialectical method (based on 
diaharesis and synagoge). These features of the good speech are gathered together, 
coherently, in a later passage: 
 
113 Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul, whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know 
how many kinds of soul there are. (Phaedr. 271d) 
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First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about; you 
must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to 
divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible. Second, you must understand the 
nature of the soul, along the same lines; you must determine which kind of speech is 
appropriate to each kind of soul, prepare and arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a 
complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one. Then, 
and only then, will you be able to use speech artfully, to the extent that its nature allows it to 
be used that way, either in order to teach or in order to persuade. This is the whole point of 
the argument we have been making. (Phaedr. 277 b-c) 
 
This is the best speech to compose, but Plato is nevertheless aware that even the best 
speech cannot ever be a sufficient tool to express the truth, as every speech (both oral and 
written) is always dependable on the mimetic mechanism for the reasons clearly exposed 
through the myth of Theut and in general for the weakness of the logoi themselves. This, 
far from preventing Plato from writing, rather leads him to redefine the context of use of 
writing. The eide (of justice, good and beauty)114 can be grasped through a dialogical 
method (dialectic) and can be expressed with speeches (rhetoric); both dialectic and 
rhetoric are based on logoi which are the only tools available for the human beings, but 
they are eidola. Forced to dwell in the realm of mimesis, the philosopher can only admit 
that any attempt to express the highest truths it is like a joke (paidia)115 and this is the 
correct way to value writing, as a simulation of sense.  
To grasp a general sense of the platonic criticism of writing, it suffices to consider the 
themes exposed so far. However, these last observations need to be read in connection 
with the analyses that follow in the next two chapters, only in this way the criticism of 
writing can reach a better framing within Plato’s works. 
 
114 For now, the eidos of beauty is classified equally among the other eide, while in the Third Chapter it is 
clarified the special status of this eidos. 
115 Phaedr. 276d. 
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SECOND CHAPTER 
The critique of orality in Plato’s works 
 
The platonic critique of orality is conventionally located in two areas of Plato’s works: in 
an early dialogue, the Ion and in some passages of the more famous dialogue the Republic. 
In order to draft a more complete theory of orality in Plato, it would be relevant to consider 
also other dialogues, especially those that deal with the relation between philosophy and 
sophistry.116 However, it has been decided to circumscribe the textual analysis mainly to 
these two dialogues as they contain a critique of oral tradition preserved and transmitted 
by ancient Greek Poetry; while the critique of oral speeches, such as those performed by 
sophists and rhetoricians, will just be referred to in a few circumstances, but it is not 
involved directly in the dissertation. By this, it is not meant to deny the relevance of this 
aspect of the oral production in Greek Culture, on the contrary: this aspect is itself as wide 
and articulated to deserve a more detailed and deeper analysis which could not find space 
in this dissertation. 
Unlike the critique of writing, the critique of orality is not explicitly stated in Plato’s 
dialogues and it appears often in connection with the more established and famous 
“platonic critique of the arts”. In fact, the platonic critique of orality is not intended here 
as a critique of the oral exchange in the general sense, not even as a critique of the oral 
transmission of knowledge. It is rather intended as a critique of precise forms of orality: 
those performed by rhapsodes and by poets. 
For all these reasons, this chapter exercises the same caution that has been used in regard 
to the critique of writing in the previous chapter. Generalisations and polarisations are 
avoided in favour of a more contextualised understanding which implies primarily the 
adherence to the original text – often quoted, then the recalling of multiple aspects of 
Plato’s philosophy and also the contemporary consideration of cultural/anthropological 
aspects of Ancient Greek Culture. 
 
116 Specifically, the Hippias Major, Gorgias, Protagoras and Sophist. The Sophist is still consistently 
involved in this dissertation, towards the end of this chapter and the beginning of the third chapter, when 
the theme of mimesis comes to a more ontological level of analysis. 
61 
 
 
The first Section of this Chapter deals with the genealogy of the contemporary focus on 
orality and it also introduces the critique of orality in the Ion. The second and third 
sections deal with different aspects of the critique of orality in the Republic. The last two 
sections gather the manifold elements of the platonic critique of oral poetry and aims to 
link together some of these elements with the wider theme of the ontology of the image. 
 
2.1. Orality and Vocality 
It is likely that Ion never existed. This character who gives the name to the early platonic 
dialogue117 seems to be tailored to fit perfectly to the stereotype of the rhapsode. In virtue 
of this, any detail provided about this character can be taken as a valuable indication to 
understand the sense of the platonic critique of orality. Being an early dialogue, the 
presence of Socrates in it is predominant and the dialogue veers often towards aporetic 
passages. 
As soon as the dialogue starts, Ion appears in the most beautiful dress: he is a successful 
rhapsode who returns gloriously to Athens after a poetic competition. Immediately, the 
reader of the dialogue is pushed to feel admiration for this character and for the benefits 
of his art. The reasons why this feeling is evoked here are precisely listed by a praise-
giving Socrates. First, a rhapsode has to always look beautiful and his body has to always 
be dressed up; then, a rhapsode spends most of the time “having his mind occupied with 
many good poets, especially with the divine Homer”;118 last, a rhapsode learns not only 
the words of the poets, but also their thoughts (dianoia). With this list of praiseworthy 
attributes, Socrates wants to identify the three main traits of the rhapsodic art: the beauty 
 
117 This brief but meaningful platonic dialogue has been considered inauthentic for too many decades due 
to the long-lasting and influential opinion of two relevant philosophers such as Goethe and Schleiermacher 
who asserted that the dialogue could not be authentic, but it was probably a joke or a bad imitation of a 
platonic dialogue (Cf. Reale, 2001, pp. 7-20). Only with a more complete understanding of the Greek oral 
culture it was possible to have a correct integration of this dialogue in the platonic production which, 
considering the style and the themes dealt with is conventionally collocated among the dialogues of the 
early period -most likely after the Euthyphro, but before the Hippias Major (Cf. Adorno, 2008, p. 24). Eric 
Havelock represents the most influential interpreter of the theory of orality in Greek Culture, especially in 
relation to Plato’s dialogues. Surprisingly enough, his main work Preface to Plato, although is a 
determinant source of information to understand the main arguments of the Ion, never addresses this early 
dialogue, but focuses only on the Republic and on a few other dialogues mainly used as references. 
118 Ion 530c. 
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of appearances; being occupied with poets as qualifying activity; the ability to understand 
the dianoia of the poets as a specific skill of the good rhapsode. 
That seemingly innocuous praise, with its layers of meaning, leads Ion straight into 
multiple aporias and these start from the moment that Ion proudly accepts the praises and 
recognises himself in these three traits. With Ion’s consent, Socrates chases him through 
the dialogue in an articulated web which has at its philosophical core the themes of techne 
and episteme. In fact, the very early admission of understanding not only the words, but 
also the thoughts of the poets, is what makes Ion fall into the web. 
However, the most relevant descriptive element in the prologue of the Ion is the 
ambiguous word that Socrates chooses to define the role of Ion – in relation to the 
understanding of the poets, that is hermeneus. This term is ambiguous in itself, but 
specifically because of the uses that are made of it in the dialogue. Sometimes, as in this 
early occurrence, hermeneus refers to the technical meaning of “literary exegete”,119 other 
times, as shown later in this chapter, it refers to the generic meaning of “interpreter”. 
Before delving deeper into these central aspects of the dialogue, it is important to analyse 
and make explicit the extent to which the definition of the rhapsode that Socrates 
attributes to Ion corresponds to the cultural/social figure of the rhapsode. Hence, an 
excursus about the cultural role of the rhapsode is necessary not only to fill the gap of 
meaning that sets after twenty-six centuries, but also and especially, to understand the gap 
of meaning that comes between a preliterate, oral-based culture which was shifting 
towards literacy, as the one in which the fictious rhapsode Ion lived, and a post-literate120 
culture, as the one in which we live. 
Among the different etymological hypotheses, the most convincing is that claiming the 
term rhapsode originated from the verb rhaptein (to sew) in conjunction with aoide 
(songs).121 According to this, the rhapsode was a sewer of songs, but this does not give 
any specific element of distinction about the rhapsodic art. In addition, according to this 
definition, the rhapsode is not very different from a poet and this seems to be true not 
only in terms of etymology, but also in factual terms. In fact, in the Republic Plato defines 
 
119 Cf. Rijksbaron, 2007, pp. 124-128. 
120 The term post-literate here refers to our contemporary culture, strongly affected by communication 
formats emerged with the media revolution in the 60’s. The term is taken by Orville Jenkins, 2006. 
121 This etymology can be attributed to Dionysus Thrax, Techne Grammatike, I, I, 8, 5. For this 
etymology, cf. the accurate analysis by Capuccino, 2005, pp. 263-273. 
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Homer and Hesiod, who were the most emblematic poets of his culture, as rhapsodes. 122 
Consequently, the challenge now consists in understanding why these terms and these 
roles were interchangeable. The solution to this can be found only by questioning the 
contemporary way of considering Ancient Greek poetry. 
The most established contemporary interpretation of Ancient Greek Poetry focuses on the 
original oral-mnemonic aspect of poetry. Eric Havelock became the representative of this 
revolutionary tradition, known as the Harvard School. The Harvard School tradition is 
the main theoretical model referred to in this chapter. 
Eric Havelock, a disciple of Milman Parry and Alfred Lord, continued and further 
elaborated on the investigation into oral poetry which his colleagues started in the second 
and third decades of the Twentieth Century. What Parry found out, on the basis of the 
theories held earlier by the linguist Antoine Meillet (who was Parry’s Supervisor at 
Sorbonne), is that the use of formulas, epithets and certain sets of adjectives in Homeric 
Epics was functional to oral memorisation, hence to oral transmission. Therefore, the 
choice of words by Epic Poets was not made primarily considering the meaning of the 
terms, but mainly the rhythm and the fitting of the words themselves in the structure of 
the hexameter. This theory, based on an accurate philological work, was reinforced by a 
couple of trips that Parry took to Ex-Yugoslavia, first on his own, then with Lord. During 
these trips, they investigated and recorded the still living phenomenon of oral, traditional 
poetry memorised and performed by Yugoslavian bards.123 Parry’s method of 
investigation – continued by Lord after Parry’s premature death – combining Greek 
Philology, Slavic Studies and Anthropology, resulted highly original and, although it was 
made possible by a series of favourable circumstances,124 it is a distinctive sign of his 
time. 
Havelock later noticed that his own work, Preface to Plato, was part of a wider cultural 
momentum and also an outcome of a general, intellectual inclination towards the role of 
 
122 Resp. 600d. 
123 Parry, 1971, Introduction. 
124 Milman Parry acknowledges the relevance of the theories elaborated by Mathias Murko, Professor of 
Jugoslavic Poetry in Prague, for his own research, Parry 1971, p. 439. Meillet introduced M. Parry to Murko 
and, according to Adam Parry (son of Milman Parry), it is likely that Murko’s work suggested to M.Parry 
the possibility of finding a living poetry tradition analogue to the Homeric one, Parry, 1971, p. xxiv. 
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orality and its relation to literacy in the history of human culture. This inclination is a very 
contemporary one and Havelock points to the 1963 as the watershed year:  
 
The year 1963 provides a convenient watershed: or perhaps better a date when a dam in the 
modern consciousness appears to burst, releasing a flood of startled recognitions of a host of 
related facts. To be sure, some notice of the role of the spoken as opposed to the written 
tongue goes back to the eighteenth century, and more recently field anthropologists have 
compiled extensive reports of “primitive” societies (meaning nonliterate ones) which have 
indirectly pointed to the need for a category of human communication designated as primary 
orality. But the suggestion took the form of a firm concept only after 1963 […]. Within the 
span of twelve months or less, from some time in 1962 to the spring of 1963, in three different 
countries – France, Britain, and the United States – there issued from the printing presses five 
publications by five authors who at the time when they wrote could not have been aware of 
any mutual relationship.  The works in question were La Pensée Sauvage (Levi-Strauss), 
“The Consequences of Literacy” (Goody and Watt, an extended article), The Gutenberg 
Galaxy (McLuhan), Animal Species and Evolution (Mayr), and Preface to Plato 
(Havelock).125 
 
After 1963, argues Havelock, the focus on the Oral Problem has been predominant in 
academic and specialised publications. This focus on orality, mainly on an 
anthropological level, lasted for at least twenty years and culminated with Walter Ong’s 
work, Orality and Literacy (1982), which also has the merit of tracing back the modern-
contemporary history of this theme. 
How and why the study of orality produced so much evidence to support an oral theory 
of Ancient Greek Poetry before the watershed year. In answer to this question, Havelock 
refers to the widespread use of radio and its impact, especially during the Second World 
War;126 he also refers to the relevance of anthropological investigations which produced 
“cross-cultural collisions” by showing the existence of non-literate cultures based on 
 
125 Havelock, 1986, pp. 24-25. 
126 In line with this are also some evaluation by McLuhan. I.e.: Our Western values, built on the written 
word, have already been considerably affected by the electric media of telephone, radio, and TV. Perhaps 
that is the reason why many highly literate people in our time find it difficult to examine this question 
without getting into a moral panic. There is the further circumstance that, during his more than two 
thousand years of literacy, Western man has done little to study or to understand the effects of the phonetic 
alphabet in creating many of his basic patterns of culture. To begin now to examine the question may, 
therefore, seem too late. McLuhan, 1994, p. 82. 
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orality still at his time.127 Havelock’s answers offer determinant elements to understand 
the relevance of orality on that cultural scene. Nevertheless, as a Greek Philologist, hence 
as a historian of Greek written language, Havelock probably underestimates the impact 
of another approach to language that flourished before the watershed year and that has a 
common origin with his own tradition which started with Parry. 
As said, Parry had been Meillet’s student in Paris; Meillet was a Greek Philologist, a 
Slavic and Oriental Languages Philologist and a Linguist. In his cultural development, at 
the very end of the Nineteenth Century, an important role was played in the teaching of 
Comparative Grammar at the École Pratique des Autes Études in Paris by Ferdinand de 
Saussure, considered the founder of the Structuralism and Modern Linguistics. A 
proficient elaboration of de Saussure’s theses was carried out some years later in Moscow 
by a very talented scholar, Roman Jakobson who then became the most relevant exponent 
of Structuralism. Although he went through many political misadventures, Jakobson 
obtained his Ph.D. at the German University of Prague in 1930 with the dissertation Über 
den Versbau der serbokroatischen Volksepen128 (On the Verse-Making of the 
Serbocroatian Popular Epic). During the same year, Parry published, in the Harvard 
Studies in Classical Philology, an essay entitled “Studies in the Epic Technique of Verse-
Making. I. Homer and the Homeric Style”129 and just a few years later, he left for his first 
trip in Ex-Jugoslavia to record the still existing oral tradition of Serbocroatian popular 
epic performed by bards. Until this point, the Greek Philological tradition from Harvard 
and the Structuralist movement evolved parallel (consciously or not – it is impossible to 
ascertain) around common-rooted themes, but when Parry died in 1935 the two paths 
evolved differently. As said, Parry’s tradition was brought forward by Lord and 
subsequently by Havelock. While Jakobson, well before the watershed year, spread the 
Structuralism not only to another continent but also to other subjects. In fact, when the 
Nazi invasion forced him to escape first in Scandinavia and then to New York, he had 
already theorised the necessity to apply the Structuralist method not only to Linguistics, 
but also to other disciplines. Beginning as a theory, this became a real approach in the 
work of the Anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss who met Jakobson for the first time in 
1941, in New York as a colleague at the École Libre des Hautes Études. 
 
127 Havelock, 1986. 
128 https://libraries.mit.edu/archives/research/collections/collections-mc/mc72.html#ref8425 
129 Parry, 1971, pp. 266-324. 
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Hence, the answer to the question on how it was possible, during the decades that 
preceded the watershed year, that a research on orality encouraged further elaboration on 
a sophisticated theory of the oral origin of Ancient Greek Poetry, is: through the specific 
attention to language and theory of communication that flourished in the first half of the 
Twentieth Century. 
Here has been traced just a brief account of this cultural focus on language, and this 
partiality is in virtue of its connection with the established tradition to which Havelock 
belongs and that is the favoured theoretical position of this chapter – with some limits and 
objections. 
While, the answer to why many reflections on orality emerged from a structuralist 
analysis of language, is essentially intertwined with anthropology. The need to analyse 
language and its structure is exacerbated already at the end of the Nineteenth Century as 
to lead, during the Twentieth Century, to a de-construction of language in order to find 
the original sense of language and communication. The strongest interest behind the over-
analyses of language does not seem to be primarily functional or manipulative. In fact, at 
first, Linguistics and Philology do not aim forward; instead, they look back, but not 
necessarily along a temporal line. The analytic approach aims to trace back the roots as 
to reach the genesis and the origin of language. Hence, the archaeological attempt to 
unearth the origin of what is intrinsically human (language and communication) is the 
point of connection between Linguistics and Anthropology. 
In virtue of a common origin and of a same striving, the two disciplines compenetrate and 
support each other: 
 
The linguist provides the anthropologist with etymologies which permit him to establish 
between certain kinship terms relationships that were not immediately apparent. The 
anthropologist, on the other hand, can bring to the attention of the linguist customs, 
prescriptions and prohibitions that help him to understand the persistence of certain features 
of language or the instability of terms or groups of terms.130 
 
 
130 Lévi-Strauss, 1963, p. 32. 
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This connection between Linguistics and Anthropology is obvious in European culture at 
least since Rousseau’s Noble Sauvage.131 In fact, there is a line of continuity from 
Rousseau to Lévi-Strauss,132 a line that Derrida names phonocentrism and that is one 
expression of the characterising western philosophical default, otherwise known as 
logocentrism which namely means “metaphysics of phonetic writing” .133 
In simpler terms, the basis on which Anthropology builds its structure is, actually, a 
transition: the transition from nature to culture. The principal symptom of this transition 
is detected in language which has its own phases and inner transitions – such as the 
transition from orality to literacy. The contemporary attention towards orality as opposed 
to literacy – on a linguistic level as much as on an anthropological level – and the amount 
of research developed around this theme, offered a determinant input to the interpretation 
of Ancient Greek Poetry. 
The issue of the oral origin of Ancient Greek Poetry was already debated in antiquity,134 
especially in regard to the Homeric Poems. The issue was much broader as to become 
institutionalised under the name of the Homeric Question during the Nineteenth Century. 
Some aspects of the Homeric Question were already investigated in the Sixteenth 
Century,135 but it is only during the Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Century that the 
Question reaches its full awareness and legitimacy thanks to a stricter philological 
approach, especially by German philologists. Core issues of the Question are: if there was 
a unique author or different authors behind the Iliad and behind the Odyssey; if this author 
was the author of both works; if there was an original kernel around which the poems 
developed later; if the original kernel was written down first or was originally oral. It is 
natural to notice that the issue of authorship is interdependent with the issue of writing. 
In fact, if the poems, or at least their central kernel, were originally written down, then 
 
131 Some anthropological reflections on the origin of language in the primitive and ancient cultures can be 
found the work of Giambattista Vico (i.e. De antiquissima Italorum sapientia, ex linguae latinae originibus 
eruenda, 1710; Scienza Nuova, 1744). It is likely that Vico’s Scienza Nuova influenced Rousseau’s theory 
on the origin of language and for sure Condillac’s theories influenced Rousseau. However, first, in his 
Discourse on the Origin and the Foundation of Inequality among Men (1755) and then in his Essay on the 
Origin of Languages (1781), Rousseau has the merit to theorise an evolution of human language from 
unarticulated primary sounds (to ask help, to grieve), to a deictic and imitative stage (metaphoric) and 
finally to a complex grammar structure (from which follows literacy), and all this without recurring to a 
theological foundation. 
132 Derrida dedicates the entire Second Part of Of Grammatology to this continuity.  
133 Derrida, 1997, p. 3. 
134 Ong, 1982, p. 18. 
135 Cf. D’Aubignac, 1715; Vico, 1744; Wood, 1769; Rousseau, 1781; Wolf, 1795. 
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there is no doubt that there was only one author per poem and from that it could be 
analysed, through stylometry, whether both poems were written by the same author or 
not. Instead, if the origin of the works was oral, then there must have been more than one 
author to transmit (in different places and at different times) the poems with slight 
personal variations from the original kernel, and all these variations contributed to refine 
the work until the point it was written down as we know it in the age of Pisistratus.136 
The main views on the Question are at least two and they are opposed: one view denies a 
unique authorship and a written origin of the Homeric Poems; the other, unitarian view 
considers the poems as works of one and same author. The variations and oppositions 
internal to the first view on the Homeric Question are many and well supported based on 
textual, linguistical, historical and anthropological analyses. In the unitarian view there 
are also differences and variations, but in general this view is supported by whomever 
embraces a literary approach to the Question. This approach prefers to look backward, 
before the fracture of the Homeric Question was posed, in order to keep considering the 
Iliad and the Odyssey as literary masterpieces composed by one and same author. The 
problems of this view are many, for example, there has not been any convincing 
explanation on how these poems were composed, and furthermore, the fact that there was 
a very limited use of writing at the time the poems were supposedly written is ignored. 
However, the main problem of this view – a problem that can be ascribed also to the 
opposing view – is that there is a lack of hermeneutic perspective. In fact, both views 
often considered Ancient Greek Poetry as an art-product similar to Modern and 
Contemporary Poetry. It means that an ancient phenomenon has been mis-interpreted 
with modern categories: 
 
The assumption that in retrospect seems to have been common to all the analyst scholars, 
underlying all the erudition and ingenuity of their constructions, that Homeric poetry was 
essentially poetry like ours, only subject to peculiar distortion and development in its 
transmission, was more harmful finally to their work than the qualities for which they have 
been frequently taken to task: their dogmatic presentation of guesswork, their revealing 
disagreements with each other.137  
 
136 Lachmann, 1847, pp. 31-33. 
137 Parry, 1971, p. xviii. 
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The entire Homeric Question would actually deserve at least a chapter, but it is not 
entirely relevant here.138 In fact, to follow up the historical development of the Question 
would not be beneficial for this dissertation, as it “had taken on a life of its own that 
overwhelmed the poetry. For the sake of scoring points against opponents, it had become 
scholarly practice to disparage the ancient epics themselves.” 139 This is one reason to 
focus instead on some of the positive developments in relation to the Homeric Question 
carried out by the tradition started with Parry. 
Milman Parry’s approach, as shown, was very much a child of his time, but it was also 
revolutionary, especially for its capacity to find another way out of the Homeric Question. 
In fact, Parry’s studies on the Homeric Verse highlighted how the choice of words for the 
verse was made primarily to pander to the hexameter’s structure without sacrificing the 
meaning. This also explains the recurrent use of epithets and formulas in Homeric Epics. 
This finding says something very important about the origin of Greek Poetry: the rhythm 
of the words was more important than their semantic. Hence, these words were initially 
put together to be heard and not to be read, or better, they were put together to be easily 
uttered, then to be captivatingly heard. It must be acknowledged that for this type of oral 
literature, poetic composition is completely different from the modern conception of 
poetic composition and this aspect emerges mainly from the investigations developed by 
Albert Lord in Ex-Yugoslavia. While there is a temporal gap between composition and 
reading/performance in a literary poem; instead, in the case of an oral poem 
“[…]composition and performance are two aspects of the same moment. […] An oral 
poem is not composed for but in performance.” 140 By studying the Slavic Tradition, Lord 
realises that illiteracy is a common feature in oral poetic traditions. In fact, in a literary 
culture writing substitutes and then replaces the function of oral narrative songs.141 This 
 
138 For further information of the Homeric Question it is recommended the reading of: Parry, 1971; Ong, 
1982; Nagy, 1996; Morris and Powell, 1997. 
139 Turner, F.M. in Morris and Powell ed., 1997, p. 138. 
140 Lord, 1971, p. 13. 
141 Ivi, p. 20. The connection between illiteracy and oral culture has been widely studied not only in relation 
to Ancient Greek poetry and to Slavic tradition, but also in relation to native communities of Africa (cf. 
Finnegan, 1976 and 1988) and Americas (Levi-Strauss, 1961). The decision of excluding other exempla in 
this context does not depend on the relevance of these studies, it rather depends on the need to circumscribe 
the study on the phenomenon Ancient Greek Poetry. 
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is one of the reasons why it is not possible to read and interpret Ancient Greek Poetry in 
the same way as Modern Poetry. 
At this stage, enough elements have been covered to allow the exploration into the 
difference between a poet and a rhapsode in Ancient Greek Poetry. It can be supposed 
that the moment when the creative action of the poet and the performing action ceased to 
be simultaneous corresponds most likely to the moment when literacy became a social 
and cultural reality. When epic was institutionalised and put down in writing, the terms 
aedos,142 rhapsode and poet overlapped determining also a reduction of improvisation in 
the mimetic oral repetition. 
At the time of Socrates, rhapsodes were professional reciters who had a determinant role 
during religious and social celebrations; although their role declined over the centuries 
because of the dominant role that theatre conquered, they were still a traditional institution 
in Classical Greece. Their role was institutionalised and it was perceived as a social need 
precisely because of the oral origin of Greek Poetry. In fact, before Homeric Poems were 
written down, the rhapsodes were the depositaries and transmitters – made out of flesh 
and blood – of those epic hexameters. It must be clarified that these poetic performances 
were not meant to be entertaining primarily, they meant to preserve a heritage of notions 
and hence to be educative tools for shaping social identity. As a matter of fact, according 
to Havelock’s studies, the Iliad and the Odyssey were like social encyclopaedia143 of an 
entire culture. 
Rhapsodes would perform passages from epic poems in front of a vast audience and 
possibly partake in competitions. The parameters of the competitions were certainly relied 
on memory as a skill, but not mainly. It seems very clear from the origin of their 
profession that rhapsodes had no authorship or compositional skills. Before the spread 
use of writing, rhapsodes were supposed to perform by sewing together different passages 
that they had learnt by heart through the previous listening to other rhapsodes. They would 
sew availing of formulas and epithets and obeying primarily to the rhythm and to the 
structure of the verse. Even after the writing down of traditional epic verses, rhapsodes 
still performed the same sewing process by oral performances. The writing down of the 
 
142 This is the technical Greek term to refer to the singer of poems who would compose and perform at the 
same time. In the Homeric Poems there are frequent reference to this social character who was able to 
compose and sing in improvisation. Cf. Parry, 1971, p. XVI. 
143 Havelock, 1963, pp. 61-86. 
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verses, allowed them to save energy on memorisation and to focus even better on the 
emotional bond with the audience. It is not a coincidence that the century in which 
Socrates lived (and the fictitious Ion is located) was the century in which rhetoric and 
sophistry flourished. Hence, the parameters of the rhapsodic competitions were mainly 
depending on the ability of the rhapsode of captivating, moving and shaking the souls of 
the audience. In certain ways, writing empowered some forms of orality and this is 
another reason for not thinking about orality/writing as an opposition, but rather as an 
anthropological shift. 
Recapitulating from Socrates’ praise to the evaluations carried so far, it can be said a good 
rhapsode was beautifully looking in order to be liked by the audience; also, he had his 
mind occupied with good poets. However, was he really supposed to understand the 
dianoia of the poets? 
In the light of the above, Ion does not have to understand the thoughts of the poets, he 
only had to repeat the words (which, at his time were already immobilised in writing) 
previously memorised and he has to transmit irrational feelings through the repetition of 
these words. It is true that, once the poems were written down, the rhapsode became a 
sort of literary exegete, a hermeneus, but never a composer himself. The aedos was a 
composer and singer of verses at the same time; the poet was a composer of verses; the 
rhapsode was just a reciter of what had already been composed. 
Behind Socrates’ praise, especially on the third point about the understanding of the 
thought, there is a provocation. The provocation aims to show and to make Ion aware, in 
a perfect Socratic style, that the rhapsode cannot have knowledge of the thought of the 
poets, because he cannot even give account of his own techne. In fact, Ion has no techne 
as having a techne means having mastery of the chosen art as a whole: it means to know 
and to be able to explain what you do, how you do it, why you do it and what is its 
purpose. Instead, the only thing Ion knows is that he is the most talented in talking about 
Homer, and only about Homer, in the most beautiful way.144 The very point of weakness 
is this uniqueness. Socrates claims that if someone masters a techne, then he masters this 
techne as a whole and not just a specific trait: 
 
 
144 Ion 533c. 
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SOCRATES: […] Anybody could understand what I meant: don’t you use the same 
discipline throughout whenever you master the whole of a subject? Take this for discussion—
painting is a subject to be mastered as a whole, isn’t it? […] Have you ever known anyone 
who is clever at showing what’s well painted and what’s not in the work of Polygnotus, but 
who’s powerless to do that for other painters? […] 
ION: Good lord no, of course not! […] 
SOCRATES: And further, it is my opinion, you’ve never known anyone ever—not in flute-
playing, not in cithara-playing, not in singing to the cithara, and not in rhapsodizing—you’ve 
never known a man who is clever at explaining Olympus or Thamyrus or Orpheus or 
Phemius, the rhapsode from Ithaca, but who has nothing to contribute about Ion, the rhapsode 
from Ephesus, and cannot tell when he does his work well and when he doesn’t—you’ve 
never known a man like that. 
ION: I have nothing to say against you on that point, Socrates. But this I know about myself: 
I speak about Homer more beautifully than anybody else and I have lots to say; and 
everybody says I do it well. But about the other poets I do not. Now see what that means. 
SOCRATES: I do see, Ion, and I’m going to announce to you what I think that is. As I said 
earlier, that’s not a subject you’ve mastered—speaking well about Homer; it’s a divine power 
that moves you […] (Ion 532e-533c) 
 
The words that Ion performs orally seem to be very similar to the written words of Lysia’s 
speech in the Phaedrus. These words are orphans, no one owns them and defends them, 
they are just repeated and heard. They cannot express any knowledge (episteme) because 
whoever reproduces them has no knowledge of what he is talking about, but has only an 
appearance of knowledge. 
 
But you, Ion, you’re doing me wrong, if what you say is true that what enables you to praise 
Homer is knowledge or mastery of a profession. […] You aren’t even willing to tell me what 
it is that you’re so wonderfully clever about, though I’ve been begging you for ages. Really, 
you’re just like Proteus, you twist up and down and take many different shapes, till finally 
you’ve escaped me. (Ion 542a) 
 
Rhapsodising is similar to painting or acting. A painter does not have to be a craftsman 
to paint a bed, just as an actor does not have to be a king to represent a king on the stage, 
just as a rhapsode does not have to be a general to speak about war strategy in Homeric 
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poems. These arts imitate, and not without purpose, Socrates refers to the art of painting145 
and to the art of sculpting as comparisons for the art of rhapsody. The comparison is 
actually wider and continues referring also to the art of flute-playing, cithara-playing and 
singing. It seems pretty clear that what connects painting and sculpting to rhapsodising is 
mimesis (imitation/representation). However, what is it that binds together flute, cithara 
and singing to rhapsody? The answer is rhythm. Rhythm itself is a support of memory 
and of mimesis. The relevance of this supporting role can be better understood only 
considering the other half of the rhapsodic performance. 
So far, the role of the audience participating to rhapsodic recitals has not been considered 
much. The audience is the other half of the performance itself, as the performance is a 
real exchange between the rhapsode and his public. The exchange happens through the 
voice uttered by the rhapsode and heard by the audience, but there is a much wider 
involvement, the involvement of the entire soul (psyche) and of the entire body. Very 
often, the audience would not just listen, but it would participate actively imitating the 
rhapsode: repeating the verses and dancing according to the rhythm of the hexameter 
punctuated by music that always accompanied these performances. The rhapsodic recitals 
were a totalising experience that would release the psyche from anxieties and relax the 
body from tensions, as if the audience was almost hypnotised and dragged by rhythmic 
words and music. This type of performances did not aim only to preserve the culture of a 
commonalty through the repetition of its epos, but also to urge pleasure and recreation, in 
other words “the Muse, the voice of instruction, was also the voice of pleasure.” 146 
There are two features about Ion’s art on which Socrates insists more than once. First, Ion 
does not even have a techne, neither he has dianoia of the thoughts of the poets; hence he 
performs his art without awareness. His knowledge is not rational; it is not mastered, as 
he cannot explain what it is. His knowledge is irrational, and this is the second point that 
Socrates stresses. Ion seems to be only an instrument, a vehicle, better a hermeneus (now 
used in the sense of intermediator) between the Muses and the audience. Maybe he has 
not a techne, but he has a mania (madness) and the ability to transmit it as much as to 
 
145 Cf. also Resp. 198b. 
146 Havelock, 1963, p. 152. 
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make entheoi147 also the members of the audience. Ion’s mania is categorised in between 
other irrational activities which were part of the spiritual and religious heritage of Ancient 
Greek Culture. These maniai148 were both non-rational and non-conscious, although they 
were not related to a pathological state, rather, they were mostly considered a source of 
authority.149 In the Ion, in the Symposium, in the Phaedrus and also in the Timaeus Plato 
refers to the mania as something necessary to be in contact with the gods and gain 
knowledge from them.150 To engage in divination a human being has to lose control of 
his/her mind as to let the good to take possession of his/her soul.151 The most established 
account of this madness comes from the Phaedrus where Socrates, in order to strengthen 
the positive source of love-madness, states that “the best things we have come from 
madness, when it is given as a gift of the god.” 152. The divine madness, or else mania, 
has different forms of expression among humans, such as: prophecies and predictions; 
mystic rites and purifications; “[…] possession by the Muses, which takes a tender virgin 
soul and awakens it to a Bacchic frenzy of songs and poetry that glorifies the 
achievements of the past and teaches them to future generations.” 153 – this is precisely 
the mania that Ion expresses; and last, erotic madness that arises in the soul of the person 
who has fallen in love. 
Being entheos, as every maniac is and as Ion is, means to be dispossessed of the soul and 
this is the very reason why Ion has no responsibility for what he does. 
By calling the poetic mania as a deus ex machina on the scene of the Ion, Socrates denies 
any form of rationality to the art of rhapsody. Ion is simply a voice possessed by the 
Muses and he sings Homer not for choice, but almost for an innate talent, or more 
precisely for theia moira,154 divine fate. Moira is the portion of fate that happens to each 
 
147 Technically the Ancient Greek term entheos means “full of god”, or else “filled by god”. It refers to the 
phenomenon of divine inspiration, when a prophet or a poet would lose control over his own soul and would 
be possessed by a god. Cf. Velardi, 1989. 
148 For an accurate reflection on these forms of sacred madness, cf. Chap. III in Dodds, 1951. 
149 Hatab, 1990, p. 57. 
150 It is typical of ancient cultures to consider divine madness as a form of knowledge, but Ancient Greek 
Culture was definitely giving to sacred madness a privileged role also in public and politic life, as much as 
madness was considered the origin of knowledge. Cf. Colli, 1975, pp. 15-21. 
151 Tim. 71e. 
152 Phaedr. 244a. 
153 Ivi, 245a. 
154 Ion, 534c. Theia moira (literally “divine partition”) is the very same terminology that Plato attributes to 
Socrates when this last one tries to explain what is that “voice” that pushes him to speak and act rightly, cf. 
Apol. 33c. Jean-Luc Nancy insists on the vocal aspect of the rhapsodic activity, considering it as a partition 
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and every human being, it is personal and unique. For Ion his moira corresponds to his 
voice. Considering the role and the type of performance in Ancient Greek Poetry, it is 
deducible that the voice of the rhapsode has a sensorial surplus if compared to the 
contemporary idea of orality: it is more material and physical because it has a rhythm and 
a melody which are specific traits of identity and are bearers of meaning, a meaning that 
it is not necessarily rational.155 Hearing, in Ancient Greek Culture, was the predominant 
sense, especially before the spread of literacy which instead, through the introduction of 
the alphabet,156 involves vision. Archaic Greek Culture is oral-based, or better, vocal-
based in a way that it is very difficult to imagine for a contemporary reader. In fact, to 
accept the complete lack of responsibility and the complete passivity of the rhapsode Ion, 
it has to be understood that the psychology (literary, the structure of the soul) of a Greek 
Poet had not consciousness and not precise idea of the self, hence lacked completely of 
self-consciousness. Some vocal messages, accompanied and emphasised by the rhythm 
of music, were stored passively and would be recalled with the same passivity, almost in 
a state of trance. Some studies convincingly showed that in Greek Archaic Culture 
auditory hallucinations157 would work as nowadays intuition and visualisation work and 
self-identity would be better identified with the personal voice rather than by self-
consciousness. 
The opposition to orality that Plato expressed through Socrates’ hunt of the rhapsode, it 
is actually, but partially, also criticism to a vocal based psychology. The “new-born” 
philosophy is a reaction to the archaic culture based on vocality, irrationality and 
passivity. Socrates’ quest for truth cannot accept any ready-made, impersonal, 
uncontrollable and especially easy-to-repeat logos. The soul, which is the tool of the 
philosopher, has to be readable, tided up and purified of any form of irrationality. 
 
But to see the soul as it is in truth, we must not study it as it is while it is maimed by its 
association with the body and other evils—which is what we were doing earlier—but as it is 
in its pure state, that’s how we should study the soul, thoroughly and by means of logical 
 
of the divine voice itself as if the personal voice represents the personal identity, the individual soul of each 
human being. Cf. Nancy, 1993, pp. 65-sgg. 
155 Cf. the analyses developed by Cavarero, 2003. 
156 Most likely spread by the mid-eight century BCE. Cf. Havelock, 1986, p. 63. 
157 With this term Julian Jaynes refers to the “auditory hallucinations” that were typical of prophets and 
god-possessed human beings, cf. Jaynes, 1976, pp. 340-341. 
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reasoning. We’ll then find that it is a much finer thing than we thought and that we can see 
justice and injustice as well as all the other things we’ve discussed far more clearly. What 
we’ve said about the soul is true of it as it appears at present. But the condition in which 
we’ve studied it is like that of the sea god Glaucus, whose primary nature can’t easily be 
made out by those who catch glimpses of him. Some of the original parts have been broken 
off, others have been crushed, and his whole body has been maimed by the waves and by the 
shells, seaweeds, and stones that have attached themselves to him, so that he looks more like 
a wild animal than his natural self. The soul, too, is in a similar condition when we study it, 
beset by many evils. (Resp. 611b-d) 
 
2.2. Myth and Philosophy 
If on the one hand, logos – intended as rational reasoning – and dialogos (especially the 
one that occurs within the soul) are the tools and the gifts of the philosopher; then, on the 
other hand, performance and mania (specifically the one that comes from the Muses) are 
the tools and the gifts of the poet. The philosopher detects and sets this opposition on the 
battlefield of the soul. However, the opposition seems to be unjust as the poet is not aware 
of it, he is not even aware of the readability of his soul. The poet speaks and hears material 
words; he does not have inner dialogues made out of immaterial words – as the 
philosopher does. In addition, the poet is not in control of his soul, his soul is at the service 
of the Muses, it is the channel of poetic madness. The philosopher instead knows his own 
soul and makes it disciplined to serve the logos. 
Plato can be considered the first author to set out the opposition between myth and 
philosophy, but very often Plato identifies myth with the entire contents of the oral 
tradition, to the point that he considers the poet not simply a myth-teller, but also a myth-
maker.158  The differences between philosopher and poet are multiple and widely 
expressed by Plato throughout his dialogues. Nevertheless, there is one difference which 
expresses an opposition between poet and philosopher, a difference which remains 
blurred compared to the others, although it says a lot about the cultural shift from an oral 
culture to a literate culture. The theme of this opposition is memory: the memory of the 
poet is a goddess; the memory of the philosopher is coincident with true knowledge. 
 
158 Naddaf, G. in Wians, ed. by, pp. 101-102. 
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The exercise of memorisation, as it can be understood nowadays, is a phaenomenon that 
appeared in Greece only at the beginning of the IV Century BCE among literate 
intellectuals,159 almost as a necessary technique to acquire for the exercise of rhetoric. 
Back in Archaic Greece, the poets’ memory was personified with the goddess 
Mnemosyne (literary, remembrance). Mnemosyne as a goddess did not have any direct 
communication with the poet, she availed of a more sophisticated system of 
communication which is the poetic mania given to the poets in different ways, via the 
intercession of different Muses. Hence, Mnemosyne communicates with the poets 
through the Muses, and the Muse sings to the audience through the voice of the poet. The 
real gift of the poet is not simply to sing; rather it is to be able to hear the voice of the 
Muses during a maniac trance. 
The nine sisters known as Muses retain the heritage of Mnemosyne as they are her 
daughters. The Muses can be considered the guardians of social memory, a form of 
memory preserved and transmitted in spoken speech.160 They are very representative of 
the oral culture to the point that the preservation of social memory, as well as the role of 
the Muses changed slowly with the progressive introduction of literacy in Greek Culture, 
up to the point that their influence on poets was no longer functional, but simply 
inspirational. 
In Greek Epics, at the beginning of any poem, the poet addresses the Muses asking them 
to sing something to him so that then he would be able to sing it himself to his audience. 
Almost as if by searching for the voices of the Muses, the poet indeed searches for that 
voice which would help him to sing: the inner voice of memory. With the support of 
writing, poets did not need to hear the sound of that voice as much as they did in the past. 
In fact, the words were put down and became visible. Nevertheless, poets and rhapsodes 
kept invoking the Muses at least as an inspirational ritual. The Muses are not only 
daughters of Mnemosyne, but also of Zeus. This makes their genealogy not only culturally 
relevant but also religiously relevant. They are as functional as solemn; also, being almost 
a choir, they needed a lead which was taken by Apollo, the Greek god of Poetry. The 
Muses were specialised in different artistic disciplines representative of an archaic, oral-
based culture. Their own names reveal their primary belonging to an oral culture. In 
 
159 Havelock, 1986, p. 80. 
160 Ivi, p. 79. 
78 
 
 
conventional order: Cleio (Celebrator) represented History; Euterpe (Delighter) 
represented Lyric Poetry; Thaleia (Luxuriator) represented Comedy; Melpomene (Song 
Player) represented Tragedy; Terpsichore (Dance-Delighter) represented Choral Lyric 
and Dance; Erato (Enrapturer) represented Erotic Poetry; Polyhymnia (Hymnal Player) 
represented Ritual Dance and Sacred Singing; Urania (Heaven Dweller) represented 
Astrology; Calliope (Fair-Speaker) represented Eulogy. 
The contents of Greek Poetry were conveyed to the poets by the voice of the Muses. The 
Epic Poet who more than anyone else was able to categorise clearly what the voice of the 
Muses told him, was Hesiod. In the Proem of the Theogony, while invoking the Muses 
for inspiration, Hesiod gives relevant information about the cultural role of the nine 
sisters. Specifically, he says that “They sing the laws (nomoi) of all and the ways (ethe) 
of all/ even of the immortals they do celebrate.” 161 Both terms laws and ways shifted their 
meaning from the original use of Greek Archaic Culture to the use made later by 
Philosophy. The shift moves from a more concrete meaning of the terms to a more 
abstract one. By laws here is intended the force of usage and customs before they were 
written down,162 while ethe (ways) – etymologically connected to the haunt of an animal 
– in this context means personal behaviour patterns or even personal character.163 
The striking aspect of Hesiod’s declaration does not consist in revealing the contents of 
the Muses’ songs, but rather in the juxtaposition of human laws and ways with those of 
the immortals. This is a characterising trait of Epos and one of the points of criticism in 
the platonic opposition to Poetry and imitative arts in general. In fact, in the Republic, 
Plato says that “the most serious charge against imitation, namely, that with a few rare 
exceptions it is able to corrupt even decent people” 164 This corruption happens because 
of a double imitation: the poet in his compositions imitates the behaviour of heroes and 
gods making them too vulnerable to suffering and grief; hence, human beings, taking 
heroes and gods as exempla of virtue, end up in imitating their psychological weaknesses. 
Heroes and Gods in epos are represented with human psychological features and this is 
wrong according to Plato, as the only way for a man to become just is to make himself 
godlike, but the image of the gods in the epos is completely anthropomorphised. Gods 
 
161 Hesiod, Theogony, vv. 64-68. 
162 Havelock, 1963, p. 63. 
163 Ibidem. 
164 Resp. 605c. 
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and heroes in the epos are easily inclined towards their weakest part of the soul, the 
irrational/emotional part. It is precisely this part of the soul that is urged by traditional 
Greek Poetry. 
The problematic aspects that led Plato to an opposition against this whole poetic world 
are many but they all converge to the theme of the soul, to its safeguard and ownership. 
This is explicitly expressed in the Republic, the dialogue that par excellence looks at the 
structure of the soul in relation to the structure of the ideal city in which justice reigns. 
The role of arts, and specifically the role of the poet in the city, along with the dangerous 
effects of his art on the soul, are questioned in this dialogue, as much that Plato states: 
 
Then let this be our defence – now that we’ve returned to the topic of poetry – that, in view 
of its nature, we had reason to banish it from the city earlier, for our argument compelled us 
to do so. But in case we are charged with a certain harshness and lack of sophistication, let’s 
also tell poetry that there is an ancient quarrel between it and philosophy […]  
(Resp. 605c) 
 
Before trying to understand the social and political reasons of this opposition, it is 
worthwhile to linger on some features about the Greek Archaic, oral-based poetry and its 
slow transition towards literacy. 
The ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, as analysed before, is mainly caused 
by the prevalence of irrational elements in the poetic performance.165 Rhythm, manic 
inspiration, dance and choral dispossession are the features of an oral-based type of 
transmission of knowledge. Moreover, it was not only the way this type of poetry was 
performed to feed that irrational part of the soul, but it was also the contents of this poetry. 
Plato considered dangerous these contents for their effect on the human soul, but also, 
intrinsically, for their deceptive ontological nature. The ontological focus is probably the 
most relevant aspect to keep in mind in order to rebalance, once again, the dichotomy 
between orality and writing in Plato. This major point of the platonic critique of poetry 
(and the arts) has been addressed by Havelock, but somehow also missed, as in fact he 
 
165 This is the platonic position which, even if it sounds quite assertive, it should not be taken as a commonly 
accepted truth. Glenn Most analyses the genealogy of this quarrel and questions its platonic assertiveness 
in “What Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry?” in Destrée and Herrmann, ed. by, 2011, pp. 1-
20. 
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focused mainly on the poetic performance and the social role of Greek poetry connecting 
these themes under the category of Oral Culture. This is perfectly in line with the tradition 
to which Havelock belongs and which he represents; although, in comparison to this same 
tradition, Havelock has the merit of having broadened the theme of orality in Plato to 
more philosophical aspects. 
From a philosophical point of view, the transition from orality to literacy does not reflect 
simply a change in the technology of communication, but reflects a deeper change of 
values from mythology to philosophy. This shift is probably one of the contingent 
elements that determined the birth of Western Philosophy as it is still thought of. 
As already anticipated while talking about the self-perception of the soul by the poet, the 
concept of identity was lacking back in the oral culture and so it was the concept of 
authorship.166 In Epics the poet is present but as a role, not as a specific identity. He is a 
performer and hermeneus. 
In mythical thought the concept of subject, as a pivot around which experience is 
organised and filtered, is missing. Every human being was part of a social, cultural, 
spiritual and natural system, and therefore would not perceive himself/herself as an 
isolated self. The concept of self that is central in philosophy was not developed in 
mythology. In fact, one of the revolutions instigated by Socrates, conventionally the 
initiator of Western Philosophy, consisted in bringing to completion a progressive change 
of meaning of the term psyche. 
 
In brief, instead of signifying a man’s ghost or wraith, or a man’s breath or his life blood, a 
thing devoid of sense and self-consciousness, it came to mean ‘the ghost that thinks’, that is 
capable both of moral decision and of scientific cognition, and is the seat of moral 
responsibility, something infinitely precious, an essence unique in the whole realm of 
nature.167 
 
Self and world are not separated in myth, as much as subject and object are separated in 
philosophy instead. This distance and reversal which is the essential one between 
 
166 Cf. Havelock, 1986, pp. 20-21. 
167 Havelock, 1963, p. 197. 
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mythology and philosophy, is made evident also in other aspects typical of myth that 
changed completely with the advent of philosophy. Whereas myth would focus on 
specific exempla and situations, full of concrete details; philosophy, on the contrary, 
would abstract from concreteness to reach a general concept. In the same way, while in 
myth there is no different degree of ontological value between reality and imagination, as 
they are both part of the same lived experience; instead, philosophy constantly draws a 
line of demarcation between what is real and what is illusion. Moreover, is the entire way 
of thinking that changes, precisely with the affirmation of the psyche as self-
consciousness. In fact, the affirmation of the subject in opposition to an object, caused an 
active and rational control over the given world, that is typical of philosophy; while myth 
is taken a-critically and its meaning emerges without control, in the same way as dreams 
or hallucinations happen: 
 
Mythical thought requires receptivity; logic cannot exist without activity. Logic does not 
materialize until man has become cognizant of the energy within him, and the individuality 
of his mind. Logical thought is unimpaired wakefulness; mythical thinking borders upon the 
dream, in which images and ideas float by without being controlled by the will.168 
 
The process from mythical thought to philosophy was not straight and clear. Those who 
are conventionally considered the first philosophers (Preplatonics)169 moved their 
attention from mythological stories and characters, to nature, physis, but they still referred 
to mythical elements and categories such as the relation of opposites, the materiality and 
unifying role of the arche. Even later, when philosophy became more conceptual and 
abstract with Plato, the presence of myths was still strong but more as a reference to 
stories and characters which would exemplify the immaterial essence of the philosophical 
logos. Especially, with Plato the myth is a like a crucible of allegories in which deeper 
values, religious rituals and social meaning could be found. In this way myth ceases to be 
the message of the communication, it is silenced and visual, as a blurred past internalised 
and passively memorised. For all these reasons, it is possible to agree with the fact that 
 
168 Snell, 1953, p. 224. 
169 Havelock deliberately decides to use the term “Preplatonics” instead of “Presocratics”. Although -as 
Havelock himself recognises- at least since Zeller (1846) the term Presocratic has become institutionalised, 
in this dissertation it is preferred to follow Havelock’s amendment for chronological and theorical reasons. 
Cf. Havelock, 1996, pp. 15-22. 
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there is no shift from myth to philosophy, but there is an actual shift through myth to 
philosophy.170 
In the same way, there is no shift from orality to writing, but through orality to writing 
and Plato can be considered the main representative of this shift, surely because it gains 
more awareness and intentionality in his cultural project. Plato, in fact, invented a new 
literary genre: the written (oral) dialogue and he called it “philosophy”.171 After Plato, 
this genre veered quickly towards a more systematic style where all oral residual 
(dialogues) are sublimated in the dialectical movement. This is the “philosophical 
treatise” of which Aristotle was already the best representative and it is still the main 
philosophical genre. Philosophy flourished on the basis of literacy and it seems 
impossible to refer to philosophy without its literary substratum. That is also why all the 
Greek mythical heritage has been confined in the tradition of oral poetry in opposition to 
philosophy, an opposition first stated by Plato in an explicit and aware way. 
This deeply rooted opposition reached its dramatic peak in Socrates’ death sentence. 
Socrates was indeed the living example of a new way of thinking that was perceived as 
threatening. This new way of thinking was still expressed orally –Socrates did not leave 
any written work. Plato was in some ways protected by dialogue-writing, although he 
lived the risks of philosophy himself by opening the Academy and also with his 
misadventures in Syracuse. 
The main charge against Socrates was that with his teachings he was corrupting young 
people. His way of teaching was rather a way of raising questions, hence of instigating 
the doubt in that new territory of self-reflection called psyche. The main things to put in 
question by a logical attack were consolidated convictions, established traditions and 
appearances. The world of traditional myth was based precisely on these features. 
Dialectic and rationality aimed to dismantle the passivity of the mythological world and 
instigate the search for a truth that was not ready-made by the tradition. The awakening 
of the individual psyche was considered threatening on a political level, because anything 
could be put into question and the inner truth of the individual could become more 
 
170 Expression taken from Hatab, 1990, p. 199. 
171 Cf. Colli, 1975, p. 109. 
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relevant than the established institutions of the community. Critical thinking is perceived 
as a challenge for social stability. 
In the same way, but in the opposite direction, one of the main platonic charges against 
Poetry (the melting pot of the mythological heritage) is that it corrupts young people by 
giving bad examples. In fact, it feeds the worst part of the human soul by showing human 
beings and gods easily inclined towards emotions and irrational behaviours. Young 
people are the next polites (citizens) in charge for the wellbeing of the city. To be good 
citizens young people need to be awake and aware through a healthy control over their 
souls. The education of young people is at stake in both cases, in attacking philosophy 
and in defending philosophy. 
From the moment the soul was silhouetted with clarity through attentive philosophical 
work, the concept of identity became the pivot of the human experience and the mythical 
world faded away, but never disappeared. 
 
2.3. The Arts and the City 
In the Republic, the criticism of the oral culture, specifically in its poetic guise, starts in 
Book II, continues in Book III and comes back, changed and revised, in Book X. From 
the first occurrence of the issue to its later revision, Plato’s position on poetry changes in 
its disfavour. To explain this type of interruptions and changes which are typical of the 
Republic, often it has been argued that the Republic is a fragmentary work. According to 
this argument, the reasons of this fragmentation are due to the length of the work and to 
the fact that most likely it has been composed in a fragmented way, through a wide lapse 
of time.172 Most studies support this theory of the fragmentation which is valid and 
functional for a general reading of the dialogue, however, in this context, it is preferred 
to consider that the reasons for such interruptions and changes are actually internal and 
rely on the dialectical structure of the work itself.173 It is, in fact, what is discussed in the 
long gap between the first and the last occurrence of poetry that better explains Plato’s 
change of position. 
 
172 Cf. Vegetti, 2008, pp. 7-21. 
173 For a complete and coherent account of the theme of mimesis throughout the entire Republic cf. Belfiore, 
1984, pp. 121-146. 
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The discourse about the arts comes up in the Republic in connection with a discourse on 
the soul, which in turn is related to a theoretical projection of an ideal city in which justice 
reigns –justice is, in fact, the original theme of the dialogue. More specifically, in the 
bigger frame of the whole dialogue, a just city is the one in which live just citizens who 
can become so only if they get a just education.  
When Plato first introduces the theme of poetry in Book II of the Republic, the context of 
discussion is the definition of justice. The exchange is mainly between Socrates and 
Glaucon, but Adeimantus intervenes too citing the common opinion on justice, with 
discourses supported by ancient poets. The discourses from poets like Homer and Hesiod 
show that it requires a lot of effort, and ultimately it is useless, to act according to justice, 
because very often the gods reward the unjust and punish the just. In addition, an unjust 
action can be exculpated following the ancient rituals and sacrifices that purify and 
absolve the soul. Seemingly, there is no convenience in being just. This brings up a radical 
question: why should human beings pursue a strenuous but unrewarding aim such as 
justice?174 
In few lines, through Adeimantus intervention, Plato points to the ancient heritage of the 
poetic tradition to show how it does not allow even the possibility of justice. Even worse, 
it may persuade that injustice is better and easier to live with, and this is highly dangerous 
for the ears of young citizens who are in the process of shaping their souls. Confronted 
with this risk, Socrates is called to give good reasons why justice should be preferable to 
injustice, and also – in connection to this – why ancient poetry should not be part of the 
education of young citizens. 
 
“The investigation we’re undertaking is not an easy one but requires keen eyesight. 
Therefore, since we aren’t clever people, we should adopt the method of investigation that 
we’d use if, lacking keen eyesight, we were told to read small letters from a distance and then 
noticed that the same letters existed elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface. We’d 
consider it a godsend, I think, to be allowed to read the larger ones first and then to examine 
the smaller ones, to see whether they really are the same.” 
 
174 Resp. 366 b-sgg. 
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 “That’s certainly true”, said Adeimantus, “but how is this case similar to our investigation 
of justice?” 
“I’ll tell you. We say, don’t we, that there is the justice of a single man and also the justice 
of a whole city? […] Perhaps, then, there is more justice in the larger thing, and it will be 
easier to learn what it is. So, if you’re willing, let’s first find out what sort of thing justice is 
in a city and afterwards look for it in the individual, observing the ways in which the smaller 
is similar to the larger. That seems fine to me. If we could watch a city coming to be in theory, 
wouldn’t we also see its justice coming to be, and its injustice as well? Probably so. And 
when that process is completed, we can hope to find what we are looking for more easily?”  
“Of course.” […]  
“I think a city comes to be because none of us is self-sufficient, but we all need many things. 
[…] And because people need many things, and because one person calls on a second out of 
one need and on a third out of a different need, many people gather in a single place to live 
together as partners and helpers. And such a settlement is called a city. Isn’t that so? […] And 
if they share things with one another, giving and taking, they do so because each believes 
that this is better for himself?” 
“That’s right.” 
“Come, then, let’s create a city in theory from its beginnings. And it’s our needs, it seems, 
that will create it.” (Resp. 368b-369c) 
 
This method of comparison consists in recognising, through the magnifier of a 
macrocosm, a similar structure in a microcosm. Socrates establishes that there is an 
isomorphism between human soul and city government and through this parallel his 
philosophical focus shifts from justice to political theory. Specifically, he puts the 
theoretical bases on which he projects the foundation of a beautiful city (Kallipolis) in the 
following books of the Republic. This is extremely relevant in this context because one 
thing that Socrates asserts repeatedly, at this early stage already, is that there is no space 
for poetry in such a political project. In the essential structure of a city, which covers only 
the essential needs, poetry is not involved. There is a risk, though, that as the city grows 
beyond its limits, then a series of new accessories and new characters is required: 
 
Then we must enlarge our city, for the healthy one is no longer adequate. We must increase 
it in size and fill it with a multitude of things that go beyond what is necessary for a city—
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hunters, for example, and artists or imitators, many of whom work with shapes and colours, 
many with music. And there’ll be poets and their assistants, actors, choral dancers, 
contractors, and makers of all kinds of devices, including, among other things, those needed 
for the adornment of women. And so we’ll need more servants, too. Or don’t you think that 
we’ll need tutors, wet nurses, nannies, beauticians, barbers, chefs, cooks, and swineherds? 
We didn’t need any of these in our earlier city, but we’ll need them in this one. (Resp. 373 a-
c) 
 
The poets are listed in a series of unnecessary adornments which may be required in a 
larger city. Bearing in mind the parallelism between city and soul, it can be implicitly 
assumed that there is a similar risk for the soul too. If the soul gets more than it needs, 
then unnecessary needs will come up. This is not explicitly stated, but the way Socrates 
shifts back from the city to the soul is quite pointed. He starts considering how the city 
has grown, so that it requires an army for the defence of all its needs. The army has to be 
composed of professional guardians who have to be in possession of certain physical 
dispositions by nature, such as fast reactions and strength – spiritedness, in one word. 
This is all they need, according to their physical disposition; but, if their souls are that 
spirited too, they may end up acting savagely among themselves and also with their own 
citizens – observes Socrates.175 How do we get an army of spirited guardians who are also 
gentle – when required, and philosophical – since they need to discern between friends 
and enemies?176 
The answer is through education. This answer brings Socrates back to the exploration of 
the soul and this investigation helps also to reach the goal of the original inquiry which 
was the definition of justice. For a moment, the foundation of the beautiful city is put 
aside, to focus on the education of the soul of the guardians. As predictable, if the poets 
were an unnecessary adornment for the city, it can be deduced that they are no good for 
the soul either. 
At first, indeed, Socrates claims that the best education is based on music and poetry for 
the soul, and on physical exercise for the body. On second thoughts, he rejects poetry 
because all poetry derives from the stories told by the ancient oral tradition (Homer and 
 
175 Resp. 375b. 
176 To distinguish between friends and enemies means to be able to distinguish between right and wrong 
which is a specific task of the philosopher. 
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Hesiod mainly). The problem with these stories is that by being false and not well told, 
they are compromising the education of the youngest: 
 
Telling the greatest falsehood about the most important things doesn’t make a fine story […]. 
But even if it were true, it should be passed over in silence, not told to foolish young people.  
The young can’t distinguish what is allegorical from what isn’t, and the opinions they absorb 
at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable. For these reasons, then, we should 
probably take the utmost care to insure that the first stories they hear about virtue are the best 
ones for them to hear. (Resp. 377e-378e) 
 
Circularly, the detailed motivations and exempla offered towards the end of Book II, 
reconnect and reinforce the first occurrence of poetry, with its the criticism of ancient 
culture, expressed early in the same Book. The poets tell false stories about gods and 
heroes, hence they instigate and promote injustice, this becomes even a bigger danger if 
it impacts on the souls of young citizens. 
This quite intuitive criticism, expressed in an articulated narrative frame, contains a more 
implicit aspect that links with the criticism of poetry which follows in Book III of the 
Republic. It is the connection between false stories and false images which recurs often 
in the Republic. 
The first time that this connection occurs, it is meant literally and not metaphorically; this 
is one of the reasons why this connection needs to be considered as intentionally 
established by Plato and not just rhetorical. More precisely, Socrates, while articulating 
his criticism of storytelling, compares a false story to a bad painting which does not 
represent things as they are.177 Then, a few passages later, talking about falsehood in a 
more ontological way, Socrates states that a falsehood in words is not a complete 
falsehood, as it is an imitation, an image:  
 
Surely, as I said just now, this would be most correctly called true falsehood-ignorance in the 
soul of someone who has been told a falsehood. Falsehood in words is a kind of imitation178 
 
177 Resp. 377e. 
178 Italics is mine. 
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of this affection in the soul, an image of it that comes into being after it and is not a pure 
falsehood. (Resp. 383b) 
 
In the last occurrence, in Book II, it is again related to deception; specifically the false 
story told by ancient poets cannot be trusted in their representation of the gods, because 
a god does not deceive by means of images, words or signs. 
It needs to be noted that the connection between logos and eidos that Plato starts 
establishing through Book II of the Republic has a specific name revealed en passant, this 
name is mimesis (imitation, representation). This should not surprise, as in fact mimesis 
played this same connecting role in regard to the critique of writing. The theme of mimesis 
is a clear point of connection between the criticism of writing and the criticism of orality 
which converge in the wider theme of the ontology of the image, as it shown at the end 
of this chapter. 
In Book III of the Republic the theme of mimesis comes back openly, still in relation to 
the criticism of poetic stories. Socrates assesses again the rejection of all the poetic stories 
which contain falsehood, then proposes to leave the discussion about the content (logos) 
of the stories to focus rather on the style (lexis) in which these are told.179 
There are three stylistic ways that the poets use for storytelling: one is narration itself 
(diegesis), when the poet uses his own voice to refer a story; the second is imitation 
(mimesis), when the poet narrates through the voice of the characters – this is the typical 
style of tragedy and comedy; the last is a combination of the two previous styles – which 
is the typical style of epos. 
After this distinction, Socrates goes directly to the point of this stylistic analysis which 
consists in rejecting mimesis once again. Mimesis, as a stylistic device in which logos and 
eidos are connected, is dangerous in the city because it allows the possibility of 
multiplicity, which means that a person can act as if he/she is at the same time 
himself/herself, and someone else, just by means of imitation and not by means of real 
knowledge. Furthermore, multiplicity of roles is not suitable to the constitution (politeia) 
of the beautiful city where everyone has a precise role and does only one specific job.180 
 
179 Resp. 392c. 
180 Resp. 397e. 
89 
 
 
This last, seems a too abstract reason itself to exclude poetry from the beautiful city, but 
it gains a more complete sense of reality when applied to the educative system, especially 
that of the guardians which is at stake in Books II and III of the Republic. 
This criticism may leave contemporary readers quite astonished, not only because of the 
exclusion of poetry from an educative system, but also because the work in which Plato 
is articulating this criticism is written precisely with the style that it is banished from the 
city, the mimetic style. Through Socrates’ voice, Plato seems to banish any form of poetry 
(and his own dialogues too) from the beautiful city. However, there are actually some 
exceptions, within the mimetic style, that can make it acceptable: 
 
It seems, then, that if a man, who through clever training can become anything and imitate 
anything, should arrive in our city, wanting to give a performance of his poems, we should 
bow down before him as someone holy, wonderful, and pleasing, but we should tell him that 
there is no one like him in our city and that it isn’t lawful for there to be. We should pour 
myrrh on his head, crown him with wreaths, and send him away to another city. But, for our 
own good, we ourselves should employ a more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and 
storyteller, one who would imitate the speech of a decent person and who would tell his 
stories in accordance with the patterns we laid down when we first undertook the education 
of our soldiers. (Resp. 398 a-b) 
 
According to this passage, some part of the poetic art is actually valid and worth saving 
it as far as, when it comes to imitation, it imitates good characters who can work as 
exempla for the younger citizens. Probably, this is the role imagined for Plato’s own 
philosophical dialogues. 
Nevertheless, later on, in Book X, the last Book of the Republic, Plato’s position becomes 
harsher. That careful stylistic distinction (between diegesis and mimesis) fades away and 
the entire poetic art is condemned as mimetic: 
 
[…] all such poetry is likely to distort the thought of anyone who hears it, unless he has the 
knowledge of what it is really like, as a drug to counteract it. (Resp. 595b) 
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Poets can only present things by their appearances, not in their truth. The drug to 
counteract this poetic spell would be the knowledge of things as they really are – and not 
as they seem. For this reason, Socrates decides to reject also the verses of the beloved 
Homer, in fact, there cannot be any exception, as no man is more honourable than the 
truth.181 
From this moment on Socrates and Glaucon engage in a philosophical analysis of 
mimesis. 
Through the famous example of the table and the bed, Socrates and Glaucon are able to 
distinguish three ontological degrees, corresponding to three different activities. This 
distinction makes possible the acknowledgment of the three steps that lead from truth to 
appearance through mimesis. First, there is the generation of an idea which comes directly 
from the god; then, there is the production of an object that the craftsman creates looking 
to the idea of it; last, there is the visual representation of that object painted by an artist. 
In this transition there is an anti-climax in terms of ontological value which is also 
aggravated by the multiplicity that it implies. In fact, the idea is only one and whole, while 
the objects created by the craftsman can be many and the images represented by the 
painter can be even more. Hence, the transition in three steps not only diminishes the 
value of the original idea by decreasing its ontological value, but also by the dispersion 
that the easy multiplication of the image allows. 
This fairly intuitive tripartite scheme is simplified through very concrete examples – bed 
and table are quite trivial, but common. If, on one side, this makes the concept easy to 
grasp, on the other side it makes it also vulnerable to philosophical criticisms. The chief 
of these criticisms addresses the reason why the painter cannot himself look at the idea of 
the bed and paint it out from that, rather than looking at the material bed created from the 
carpenter.182 
The answer to this question is overshadowed by the surprising simplicity of the “furniture 
comparison”. The question itself is caused by the extreme simplification that Plato makes 
 
181 Resp. 595c. 
182 Cf. Sallis, 2015. 
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from Book VI, where a theory of the ideas is sketched,183 to Book X, where he seems to 
betray his previous theorisation. 
As often in Plato’s work, metaphors, myths, poetic quotations and digressions mean to 
simplify a complex abstract argument to the interlocutor of the moment. This throws the 
argument into a world of materiality that has to be taken analogically and never literally. 
What seems to matter the most, in Plato, is the geometry of the argument, its intrinsic 
inner structure. Hence, in the metaphors and narrations that Plato uses, the reader has to 
look for that essential geometric structure184 in order to find a resemblance with the 
original philosophical thought. This does not diminish at all the value and the suggestions 
that may come from concrete details, but the game of analogy does not work as a 
mirroring resemblance –as a mimesis, indeed – it rather works as a parallel restructuring. 
Certainly, if taken literally, it is not easy to understand why the painter cannot look to the 
original idea of the bed, but in truth, something like “the idea of the bed” does not even 
exist. What the craftsman looks at is the structure of the techne which allows him to create 
a bed; in other words, it is to the structure and the organization of practical knowledge 
required to build a bed or a table that he looks at. However, in Plato’s view, the artist does 
not have a techne at all –as discussed earlier – so that he can only reproduce phantoms of 
material things, without having the knowledge of how these really are in their inner 
structure and organisation. Plato does not spend time in explaining this, because the point 
to stress here is another: the painter, as well as the poet, is not able to look at the eidos of 
the things; he can look only at the eidola and imitate them. This, which is clearly 
expressed in the dialogue, it is already enough to answer to the question above. 
 
Then imitation is far removed from the truth, for it touches only a small part of each thing 
and a part that is itself only an image. And that, it seems, is why it can produce everything. 
For example, we say that a painter can paint a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, 
even though he knows nothing about these crafts. Nevertheless, if he is a good painter and 
 
183 In Book VI of the Republic common objects do not seem to have ideas from which these supposedly 
derive; at this stage of the dialogue, ideas exist only for values and abstract entities, not for common objects. 
184 Cf. Timaeus, where the transition between ideal world and material world is made more accessible 
thanks to presence of geometrical shapes which work as intermediaries. This is expressed particularly in 
the act of creation of the world by the demiurge: And he gave it a shape appropriate to the kind of thing it 
was. The appropriate shape for that living thing that is to contain within itself all the living things would 
be the one which embraces within itself all the shapes there are. Hence he gave it a round shape, the form 
of a sphere, with its center equidistant from its extremes in all directions. (Tim. 33b) 
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displays his painting of a carpenter at a distance, he can deceive children and foolish people 
into thinking that it is truly a carpenter. (Resp. 598 b-c) 
 
This entire discourse on mimesis in Books II, III and X of the Republic, in its essential 
lines, can be reduced to three features of the mimetic mechanism listed in the previous 
chapter: first, mimesis is an imitative re-production strictly connected to the paradigm of 
visual image; second, mimesis reproduces but does not produce; third, the copy which 
emerges from the mimetic reproduction is false. As said, the criticism of mimesis can be 
definitely considered the point of connection between the criticism of orality and the 
criticism of writing in Plato. 
To honour the entire structure of Plato’s dialogue and to contain those criticisms about 
the fragmentary nature of the Republic, it is still worth spending a few lines trying to 
understand what happens between the position held by Plato in Books II and III, and the 
revised position in Book X in regard to poetry and the arts in general. 
The return to the theme of poetry in Book X happens unexpectedly, also because Socrates 
had already taken a position about it in Book III. If in Book III some part of imitative 
poetry was accepted in the beautiful city, in Book X instead it is completely rejected. 
What has changed from Book III to Book X is not simply Plato’s conception of poetry, 
rather it is the city itself and consequently – in virtue of that isomorphism established 
before – the soul.  
From Book II to IV there is an attempt to found Kallipolis, the beautiful city. Specifically, 
in Book IV there is an outline of the structure of the soul as tripartite (epithymetikon = 
desiderative; thymoeides = passional; logistikon = rational) corresponding to the tripartite 
structure of the classes in the city (bronze class = moneymaker; silver class = auxiliary; 
gold class = guardians). The tripartite system is structured in a very analytic way and it 
works both for the city and the human. It needs to be noted that when the critique of 
poetry was first articulated in Book III, there was not a definite psychology to which apply 
the critique itself. This would be already a good reason to come back to the theme of 
poetry availing of a more articulated theory of the soul. But, if Socrates does not come 
back to poetry with this tripartite psychology, it is because the more the dialogue 
progresses, the more this tripartite scheme is challenged by limits and contradictions to 
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the point of resulting inadequate to describe the soul and the city. In fact, from Book V 
to VII, Socrates is forced to a long pause mainly because Polemarchus had forced him to 
elaborate on about the sexual regulation in Kallipolis. Only after this break, through which 
Socrates revises and integrates his previous account, in Book VIII it is possible to find a 
more complete articulation of tripartite psychology and by Book IX Socrates 
acknowledges that human beings act with the soul as a whole, not by means of separate 
parts.185  
Already in Book IV186 Socrates admits that there are two ways of articulating the soul, 
the first one is the analytical, expressed in Book IV itself which is adequate and logical, 
and then a longer road. The longer road must be this new account of the soul in Books 
VIII and IX, which still respects the tripartition of Book IV but also includes eros. 
Only by articulating a human psychology, Socrates is able to take the critique of poetry 
to its full extent in Book X. 
By giving this brief and concise account of the dialogue, it is meant to show the dialectical 
movement of the entire work and its profound unity. Although in this chapter there has 
been a selection of themes and passages to better serve the argumentation, none of the 
passages could have been used if not understood in the light of the entire dialogue. To 
express this effectively:  
 
No single bit of the dialogue, then, should be isolated and treated as a whole. Similarly the 
whole should not be read as a single argument guided by the norm of logical consistency. 
Instead, it is a dialectical drama, a dialogue, a conversation that twists and turns, develops 
and at times revises what was earlier said. In its totality it gives voice to the truth about the 
human soul.187 
 
The protection of and the control over the human soul are at stake in this articulated 
criticism of poetry and ancient culture, not only in the Republic, but also in the Ion as 
argued earlier.  
 
185 For further information about this interpretation of the Republic and the relevance of eros in this 
dialogue, cf. Roochnik, 2003. 
186 Resp. 435d. 
187 Roochnik, 2003, p. 131. 
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2.4. Hermeneia and Responsibility 
There is still one aspect left aside earlier that needs to be deepened. It is the role of the 
poet as hermeneus.188 As mentioned, the term can be translated in different ways and it 
occurs with different meanings in the dialogue Ion. Its first and most generic translation 
is “interpreter”. In fact, as seen, the rhapsode Ion is a fine interpreter of one poet, Homer. 
He is an interpreter both in the sense of a literary exegete, but also in the sense of a 
performer of Homer’s verses – at least, this is of what Ion is convinced of. Socrates, 
instead, through a dialectical confrontation proves the rhapsode to be wrong about his 
convictions, as in fact Ion has no understanding of the thoughts of the poets, he can only 
interpret – as to repeat and perform – Homer’s verses not in virtue of his mastery of 
poetry, but in virtue of a divine gift. 
The role and the position of the interpreter in the process of transmitting knowledge is 
“in-between”, in fact, he is a deliverer of a message. This is confirmed by the etymology 
of the word hermeneus that can be connected to the Greek god Hermes whose primarily 
role was to be a messenger between gods and humans. 
Olympic gods usually would not communicate directly with human beings, also because, 
in virtue of the ontological distance between gods and humans, the message would not be 
expressed in the way human beings could understand it – with a rational language on 
which communication is normally based. To communicate with human beings, the 
Olympic gods availed of different irrational channels: dreams; oracles; exceptional 
natural events; symbols. On the other side, to communicate with the gods, or better, to 
ask their support and to get their mercy, human beings had to put in practice some rituals 
which mainly consisted in sacrificing the life of animals, sometimes also of human 
beings.189 
 
188 As anticipated earlier, the general term used to translate hermeneus is “interpreter”, but this translation 
is influenced by biblical exegesis. In Ancient Greece the term originally referred to the semantic area of 
“expression” meaning the vocal expression of something held inside (such as the voice of a god). Only later 
(already with Pythagoras and more explicitly with Plato) it assumes a meaning of “mediator” between gods 
and humans of which Hermes has been taken as divine representative. From the meaning of mediator, the 
shift to interpreter or translator is quite natural. Cf. Carchia 2003, p. 161. 
189 The most common ritual practice to gain the favor of the gods was the hecatomb: the sacrifice of a 
hundred oxen. In some circumstances, a god would have asked to sacrifice the life of a virgin, as narrated 
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A demonstration of this practice can be found in the dialogue Statesman: 
 
Then let’s get still closer to those we haven’t yet cross-examined. There are those who have 
a part of a subordinate sort of expert knowledge in relation to divination; for they are, I 
believe, considered to be interpreters from gods to men […]. And then too the class of priests, 
in its turn, has—as custom tells us—expert knowledge about the giving through sacrifices of 
gifts from us to the gods which are pleasing to them, and about asking from them through 
prayers for the acquisition of good things for us. I imagine that both of these things are parts 
of a subordinate art. (Pol. 290c-d) 
 
This exchange between gods and humans, and vice-versa, needed to be regulated and 
somehow translated by specific persons who can be represented by the role of the 
hermeneus. In the above quoted passage, the word used to identify them is hermeneutai 
(interprets); while the word to mean the general art, that subordinates this and other forms 
of knowledge, is mantiken (divination). Since the hermeneus is still a human being, his 
way to access to this superior knowledge, is by escalating his human side and push 
himself out of his soul. It is, in fact, only when he loses control over his soul that the voice 
of the god can inhabit him, making him entheos. This is typical of all the genres of mantike 
(divination). Before to understand what type of divination characterises the rhapsode Ion, 
it is worth to analyse what type of account Plato has given about divination in his works.  
As argued earlier, the dialogue that, more than others, deals with the topic of divination 
is the Phaedrus, here Plato identifies four types of divination. The discussion about 
divination originates from a previous attempt to revaluate positively the effects of eros on 
the human soul. Eros makes human beings irrational to the point of losing control over 
their own souls. As a first instance, this is considered negatively by Socrates, on a second 
instance he reconsiders his opinion and eventually praises this erotic madness as 
something divine, which derives to the humans from the gods. In this praise Socrates 
connects, also etymologically,190 the divine madness to the mantike techne (divination 
 
in the tragedy Iphigenia in Aulis by Euripides. Not all the rituals to propitiate the gods involved sacrifices, 
sometimes they consisted in the offer of bread, seeds and devotional objects. 
190 The people who designed our language in the old days never thought of madness as something to be 
ashamed of or worthy of blame; otherwise they would not have used the word ‘manic’ for the finest experts 
of all—the ones who tell the future thereby weaving insanity into prophecy. They thought it was wonderful 
when it came as a gift of the god, and that’s why they gave its name to prophecy; but nowadays people 
don’t know the fine points, so they stick in a ‘t’ and call it ‘mantic.’ (Phaedr. 244b-c) 
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art). Four are the main expressions of divine madness: prediction of the future through 
the observation of natural events – such as the flight of the birds; mystic and purification 
rites to clear the souls from ancient guilts: 
 
Third comes the kind of madness that is possession by the Muses, which takes a tender virgin 
soul and awakens it to a Bacchic frenzy of songs and poetry that glorifies the achievements 
of the past and teaches them to future generations. If anyone comes to the gates of poetry and 
expects to become an adequate poet by acquiring expert knowledge of the subject without 
the Muses’ madness, he will fail, and his self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry 
of men who have been driven out of their minds. (Phaedr. 245a) 
 
 
Fourth comes the erotic madness. 
The conception of poetry as possession by the Muses as described in the Phaedrus is 
expressed similarly also in the Ion. Socrates, with highly inspirational words, seems to 
praise the poetic activity, while he is actually criticising it for what seems to be its virtue: 
the capability of making someone out of control. 
 
For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he 
becomes inspired and goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him. As long as a 
human being has his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power to make poetry 
or sing prophecy. Therefore because it’s not by mastery that they make poems or say many 
lovely things about their subjects (as you do about Homer)—but because it’s by a divine 
gift—each poet is able to compose beautifully only that for which the Muse has aroused him: 
one can do dithyrambs, another encomia, one can do dance songs, another, epics, and yet 
another, iambics; and each of them is worthless for the other types of poetry. You see, it’s 
not mastery that enables them to speak those verses, but a divine power. (Ion 534b-c) 
 
This passage, not only gives further elements to the platonic theory of poetic madness,191 
but it also points to a relevant aspect of the platonic criticism of poetry. According to 
 
191 A platonic theory of divine madness can be traced out considering these passages from the dialogues: 
Ion, 534b, Apol. 22b-c, Prot. 347e, Meno 99c, Rep. 598c-e, Symp. 218b, Phaedr. 244d, 256b, Tim. 72a, 
Leg. 682a and Leg. 719c: There is an old tale, legislator, which we poets never tire of telling and which all 
laymen confirm, to the effect that when a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the Muse, he cannot control 
his thoughts. He’s like a fountain where the water is allowed to gush forth unchecked. His art is the art of 
representation, and when he represents men with contrasting characters he is often obliged to contradict 
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Plato, anything a poet composes does not originate from the poet’s mastery, but rather 
from a divine power. In fact, it is possible to compose verses only when the possession 
of the intellect is lost and the soul is somehow emptied to leave space to the god. Without 
being entheos (possessed by a god) a poet would not be able to compose any verse. Proof 
of this is the fact that if verse-making was an art to master, then a good poet would have 
been able to compose any type of verse, but this does not happen. Each poet, in fact, is 
gifted to compose only the type of verses for which the Muse has aroused him. 
The very problematic aspect of this loss of control over the intellect is that it is contagious. 
In the Ion Plato refers to it as a magnetic power that bonds together many rings in a chain. 
This analogy shows not only how the poetic madness is pervasive and contagious, but 
also how complex and multi-layered is the poetic composition and performance. 
The spectator is the last ring of the chain and is held by the middle ring which is the 
rhapsode, the rhapsode/actor192 in his turn is held by the poet, first ring of the chain, 
directly depended on the Muses who magnetically radiate the power of the god who pulls 
the souls of the humans as he wants, through this chain. Once again, the “hermeneutic” 
role of the rhapsode is made evident by his in-between position in the chain. Indeed, for 
the nature of the analogy itself, each ring of the chain has, partially, a hermeneutic role, a 
role of transmission which is not simply vertical, but also lateral, as there are numerous 
rings hanging on the side, held directly by the Muses and these represent the art of 
dancing. 
On the level of the poet’s ring, there are some specificity; in fact, some rhapsodes can be 
held by the poetic ring of Homer, some other by Orpheus and some other by Musaeus. 
This specificity nullifies any form of independence and choice by the rhapsode and this 
explains, via analogy, why Ion can sing only Homer’s verses. If the poet is already limited 
in composing only one type of verse, depending on the Muses’ inspiration, the rhapsode 
– who has the role of the hermeneus par excellence – seems to be even more deprived of 
freedom, hence of any human responsibility. This is what the conclusion of the dialogue 
points to.  
 
himself, and he doesn’t know which of the opposing speeches contains the truth. But for the legislator, this 
is impossible: he must not let his law say two different things on the same subject; his rule has to be “one 
topic, one doctrine.” 
192 Ion, 536a. Here Plato places the role of the rhapsode and role of the actor on a very same level, 
emphasising in this way the performative side of the rhapsodic activity. 
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If you’re really a master of your subject, and if, as I said earlier, you’re cheating me of the 
demonstration you promised about Homer, then you’re doing me wrong. But if you’re not a 
master of your subject, if you’re possessed by a divine gift from Homer, so that you make 
many lovely speeches about the poet without knowing anything—as I said about you—then 
you’re not doing me wrong. So choose, how do you want us to think of you—as a man who 
does wrong, or as someone divine? ION: There’s a great difference, Socrates. It’s much 
lovelier to be thought divine. SOCRATES: Then that is how we think of you, Ion, the lovelier 
way: it’s as someone divine, and not as master of a profession, that you are a singer of 
Homer’s praises. (Ion, 542a-b) 
 
If Ion does not want to take responsibility for his ignorance, then he cannot take merit for, 
and not even ownership of, his performances. Ion’s ignorance is mainly expressed by the 
phenomenon that Socrates often met in the polis, especially bumping into the sophists. 
This phenomenon is the polymathia193 (the self-alleged knowledge of everything). 
Socrates shows to the rhapsode that being able of speaking about everything – as Ion 
claims, it is equivalent of knowing nothing. Nevertheless, this fault affects Ion only as a 
second instance, this is in fact a feature of epic poetry first, and it affects Ion only in the 
vest of a repeater of those verses. If there is, but one thing that Ion should prove to know, 
in order to avoid the charge of ignorance, is his own techne. However, Ion fails also on 
this; the evidence of his failure is that he can sing only Homer’s verses. Instead, who 
masters a techne, masters it as a whole and should be able to sing the verses of all of the 
poets. As a result, Ion is irresponsible on three levels: first he believes to know everything, 
but in truth he is not able to respond and take responsibility for anything he believes to 
know; then, he has no responsibility for the verses he sings, he cannot respond for their 
composition, because he has not a techne to master as a whole and to apply to the poetic 
art, rather he depends on one poet; last, he has no ownership of his own activity, as a god 
possesses him during the performance. 
For Socrates it is vital that Ion acknowledges the limits of his responsibility, as this traces 
also the limits of the rhapsode’s freedom. To lose control over the soul means also to give 
up to freedom and to a portion of humanity. Being divine, after all, is not that lovely. 
From Socrates’ point of view, Ion is a simple voice in the manipulative hands of divine 
 
193 This is exemplified by the myth of Proteus recalled earlier cf. Ion, 542a. 
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inspiration; he is a vehicle, a hermeneus whose identity and freedom are nullified by 
divine inspiration. Even worst, this loss of control over the soul is magnetic and 
contagious, to the point of affecting the audience and push it in a state of trance. 
This consideration of poetry as a powerful mean to encourage a dangerous psychological 
identification, ties together the criticism of the rhapsode’s contagious loss of control over 
the soul and the criticism of the effect of poetry in the Republic which main focus is on 
the soul of the young citizens. Both in the Ion and in the Republic the platonic criticism 
of poetry is not related to “artistic” reasons. Instead it is related both to an entire world of 
values and meaning which impeded the development of the new-born philosophy, and to 
a weakening of the soul through a progressive dispersion of and distancing from the truth. 
To refer to a more contemporary vocabulary, it can be said that traditional, oral, Greek 
poetry was a powerful medium which reinforced the psychological damage already 
intrinsic in the contents of the tradition. In fact, the performances of rhapsodes 
accompanied by music and dance empowered the negative effects of such archaic set of 
values on the soul. The vocabulary to which is referred to here is taken from McLuhan’s 
theorisation of the medium as the content: 
 
[…] This fact, characteristic of all media, means that the “content” of any medium is always 
another medium. The content of writing is speech, just as the written word is the content of 
print, and print is the content of the telegraph. If it is asked, “What is the content of speech?,” 
it is necessary to say, “It is an actual process of thought, which is in itself nonverbal.”194 
 
Bearing this terminology in mind, it can be said that the voice of the rhapsode is itself a 
medium which content is another medium, which content is another medium and so on – 
as the platonic analogy of the magnet expressed it clearly, well before McLuhan’s theory. 
Nevertheless, the platonic critique of the oral tradition is not completely exhausted in the 
critique of poetic madness, hence of poetic lack of responsibility. The Republic shows, in 
fact, that beyond the psychological aspect, there is also a more ontological aspect which 
has to do with the issue of mimesis. The Ion highlights how the reproduction of a message 
without techne, without dianoia and, ultimately, without responsibility is highly 
 
194 McLuhan, 1994, p. 8. 
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damaging for the soul of the audience. The Republic highlights how the repetition carried 
out by the poet is damaging for the soul, but it also demonstrates that the nature of the 
message is ontologically deceptive because of its mimetic (re)reproduction. The theme of 
truth of poetry comes into play in the Republic, while it seems to be overshadowed by the 
divinity of the message in the Ion. In other words, if in the Ion the message is (the voice 
of the) medium (which is itself a medium of a medium with a divine source), in the 
Republic the medium is the message (which, being already a mediate message, is false). 
The ambiguity of the term hermeneus is clearer now, it is an ambiguity personified by 
Ion himself. In fact, Ion claims to be an interpreter (hermeneus) of the thoughts of the 
poets, but through the dialogue, Socrates proves him to be only a medium (hermeneus) 
of only one poet. 
A similar ambiguity is in the Republic, in relation to the different meanings of the term 
mimesis. If in the Book III mimesis is one of the lexeis (techniques of poetic composition), 
in Book X, instead, mimesis is revealed to be an ontological deception. The inner 
evolution of the two dialogues can be compared through the parallel evolution of the 
terms hermeneus and mimesis. In some way, it can be held that the internal transition in 
each dialogue reflects also an evolution of the platonic theory of oral poetry between the 
two dialogues and, in general, in the platonic production, as Catherine Collobert claims: 
 
In Republic Book X the falsehood of poetry is clearly stated and the definition of poetry as a 
deceitful art appears to be justified. Plato, dare I say it, lays his cards on the table. The 
cautious critique of poetry, which Plato shows in the Ion, Book III of the Republic, and the 
Phaedrus, is no longer in place. The critique is final: poetry is nothing but an illusion and a 
dangerous deceit. Mimesis is no longer viewed as a technique of narrative combined with a 
poetic experience, but is regarded as the nature of poetry.195 
 
 
The turning point for this shift to happen, in both dialogues, and more generically in 
Plato’s work, is the increasing involvement of the image as a term of comparison to 
explain the poietic196 activities in general sense. 
 
 
195 Destrée and Herrmann, ed. by, 2011, p. 49. 
196 Here the term is intended in the original and more generic sense of poiesis as “making”, “producing”. 
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2.5. Image-making 
The previous section illustrated that there is an inner transition in the platonic criticism 
of oral poetry. This transition moves from a particular aspect of the criticism to a more 
abstract and ontological level explicated with the comparison of the image. In its essential 
terms, this criticism finds many points of contact with the platonic criticism of writing. 
The two forms of criticism, often considered as opposed poles in Plato’s philosophy, 
ultimately address the same ontological issue which is the mimetic relation between eidos 
and eidolon and for this reason they can be reduced to what, in the previous chapter, has 
been referred to as “the dialectic of the image” – expression adequately outlined by 
Gadamer.197 
Both in the Ion and in the Republic, there are references to the image which aim to 
reinforce and to move to a higher level of abstraction the criticism of oral poetry. 
According to the same abstractive process, the references to the image are first expressed 
through an analogy with the art of painting and then, more generically with “image-
making”. 
In the Ion, Socrates simply establishes an analogy between rhapsody and painting198 as 
similar arts to be compared in order to establish that each art is a whole to master. What 
specifically connects these two (as the other mentioned) “arts” is that they produce 
something through a mimetic mechanism, hence they need a techne – as any other form 
of production. 
In the Republic, the analogy is carried throughout the whole dialogue and it is expressed 
in all its complexity. The first occurrence of painting is by mentioning it in between those 
extra accessories that feel needed in the city when it overgrows.199 While, the second 
occurrence establishes immediately a connection with the oral tradition of story-telling: 
 
Those that Homer, Hesiod, and other poets tell us, for surely they composed false stories, 
told them to people, and are still telling them. […] what fault do you find in them? The fault 
one ought to find first and foremost, especially if the falsehood isn’t well told. […] When a 
 
197 Gadamer, 1980, pp. 112-113. 
198 As discussed earlier in this chapter, this analogy is actually wider and takes into account also the art of 
sculpting, the art of flute and chitara playing, and the art of singing. Cf. Ion 533a. 
199 Resp. 373a. 
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story gives a bad image of what the gods and heroes are like, the way a painter does whose 
picture is not at all like the things he’s trying to paint. (Resp. 377d-e) 
 
After this connection, it follows a progressive escalation in the use of the painting 
analogy200 which leads to Book X where the analogy is more explicitly connected to the 
critique of the poetic oral tradition. 
 
Then shall we conclude that all poetic imitators, beginning with Homer, imitate images of 
virtue and all the other things they write about and have no grasp of the truth? As we were 
saying just now, a painter, though he knows nothing about cobblery, can make what seems 
to be a cobbler to those who know as little about it as he does and who judge things by their 
colors and shapes. […] And in the same way, I suppose we’ll say that a poetic imitator uses 
words and phrases to paint colored pictures of each of the crafts. He himself knows nothing 
about them, but he imitates them in such a way that others, as ignorant as he, who judge by 
words, will think he speaks extremely well about cobblery or generalship or anything else 
whatever, provided—so great is the natural charm of these things—that he speaks with meter, 
rhythm, and harmony, for if you strip a poet’s works of their musical colorings and take them 
by themselves, I think you know what they look like. […] We say that a maker of an image—
an imitator—knows nothing about that which is but only about its appearance. (Resp. 600e-
601c) 
 
The critique of oral poetry is empowered by the painting analogy, which helps to show, 
even better, that this type of mimesis has its weakness not only in its psychological and 
educational aspects, but also and mainly in the epistemic and in the ontological aspects – 
as already discussed. 
This critique also highlights a heavy lack of responsibility of the poetic message as, in 
fact, its oral words do not vehicle any content, but only appearances along with meter, 
rhythm and harmony. The multicoloured (poikilia)201 mimesis behind both painting and 
poetry provokes dispersions. Being repeated mouth by mouth the poetic words lose their 
 
200 The painting analogy recurs very often in the Republic, not all the recurrences are relevant for this 
argument and not all of them are worth being analysed here. However, it follows a brief list of the passages 
with the most relevant recurrences: 400e 401a, 500e-501c, 523b, 583b, 586b, 596e, 597b, d-e, 597e-598c, 
600e-601a, 601c, 602a, 602d, 603b, 605a-b. 
201 Resp. 604d. 
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origin and no one owns them anymore; in the same way, being represented multiple times, 
the original image gets lost and cannot find its way back to its origin anymore. 
Something similar has been analysed in the previous chapter, in regards to the critique of 
writing in the Phaedrus: 
 
You know, Phaedrus, writing shares a strange feature with painting. The offsprings of 
painting stand there as if they are alive, but if anyone asks them anything, they remain most 
solemnly silent. The same is true of written words. You’d think they were speaking as if they 
had some understanding, but if you question anything that has been said because you want 
to learn more, it continues to signify just that very same thing forever. When it has once been 
written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with 
understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom 
it should speak and to whom it should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it 
always needs its father’s support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own 
support. (Phaedr. 275 d-e) 
 
Once mimetically repeated, both the oral words and the written words end up in being 
fragmented and lost not only in their meaning and in their truth, but also in their 
ownership. This is the very same mechanism established by the mimetic process of 
image-making. In fact, if the painting analogy works so well, both for the written word 
and for the oral word, it is because is itself an analogy of an ontological mimetic 
mechanism, the one already mentioned, between eidos and eidolon which is intrinsic in 
any form of mimesis.202 
The painting analogy is the most functional one as it is image-based, hence it avails, for 
its inner structure, of the mimetic mechanism between eidos and eidolon. It could be said 
that the painting analogy is itself an eidolon of the eidos of the mimetic mechanism.203 
 
202 Stephen Halliwell, in his study on mimesis, underlines two aspects that are worth recalling about Plato’s 
conception of painting: first that, very often, Plato refers to painting as a synecdoche for all the figurative 
arts; second, that  if painting would not have existed, maybe it would have not mattered for Aristotle, but it 
would have deprived Plato of “source of reflection on human attempts to model and interpret reality” . 
Halliwell, 2002, p. 125. 
203 The model of pictorial mimesis is a topos in Plato’s dialogues since the early dialogues such as the 
Cratylus, cf. Halliwell, 2002, pp. 126-128. 
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Surely, the painting analogy, used as an exemplification both for the critique of writing 
and for the critique of orality, demonstrates that at the essential core of Plato criticism it 
is not implied an opposition between writing and orality, and even if this would be 
implied, it would be completely inessential. Indeed, also the painting analogy, which 
connects the two criticisms, is itself inessential. 
The critique of writing and the critique of orality are actually two expressions of one 
common rooted criticism. Reason why to read the two criticisms either in terms of 
contrast, or in terms of supremacy of one over the other one, does not help to understand 
the original, ontological value of the platonic criticisms. It is a criticism of image-making 
which probably finds its best ontological expression in the Sophist.204 This dialogue 
represents an invaluable model of comparison to grasp the ontology that structures the 
“dialectic of the image”. In fact, in the Sophist there is a real hunting of the sophist through 
the definitional tool of the logos which explicates itself in the dialectical exchange 
between the Visitor from Elea (representative of the Eleatic philosophical tradition) and 
Theaetetus. Hence, the dialogue stands as a model firstly and generically, because it 
intentionally shows multiple eidola of the eidos of the dialectic structure; secondly and 
specifically to this dissertation, because in order to define the sophist the two interlocutors 
have to refer to the mimetic mechanism as the only way through which the falsehood of 
the sophist’s logoi can come to existence both in language and in essence. In fact, when 
the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus are getting closer to catch the sophist with their 
seventh definition, the mimetic mechanism plays a determinant role in this chase.  
The chase has been very difficult for the two philosophers, as the sophist managed to 
escape any definition and slipped down the dialectic net at least six times. The main 
reason why the sophist is hard to define/to catch in a unifying definition (synagoge) is his 
polymorphic nature: he knows not only “how to say things or to contradict people, but 
how to make and do everything.” 205 In the same way as Ion claims to able to speak about 
any techne (although he is not able to perform any of them) and, even more, in the same 
 
204 The interpretation of the Sophist in this dissertation takes a very different direction to one of the most 
established interpretations, the one by Stanley Rosen. Rosen (1983, pp. 165-173) in fact, argues that the 
analogy of the image in the Sophist obscures the real disputative nature of the sophist and allow the Visitor 
to avoid this aspect of the analysis. Instead, in this dissertation it is argued that the exemplifying role of the 
image in this seventh definition is determinant in order to highlight the commonality of all those activities 
in which the mimetic mechanism is activated by means of the relation between eidos and eidolon. 
205 Soph. 233d. 
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way as the mirror in the Republic can represent everything (but not real things), the 
sophist can say and reproduce anything.206 
In the Sophist, the best way to exemplify this ability is, once again, by the painting (in 
this case drawing) analogy: 
 
So think about the man who promises he can make everything by means of a single kind of 
expertise. Suppose that by being expert at drawing he produces things that have the same 
names as real things. Then we know that when he shows his drawings from far away he’ll be 
able to fool the more mindless young children into thinking that he can actually produce 
anything he wants to. […] Well then, won’t we expect that there’s another kind of expertise—
this time having to do with words—and that someone can use it to trick young people when 
they stand even farther away from the truth about things? (Soph. 234b-c) 
 
There is, of course, a kind of expertise like this and that is sophistry. By means of spoken 
images/copies (eidola legomena)207 the sophist can trick young people and foolish ones, 
as he seems able to reproduce everything with his logoi. This ability is nothing but 
mimesis, it is in fact a reproduction of eidola, but the analysis and the terminology in the 
Sophist are much more detailed and articulated than elsewhere, because the Visitor and 
Theaetetus are involved in a definitional hunting. Hence, the specific definition for the 
sophistic art is: eidolopoiikes techne (image-making art/copy-making art). This is the 
seventh and last definition of the sophist, but it still involves a further reflection on the 
image that is worth to consider in this place. In fact, the image-making art/copy-making 
art is subject to a distinction (diairesis): it can be a way of likeness-making (eikastike 
techne) or a way of appearance-making (phantastike techne).208 Likeness-making is a way 
of reproducing an image which respects the proportions and real colours of the model 
(eidos); appearance-making is a way of reproducing an image in which proportions are 
 
206 The sophist, the orator, and the poet fall under the same category of ignorant and ‘insincere 
manufacturer of eidola by mimicry’ as Dodds 1959, puts it. Collobert, in Destrée and Herrmann, ed. by, 
2011, p. 58. 
207 Soph. 234c. 
208 Elizabeth Belfiore warns about the common mistake of considering the phantastike mimesis the same as 
the imitation of eidola in book X of the Republic. The eidola of the phantastike techne in the Sophist are 
deceptive in virtue of a partiality of vision; the eidola of the book X of the Republic are deceptive 
ontologically. This warning is poignant and correct, also because it depends on the different articulation of 
the arguments in the two dialogues. However, I believe, ultimately both types of eidola have their main 
weakness in their ontological status. Cf. Belfiore, 1984, pp. 129-132. 
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not correct as there is no interest in representing the truth, but the aim is just to seem 
beautiful. This last “part of imitation covers a great deal of painting and of the rest of 
imitation.”209 After all that has been said, it seems spontaneous to place the sophistic art 
in this last category; nevertheless, the Visitor and Theaetetus, have now more doubts than 
before. In fact, they left the exemplifying painting analogy and moved back again to the 
real issue of sophistry, the one related to logoi. With the intent of going to the essence of 
the issue, they have made things more complicated by challenging the parmenidean 
interdiction: 
 
[…] which type we should put the sophist in. He’s really an amazing man—very hard to 
make out. […] This appearing, and this seeming but not being, and this saying things but not 
true things—all these issues are full of confusion, just as they always have been. It’s 
extremely hard, […] Because this form of speech of ours involves the rash assumption that 
that which is not is, since otherwise falsity wouldn’t come into being. But when we were 
boys, my boy, the great Parmenides testified to us from start to finish, speaking in both prose 
and poetic rhythms, that Never shall this force itself on us, that that which is not may be; 
While you search, keep your thought far away from this path. (Soph. 236c-327a) 
 
The Visitor, through the dialectic confrontation with Theaetetus, has gone too far, at the 
borders of Elea and of the Eleatic Philosophy of which Parmenides can be considered the 
most relevant exponent. Once they accepted pseudos (falsity) into language, they 
necessarily asserted the existence of something that is not. In the same way, once eidola 
(images/copies) and phantasmata (appearances) are taken for real, in a parallel way the 
existence of “something that is not” is asserted. This is the biggest challenge imposed by 
the sophist and it is the main danger of the mimetic mechanism: it allows the pseudos to 
find its way through logos to being. 
The philosopher can still make a good use of the mimesis as the entire dialogue proves. 
In fact, the dialectic, exhibited as a methodos210 since the very beginning of the dialogue, 
is nothing else but a form of mimesis, precisely an eikastike techne which resembles the 
 
209 Soph. 236c. 
210 Soph. 218d. The Ancient Greek term methodos, from which the word method derives, is composed by 
the word hodos (a path, a route) preceded by the preposition meta (that gives the meaning of moving 
forward). Hence it is the way to move forward on a path, it represents a quest that proceeds towards a 
destination. 
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structure of the eide and their articulations. The analogy of fishing represents a first 
training for the method that needs to be used to define the sophist himself. This analogy 
is a form of mimesis, an eidolon which represents the very structure of dialectic in its eide. 
To define a thing, first it needs to be related to something else to which it partakes 
(synagogein); secondly, this needs to be divided in two different horns (diairein); then, 
one of the two horns will be excluded (temnein); hence, the movement will start over 
again from the horn which has not been excluded with a new synagoge. This will 
eventually lead to a definition which contains in itself the different stages of diairesis and 
synagoge; this definition would not need any more divisions, nor exclusions.211 
The dialectical structure of the logoi resembles the eide and their articulation.212 This 
supports what was held earlier in this dissertation about the exemplifying role of 
metaphors and analogies in Plato’s works: these need to be considered for their analogical 
structure, for their geometrical articulation that respects the proportions, and not strictly 
literally. Nevertheless, the effectiveness and vividness of most of these analogies recall 
often some semantic areas that can inform about the meaning of the analogy itself (i.e.: 
the fishing analogy suggests that the sophist is someone to chase; the bed and tables 
analogy in Republic suggests that mimesis may occur when poiesis is involved etc.) 
These complex analogy between eide and logoi is based itself on a mimetic mechanism 
whose features are explored in the next chapter.
 
211 For an accurate logical explanation of the dialectical method in the Sophist cf. Fronterotta, 2007, pp. 36-
60. 
212 Cf. the grammar example in Soph. 253a, and the weaving (symploke) analogy in 259d-e. Cf. also Phaedr. 
265d and Polit. 286d. 
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THIRD CHAPTER 
The Ontology of the Image in Plato’s works 
 
Both the critique of writing and the critique of orality in their most philosophical essence 
reveal a connection with the ontology of the image. The reasons for this are intimately 
related to the mimetic mechanism implied in both ways of transmitting knowledge. 
Following the thread of the image and its mimetic vocation, it becomes clearer that both 
the criticisms of writing and of orality are inessential. In fact, Plato does not address 
simply and only the way the knowledge can be transmitted (either in written speech or in 
oral speech) but the nature of being itself and the possibility of grasping and 
communicating it at all, as a form of knowledge. 
After attentive evaluations carried throughout this dissertation, it seems that there are 
more points of contact than elements of opposition at the core of both criticisms; hence, 
it is fruitless to consider the orality/writing issue as a substantial matter implying that one 
way of expression excludes the other one.213 This does not mean that the medium is an 
innocent tool. It is, instead, itself misleading and dangerous, but only on a second level, 
on the level of the reproduction of the logoi.214 Being a form of de-potentiated poiesis 
(production of a production), the media may enhance the potential deception of some 
logoi by means of the mimesis to which they are subjugated, although they are not objects 
of criticism for themselves. Under this perspective, all those theories which focus mainly 
(or only) on the mediatic side of the platonic criticism are partial, almost like a 
synecdoche: they take a part to mean the whole. This approach could still be valid if used 
for a paradigmatic reading that eventually traces back the philosophical genealogy of the 
criticism; while, if it is taken literally and in an unrelated way it can be deceptive. It is 
like considering one of the eidola as the eidos or, in other words, as if the criticism of the 
 
213 As Franco Trabattoni argues in different works, the opposite of the written speech is not the oral speech, 
but the speech “written in the soul” (Phaedr. 278a). The philosophical discourse (either written or oral) 
does not aim to mirror the truth, but it aims to stimulate the philosophical exchange through dialectic. Cf. 
Trabattoni, 2015, p. 107. In addition, Trabattoni clarifies that if the two ways of transmitting knowledge 
are really meant to be read in opposition, orality would be superior to writing but exclusively because it can 
avail of that responsiveness denied to writing. However, the fact that orality can avail of responsiveness 
does not mean that it always does so, indeed Plato does not criticise orality itself, but those forms of orality 
which lack in responsibility and responsiveness. For a general theory of persuasion and philosophical 
knowledge in Plato cf. Trabattoni, 1993. 
214 Cf. McLuhan, 1994. 
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deception of a medium would overshadow the criticism of the deception itself. It is indeed 
this same deception whose philosophical implications are analysed throughout this 
chapter. 
 
3.1. Eidos and eidolon 
To trace a profile of the image in Plato’s work is a determinant enterprise which unhinge 
the ontological structure laying at the heart of Plato’s philosophical thought. Plato 
intentionally establishes a duality between being and appearing;215 the second step of this 
distinction is to give a negative connotation to the world of appearances (eidola) as an 
ontological and epistemological, hence psychological too, decrease of the authentic world 
of beings (eide).216 
The dissociation between appearance and truth happens through the mimetic mechanism 
– as discussed at different stages of this dissertation. Mimesis is, in fact, production of 
images: “We say imitation is a sort of production (poiesis), but of copies (eidōlon) and 
not of the things themselves.”217 
Hence, on one side, there is the eidos and on the opposed side there is the eidolon.218 This 
conceptual couple is based on a conflict that does not tear apart the relation between the 
two terms, but in fact it reinforces it. Eidos and eidolon are co-dependent and have the 
same source which can be detected in their etymological origin from the verb horao (I 
 
215 Cf. Vernant, 1982, pp. 119-152. 
216 About this, Lidia Palumbo punctuates that there are still some images (eidola), the philosophical ones, 
which have a high content of knowledge. Palumbo, 2008, p. 45, n. 48. This has been argued at the end of 
the previous chapter too, while distinguishing between eikastike mimesis and phantastike mimesis.  
217 Soph. 265b. 
218 The conceptual couple eidos-eidolon in this dissertation is considered the best terminology to express 
the mimetic relation between the original and its copy. I am aware that throughout Plato’s works there is 
not always homogeneity in the use of these two terms (very often Plato uses terms like eikon, phantasma 
in place of eidolon, and paradeigma, genos or idea in place of eidos, etc.) In the same way, I am aware that 
there is not a univocal meaning attributed to these two terms. However, this is perfectly in line with Plato’s 
philosophical writing in which usually the meaning and the selection of the terms is determined by the 
context of use and the structuring of the dialectical reasoning. For a clear distinction of these visual terms 
and their contexts of use I would recommend the essay by Catherine Collobert in Collobert, Destrée, 
Gonzales ed by, 2012, pp. 87-108. In regard to the term eidos and its use in the context of the theory of the 
ideas cf. cf. Fronterotta, 2001, pp. XII-XV. 
Furthermore, it needs to be clarified that the theory of knowledge exposed by Plato in Republic 509c-sgg., 
although extremely relevant and connected to the paradigm of the vision, it has been intentionally excluded 
as it focuses specifically on the epistemological side of the issue; while here, the attempt is to unearth the 
ontology behind the mimetic mechanism. 
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see) which the aorist form is idein, which in turn is etymologically connected to the verb 
oida (I know).219 According to Ernst Cassirer who dedicated an essay to this conceptual 
couple,220 eidos and eidolon represent two fundamentally different qualities of vision:221 
eidos represents the contemplative side of vision, freed from perception, which grasps 
shapes through an act of ideal conformation; eidolon represents the passive side of the 
vision as a sensible perception. In a certain way, the eide222 are elements of stability both 
in ontology and in epistemology, they manage to maintain integrity and unity against the 
multiplicity and the deterioration provoked by all the sensible and reproduced eidola. The 
co-dependency of eidos and eidolon is explicated by that movement of separation 
(diairesis) and unification (synagoge) essential in the dialectic, hence essential in the 
philosophical quest. If there would not be eidola to catch, the philosopher could not find 
a way back to the eide and if there would not be stabilising eide, the eidola would not 
have any sort of genealogy from where to derive. 
This seems to be a very intuitive and broadly accepted version of Plato’s philosophy in 
general sense. The couple eidos-eidolon, in fact, emphasises the platonic theory of ideas 
(or forms) according to which ideas are the real and fundamental forms of every being 
condemned to appear through the multiplicity of the sensible experience. 
In this dissertation, though, there is not a real interest in reassessing this ontological and 
epistemological model, neither in stressing a form of dualism in Plato’s philosophy. 
Rather, it seems relevant to consider how the paradigm of the image, configured here as 
the ontology of the image, is an evident and immediate paradigm to read Plato’s dialogues 
and to overcome some apparent contradictions in his thought. A main reason for such a 
relevance of the image may be relying on the fact that for Plato every form of production 
(poiesis) is dependent on and guided by a form of vision. As already shown, through 
many passages quoted earlier, the connection between production and vision occurs about 
 
219 Cf. Ross, 1951, p. 13; Hyland, 2011, p. 156, n. 37, Kirkland, 2012, pp. 153-172. 
220 The original essay has been published in 1924 with the title Eidos und eidolon. Das problem des Schönen 
und der Kunst in Platons Dialogen in a collect volume by the Warburg Library. 
221 Cassirer, 2009, p. 7. 
222 Ritter (1910) has identified six meanings of the term eidos: the outward appearance; the constitution or 
condition; the characteristic that determines the concept; the concept itself; the genus or species; the 
objective reality underlying our concept. The translation from German to English of these six definitions 
by Ritter is by Ross, 1951, p. 15. This variety of meaning, is due to the inner evolution of Plato’s dialogues, 
it can be noticed in fact that in later dialogues the meaning of the term has a more technical shade (such as 
class or form); while in earlier dialogues has the generic sense that derives from the Presocratic tradition as 
well, the meaning of visible form. Ross, 1951, p. 15. 
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the art of the painter, about the carpenter, about the sophist, about the philosopher and 
even about the demiurge.223 What connects poiesis and vision is indeed mimesis: the 
couple eidos-eidolon works for both the mimetic mechanism involved in poiesis and in 
vision. 
The main reason to condemn mimesis is not the reproduction in itself, but its power to 
create a world of appearances and pretend that it is the real one. If the fiction of the 
mimesis is accepted, the possibility of moving on a philosophical path towards the eide is 
denied as the mimetes (imitator) cancels the distance between eidos and eidolon. There is 
no distinction for the mimetes; conversely, the philosopher shows his best talent in the art 
of division224 and distinction. Hence, the risk presented by the mimesis is not only to 
immobilise everything in a world of phantasmata, but also to live in a lie as it happens to 
the prisoners chained in the cave – according to the myth narrated in Book VII of the 
Republic. So, if the sophist, the poet and the painter deny the way back to the eide by 
ignoring the division between eidos and eidolon; the philosopher makes the effort to 
accept the eidola but only to reveal their deception and to reassess the realness of the eide. 
It can be argued that the philosopher would not need to refer to the image as he has access 
to the logos, meant both as a system of thought and, mainly, as a way to articulate words 
in a web of relations. Nevertheless, very often, the philosopher, in making use of the logoi 
experiences that weakness of the logoi225 themselves. That same weakness that seemed 
to be a point of failure of both written transmission and oral transmission; but also, the 
failure of the thought itself. 
In front of the failure of the logoi, the philosopher may avail of something more 
immediate and essential such as the paradigm of the image. The immediate support of the 
image in favour of the logoi is explicated with a double movement of proximity and 
distance in the Sophist. In fact, after the seventh definition of the sophist as eidolopoion 
(creator of images), with the careful distinction of the eidola in eikones and 
phantasmata226 – implying the superiority of the eikon over the phantasma, the quest is 
problematised again. The paradigm of the image, in fact, has led the Visitor and 
 
223 Tim. 47b-c. 
224 Soph. 253c-d. 
225 Gadamer, 1980, pp. 93-123. 
226 Here the reference is to the distinction of the art of image-making (eidolopoiikes techne) in mimesis 
eikastike (which produces eikones, proportionated images) and mimesis phantastike (which produces 
phantasmata, images based on appearances). Soph. 236b-c. 
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Theaetetus to admit in their speech that appearances exist. This verbal admission pushes 
them away from the image to shift back to the language and its logical rules such as the 
parmenidean interdiction according to which the path toward the hypothesis of the 
existence of not being should never be undertaken.227 Nevertheless, this is a new aporia 
(a no-way-out) where the Visitor and Theaetetus are brought to a halt again: it is 
impossible to verbalise with the logoi the existence of something that does not exist; the 
simple fact of naming its non-existence makes it exist. This aporia is caused by the 
weakness of the logoi, reason why the logos is abandoned once again to come back to the 
eidolon as image/copy and its ontological relation with the eidos. 
 
So if we say he has some expertise in appearance-making, it will be easy for him to grab hold 
of our use of words in return and twist our words in the contrary direction. Whenever we call 
him a copy-maker he’ll ask us what in the world we mean by a “copy.”228 We need to think, 
Theaetetus, about how to answer the young man’s question. (Soph. 239c-d) 
 
The question now is about the definition of eidolon. This time the logos can get a real 
support by the paradigm of the image through the definition of the eidolon itself, a 
definition that needs to be made with the logoi. The level of abstraction offered by the 
image empowers the logoi to the point of finding a way to verbally articulate the existence 
of what does not exist. This twisting passage is put in place in Theaetetus’ answer to the 
question of what is eidolon. In his final answer, Theaetetus shows such an ease that may 
surprise the reader – in fairness, it seems to surprise himself too:  
 
THEAETETUS: What in the world would we say a copy229 is, sir, except something that’s 
made similar to a true thing and is another thing that’s like it? […] Not that it’s true at all, 
but that it resembles the true thing.[…] 
VISITOR: So you’re saying that that which is like is not really that which is, if you speak of 
it as not true. 
THEAETETUS: But it is, in a way. 
 
227 Soph. 237a. 
228 “Copy” here is the translation for the term eidolon which meaning is in between copy/image. 
229 Cf. previous note. 
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VISITOR: But not truly, you say. 
THEAETETUS: No, except that it really is a likeness. 
VISITOR: So it’s not really what is, but it really is what we call a likeness? 
THEAETETUS: Maybe that which is not is woven together with that which is in some way 
like that—it’s quite bizarre. (Soph. 240a-c) 
 
It takes some time and a clear awareness of the previous analyses about the ontology of 
the image to un-weave this answer by Theaetetus.  
Firstly, once again, Theaetetus is contradicting the parmenidean interdiction; in fact, he 
says that the eidolon is something made similar to a true thing. Hence, at the same time 
he is saying that the eidolon is, and that the eidolon is not – because it is not the true thing. 
There is a distinctive line of demarcation between eidolon and the true thing. On a 
parmenidean level of correspondence between ontology and language, what is true is; 
what is not true it is not. Clearly, the ambiguity is represented by the verb “to be” intended 
in terms of positive ontology and simultaneously in terms of propositional truth. 
Secondly, Theaetetus insists on similarity (eoikos), resemblance (eoikos), likeness 
(eikon). These terms work for him as mediators between what is and what is not. These 
terms though, do not sound new, they come from the vocabulary of the mimesis which 
should not provoke any surprise. As seen, the paradigm of the image and the paradigm of 
the production are intrinsically dependent on the mimetic mechanism which, in fact, 
reproduces copies of things and not real things. The answer to the question is then: 
mimesis. This is what Theaetetus is trying to say, it is an answer that has already been 
given indeed, but now it needs to be elevated to another level of analysis, to a 
metaphysical level. 
Mimesis is production of images (eidolopoiikes techne). Within the production of images, 
it can be distinguished between mimesis eikastike and mimesis phantastike. In the attempt 
to apply this paradigm of the image to the logoi, it emerges that the logoi are themselves 
mimetic, they are eidola of beings, at least according to the parmenidean correspondence 
between ontology and language. The type of mimesis that governs the production of logoi 
is the eikastike one, the one that reproduces images as likenesses; as if there would be the 
same proportion between beings and logoi, a proportion whose measures are guaranteed 
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by the dialectical method. In the same way, the dialectical method can be considered an 
eikastike mimesis of the geometry intrinsic into being. This is somehow inevitable. If it is 
true that everything that exists comes into being in virtue of a production,230 then it seems 
impossible to escape the mimetic mechanism. However, thanks to the ontology of the 
image (governed itself by the mimesis) it can be adequately distinguished between a 
“philosophical” mimesis and a “sophistic” mimesis. In this way, the logoi can be saved, 
even when they venture in the territory of the eidola. 
Lastly, it is “quite bizarre (atopon)”, but there must a way that what is not is woven 
together with what is. Theaetetus cannot deny that there is a line of demarcation between 
eidos and eidolon, nor he wants to, but he is saying that, even if the two things are distinct, 
they do not live separate and distinct lives. This is quite realistically Plato’s position: he 
never poses that eide exist while eidola do not exist; he clearly distinguishes a different 
axiological level of ontology for each of them, though. The fact that the eidolon is 
deceptive while the eidos is real, does not imply that the eidolon does not exist. This 
position cannot work coherently with Parmenides’ one. The further Theaetetus elaborates 
on his own definition of the image, the farther, or maybe the closer he gets to Parmenides: 
so close to annihilate the Eleatic position. The warning comes from the Visitor who is a 
disciple of Parmenides himself: 
 
VISITOR: Not to think that I’m turning into some kind of patricide. […] In order to defend 
ourselves we’re going to have to subject father Parmenides’ saying to further examination, 
and insist by brute force both that that which is not somehow is, and then again that that 
which is somehow is not. 
THEAETETUS: It does seem that in what we’re going to say, we’ll to have to fight through 
that issue. 
VISITOR: That’s obvious even to a blind man, as they say. We’ll never be able to avoid 
having to make ourselves ridiculous by saying conflicting things whenever we talk about 
false statements and beliefs, either as copies or likenesses or imitations or appearances, or 
 
230 This has been already argued about the Sophist, but it is a common trait of poiesis in different dialogues. 
The most eloquent one: After all, everything that is responsible for creating something out of nothing is a 
kind of poetry (poiesis); and so all the creations of every craft and profession are themselves a kind of 
poetry (poiesis) and everyone who practices a craft is a poet. (Symp. 205b-c) 
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about whatever sorts of expertise there are concerning those things—unless, that is, we either 
refute Parmenides’ claims or else agree to accept them. (Soph. 241d-e) 
 
The role of the image is exhausted at this point of the Sophist and the chase can move 
back to the logoi which, through to the paradigm of the image, have been elevated on a 
metaphysical level. 
 
3.2. The ontology of the pseudos  
The paradigm of the image helps to highlight the sophistic deception on the ontological 
level. The corresponding level of deception, implied in the parmenidean parallelism, is 
that of the logos. The shift from the deceptive image to the deceptive logos is a shift from 
the eidolon (copy/image) to the pseudos (falsity). 
The logoi, in virtue of their weakness, are a source of strength for the sophist, in fact, he 
can use the logoi to name the existence of things that do not exist. Not only this, but his 
own existential status is determined by the violation of the parmenidean interdiction. Not 
accidentally, it is while looking for a definition of the sophist that the Stranger and 
Theaetetus end up in this clamorous contradiction (to say that what is not is) which 
conduce them to confront with many aporiai. This means not only that what the sophist 
says is deceptive, but also that he is deceptive himself. 
In the first place, it needs to be considered the deception of the sophistic logoi. It can be 
said that the sophist is a producer (poietes) of things that are not real in virtue of that usual 
mimetic mechanism. This cannot be considered innocent in any way, because the 
deception of the logoi implies a deception in the opinion (pseudes doxa) of whomever 
hears or reads these logoi.231 The deception is contagious and leads always into aporia, 
almost like a bad illness that gets worst with every attempt to treat it; or almost like in a 
neurotic circle. There is a possible treatment, as well as, there is way out of the circle. It 
is a “homeopathic” treatment, but its countereffect is to break some sort of inner 
protective resistance and open the organism to new patterns. The way is to perform a 
mimesis of the deceiver on the reverse side. This is what happens in the Sophist, when the 
 
231 Soph. 240 c-d. 
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Visitor, with the support of Theaetetus, makes himself sophist-like by doing what the 
sophist does: he affirms the falsity but not by speaking it with pseudes logos, rather by 
accepting pseudes doxa (false opinion). Hence, also the philosopher is placing himself in 
the territory of the sophist, availing of the ontology of the pseudos, but on the passive side 
of it, believing in the deception (apate) instead of fighting it back. 
 
VISITOR: So you’re saying that a false belief is believing those which are not. […] Believing 
that those which are not are not, or that those which in no way are in a way are? 
THEAETETUS: That those which are not are in a way, it has to be, if anyone is ever going 
to be even a little bit wrong. 
VISITOR: Well, doesn’t a false belief also believe that those which completely are in no way 
are? 
THEAETETUS: Yes. 
VISITOR: And this is false too? 
THEAETETUS: Yes. 
VISITOR: And I think we’ll also regard false speaking the same way, as saying that those 
which are are not, and that those which are not are. (Soph. 240d-241a) 
 
The movement from the logos to the doxa serves first to explain the dangerous effects of 
the pseudos on the soul, but it also prepares a way back, and eventually a way out, for the 
philosopher. The philosopher does not want to say any false discourse (pseudes logos) 
but he can mimetically (“as if”) believe in a false opinion (pseudes doxa). Believing in a 
false opinion and accepting it, extends the acceptance also to the logoi. While lingering a 
little bit in the territory of the pseudos, the philosopher can find a way out from the aporia. 
The problem is that this determines the final rupture with the father Parmenides. Nothing 
seems to crumble down though and, by accepting the pseudos, the philosopher has not 
become a sophist himself. The philosopher has proved that even performing the worst of 
the mimeseis (making himself a sort of sophist) he is still different from what he is 
imitating because the acceptance of the pseudos by the philosopher is not guided by apate, 
but by aletheia (truth). He is accepting the deception for the sake of truth not for the sake 
of deception itself. This is even clearer in another dialogue in which the same Theaetetus 
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(who gives the name to the dialogue) and Socrates are confronting themselves with the 
issue of the false opinion: 
 
SOCRATES: We may sum up thus: it seems that in the case of things we do not know and 
have never perceived, there is no possibility of error or of false judgment, if what we are 
saying is at all sound; it is in cases where we both know things and are perceiving them that 
judgment is erratic and varies between truth and falsity. When it brings together the proper 
stamps and records directly and in straight lines, it is true; when it does so obliquely and 
crosswise, it is false. 
THEAETETUS: Well, isn’t that beautiful, Socrates? (Theaet. 194b) 
 
The doxa saves the logos. If the doxa is part of the logos and it is entitled to be false, then 
the logos can contain falsity. What happens next is that, if there is a correspondence 
between logos and being – as assumed earlier, then being can contain some form of not-
being in the same way as logos contains some form of falsity. It is a matter of symploke 
(weaving) where not-being is somehow interwoven into being. This is not dangerous on 
a philosophical level, as far as it is seen for what it is: something that goes straight-lines 
or something that goes crosswise. 
In the second place, it needs to be considered the existential deception of the sophist. It is 
in the attempt of defining who the sophist is that the Stranger and Theaetetus get trapped 
in many aporiai. It is the same existence of the sophist to prove that the deception exists. 
The sophist, in fact, is essentially deceptive and with his apate he pretends to be – or he 
even believes to be – a sophos (a wise man) while he is indeed an eidolon of a sophos. 
Conversely, with much more modesty, the philosopher is simply a lover (philos) of 
wisdom (sophia). Significantly, the sophist is defined in opposition and completion to the 
philosopher. 
The Sophist begins by introducing to Socrates the Visitor from Elea, who is told to be 
“very much a philosopher”.232 Socrates tries to verify this and in doing so says something 
very relevant about appearances: 
 
 
232 Soph. 216a. 
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Certainly the genuine philosophers who “haunt our cities”—by contrast to the fake ones—
take on all sorts of different appearances just because of other people’s ignorance. […]  
Sometimes they take on the appearance of statesmen, and sometimes of sophists. Sometimes, 
too, they might give the impression that they’re completely insane. (Soph. 216c-d) 
 
Mimesis strikes again. The grounding issue is not simply that the sophist is an eidolon of 
the philosopher, but that this eidolon can substitute the eidos in its appearance,233 so that 
even the original can be confused with the copy. Undoubtedly, this can happen only in 
virtue of ignorance; nevertheless, it is relevant to explain how to avoid this ignorance: by 
means of the philosophical method par excellence, the dialectic. Hence, the reason to start 
talking about the sophist and to define him, derives from the proximity of the philosopher 
to the sophist (the same proximity between eidos and eidolon). Even Socrates himself is 
named “sophist” in different occasions. This means that the philosopher and the sophist 
can be confused, as they appear similar: 
 
THEAETETUS: But there’s a similarity between a sophist and what we’ve been talking 
about. 
VISITOR: And between a wolf and a dog, the wildest thing there is and the gentlest. If you’re 
going to be safe, you have to be especially careful about similarities, since the type we’re 
talking about is very slippery. Anyway, let that description of them stand. I certainly don’t 
think that when the sophists are enough on their guard the dispute will be about an 
unimportant distinction. […] let’s say that within education, according to the way the 
discussion has turned now, the refutation of the empty belief in one’s own wisdom is nothing 
other than our noble sophistry. 
THEAETETUS: Let’s say that. But the sophist has appeared in lots of different ways. So I’m 
confused about what expression or assertion could convey the truth about what he really is. 
(Soph. 231a-b) 
 
 
This analogy stresses that to confuse an eidolon with its eidos is not an innocent, 
intellectual mistake, it can be dangerous especially when dealing with someone who 
 
233 About this close and twisting relation between the sophist and the philosopher cf. Cassin, 2014, I.1. 
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appears under so many ways. The wilderness of Sophistics234 recurs also in the Republic, 
it is meant in a similar way and, again, it addresses the danger represented by the 
sophist.235 More specifically, in the Republic Socrates recalls the episode when 
Thrasymachus, a teacher of the Rhetoric Art, reacted in a very aggressive way against 
Socrates. Literally, Thrasymachus “coiled himself up as a beast ready to spring” and 
seemed to want to tear apart Socrates by roaring something to him. Socrates was afraid 
and trembled, paralysed and muted for a few minutes; nevertheless, he managed to 
confront Thrasymachus and contained the sophistic arguments of the rhetorician.236 
The different ways the sophist appears denounce that he is intrinsically an eidolon and 
lives in a world of appearance where different eidola, in virtue of their essential 
inconsistency can be interchangeable. This explains why he is said to be many-headed,237 
very similarly to the way Ion is addressed by Socrates: “Really, you’re just like Proteus,238 
you twist up and down and take many different shapes, till finally you’ve escaped me 
altogether”.239 
First, it is difficult to identify the sophist; secondly and consequently, it is easy to be 
deceived by him. Nevertheless, it is necessary to unmask him because it can be dangerous 
to go wrong about him. 
The danger presented by the sophist is the loss of the logos. The sophist can paralyse and 
mute anyone who is confronting him, in the same way as, according to mythology, the 
above-mentioned wolf does240 and in the same way as a Gorgon does. 
 
234 I use the term sophistics with the full meaning of the neologism introduced by Barbara Cassin: The set 
of doctrines or teachings associated with the individuals known as the sophists is sophistike, in French 
sophistique. The expression is lacking in English, which puts one in the position of either using the 
adjectives “sophistic” or “sophistical”, or to use the dismissive expression “sophistry”. As I argue for a 
systematic role of these doctrines, I will ask your indulgence and introduce the neologism “sophistics” for 
now. Cassin, 2014, 1.I. 
235 Cf. Mati, 2010, p. 44. Always in the Republic poetry is associate with a dog barking: there is an ancient 
quarrel between it and philosophy, which is evidenced by such expressions as “the dog yelping and 
shrieking at its master” […] (Resp. 608b). 
236 Resp. 336b-sgg. 
237 Soph. 240c. 
238 Ion, 541e. Proteus is an old sea-god famous for being a revealer of truth. In fact, according to the myths 
he was omniscient and unable to lie, for this reason many tried to catch him in the sea and force him to 
speak out the truth about anything. In order to escape from his hunters, Proteus would assume any shape 
depending on the needs, even the shape of water. Cf. Homer, Odyssey, IV, 354 and Hesiod, Theogony 233; 
cf. also Kerényi, 2009, pp.47-50. 
239 Ion, 542a. 
240 Cf. Mati, 2010, pp. 43-44. 
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The Gorgons are mythological characters; they are three sisters with snakes instead of 
hair on their heads, a beard on their chins, boar-like teeth241 and a petrifying gaze 
(whomever would cross their eyes would be petrified). 
In a seemingly irrelevant passage of the Symposium Socrates recalls a verse from the 
Odyssey242 but he modifies it either unintentionally – as a lapsus, or intentionally – as a 
pun. Whichever of the two interpretations is preferred, Plato is anyway putting in place 
an example of Socratic irony: 
 
How am I not going to be tongue-tied, I or anyone else, after a speech delivered with such 
beauty and variety? The other parts may not have been so wonderful, but that at the end! Who 
would not be struck dumb on hearing the beauty of the words and phrases? Anyway, I was 
worried that I’d not be able to say anything that came close to them in beauty, and so I would 
almost have run away and escaped, if there had been a place to go. And, you see, the speech 
reminded me of Gorgias, so that I actually experienced what Homer describes: I was afraid 
that Agathon would end by sending the Gorgian head, awesome at speaking in a speech, 
against my speech, and this would turn me to stone by striking me dumb. (Soph. 198b-c) 
 
The original verses by Homer, of course says “Gorgon head” and not “Gorgian head”. 
Intentionally or not, Socrates is establishing an equivalence between Sophistics and 
petrification. The context when Socrates quotes this verse is immediately after hearing a 
speech about Eros by Agathon, a poet (who is hosting the symposium at his venue) 
disciple of the sophist Gorgias and a sophist himself. Socrates is about to perform his own 
speech, but he is in aporia, immobilised and muted by the exhibition of the sophistic art. 
Naming nothingness and using it as something real, it may even paralyse. The proximity 
to nothingness may lead to a form nihilism, not only in speech, but ultimately in being. 
In a certain way, it can be said that the major risk is that the sophist takes Parmenides 
even more literally than a philosopher would, as to demonstrate that nothingness has 
actually the same extent of being. This is what Gorgias does himself: twisting, turning 
and manipulating words with violence for the pure sake of contradiction; this is, in 
general, a typical trait of Sophistics. 
 
241 Vernant, a c. di, 1982, p. 55. 
242 Homer, Odyssey, XI, 633-635. 
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In a passage from Sextus Empiricus, it is possible to read an elaboration of the work by 
Gorgias entitled On What Is Not. This work has gone lost, but Sextus Empiricus (II 
Century), recognising its relevance, made an accurate summary of the principal issues 
dealt with in it. It is a quite long section, so here it is quoted only a part of it. However, 
this is enough to understand and empathise with the fear of the philosopher: 
 
If there is anything, either there is what is or what is not, or there is both what is and what is 
not. But neither is there what is, as he will establish, nor what is not, as he will explain, nor 
what is and what is not, as he will also teach. Therefore there is not anything. Now, there is 
not what is not. For if there is what is not, it will both be and not be at the same time; in so 
far as it is considered as not being, it will not be, but in so far as what is not is, it will on the 
other hand be. But it is completely absurd that something should both be and not be at the 
same time; therefore there is not what is not. And besides, if there is what is not, there will 
not be what is; for these are the opposites of one another, and if being is an attribute of what 
is not, not being will be an attribute of what is. But it is not the case that there is not what is; 
neither will there be what is not. (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathemathicos, 66-67) 
 
 
This is where the parmenidean logics leads, it leads to the coincidence of being and not 
being, with the outcome that not being completely overshadows being. Everything is 
immobilised: first being is annihilated by logos and then logos is annihilated by not being, 
causing an absolute silence, like a stone. It seems evident now that to commit the parricide 
of Parmenides is actually in the interest of the philosopher more than in the interest of the 
sophist. 
This is the act of violence, very similar to a sophistic act, that Theaetetus and Socrates 
decide to undertake: 
 
VISITOR: Not to think that I’m turning into some kind of patricide. […] In order to defend 
ourselves we’re going to have to subject father Parmenides’ saying to further examination, 
and insist by brute force both that that which is not somehow is, and then again that that 
which is somehow is not. 
THEAETETUS: It does seem that in what we’re going to say, we’ll to have to fight through 
that issue. 
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VISITOR: That’s obvious even to a blind man, as they say. We’ll never be able to avoid 
having to make ourselves ridiculous by saying conflicting things whenever we talk about 
false statements and beliefs, either as copies or likenesses or imitations or appearances, or 
about whatever sorts of expertise there are concerning those things—unless, that is, we either 
refute Parmenides’ claims or else agree to accept them. (Soph. 241 d-e) 
 
Every detail in this manifesto of enterprise is extremely valuable and coherent, the entire 
Sophist is, in fact, the story of the attempt to prove, on a dialectical basis, that what is not 
may be and what it is may not be.243 The solution of this logical riddle requires a 
dismantlement of the parmenidean ontology, to eventually find out that being and not 
being are interwoven. This operation implies a redemption of the ontological status of 
eidolon on different levels. Firstly, and most evidently, the eidolon is redeemed on the 
level of the logos. On one side, this makes the speech free to name “not-being” and to say 
falsities; on the other side, this makes the speech subject to judgment and discernment 
between truth and things that do not really exist. Consequently, it is also possible to 
believe hypotheses approximated to truth, and this is possible in virtue of a legitimate 
distinction between doxa and episteme. Thirdly, the redemption of the eidolon has some 
relevance on an existential level, in fact, the sophist is now allowed to exist in his full vest 
but he is invested of responsibility for what he says, especially when he speaks about 
nothingness. On this existential level though, this operation makes the sophist and the 
philosopher more related, as in some ways the sophist and the philosopher are interwoven 
together and they need to be carefully distinguished. Fourthly and lastly, the eidolon is 
finally redeemed in its own realm, the realm of the image. The image/copy is no longer 
an apate opposed to the truth of the eidos, it is still a copy but it is partially true and 
partially false, not anymore either completely true or completely false. It could be said 
that the complex logical articulation of the Sophist sheds a new light on the mimetic 
mechanism making it smoother as a continuous stream of poiesis, not anymore as a 
deceptive, reproductive tool. Hence, the poet, the painter and all the mimete can be free 
to create; but the range of their freedom should be as wide as the range of their 
responsibility. 
 
243 Not casually this operation is symbolically undertaken by the Visitor from Elea, a stranger (xenos) which 
in traditional Greek culture represents the alterity to be respected as holy and to be welcomed 
unconditionally. Cf. Curi, 2010, pp. 98-101. 
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3.3. Mirrors and paidia 
To elevate the logos to a higher ontological level, the ontology of the image comes to 
support the logic of the philosophical argument against the deception of the sophist; in 
exchange, the logos redeems the image. Even though its existence is ontologically 
accepted, nevertheless, the image/copy keeps dwelling in deception and the philosopher 
keeps denouncing it. The most relevant thing to remember about the image is that it is not 
representing things as they are, but as they seem, as a mirror does. The references to the 
mirror that occur in different parts of Plato’s dialogues have to be intended in this way, 
as exempla of deceptive image-making. 
It seems that, once the problem of mimesis (hence the problem of poiesis) is overcome 
and integrated on an ontological level, it is still necessary to clarify some problematic 
aspects related to the multiplicity and the partiality provoked by mimesis on an 
epistemological level. This is where the analogy of the mirror (intended as any reflecting 
surface) comes to help. A mirror is usually considered one of the most reliable ways to 
reproduce accurate images of objects and people. Apparently as objective as possible, 
also because any form of intentionality by the mirror can be excluded. The mirror does 
not want to deceive intentionally, nevertheless whoever looks into the mirror can be 
deceived because it does not make things for what they are, but for what they seem. This 
clarifies why this farther analysis of the eidola is set on an epistemological level, because 
it depends mainly on the beliefs (doxai) of the observers. 
The reasons that Plato offers to explain why the mirror causes deception are two. The first 
comes up immediately in some of the circumstances when the mirror is mentioned in the 
dialogues; the second is more implicit as it is based on a specific and different conception 
of the mirror by Plato. Although it is extremely obvious, it is worth to denounce that the 
analogy of the mirror is often connected with the issue of mimesis and its criticism. 
The first reason has to do with the problem of the multiplicity of the eidola. The mirror 
just like a painter, a poet, a rhapsode and a sophist244 is able to produce any sort of thing 
without discernment: 
 
244 Cf. Soph. 239d-240a. 
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It isn’t hard: You could do it quickly and in lots of places, especially if you were willing to 
carry a mirror with you, for that’s the quickest way of all. With it you can quickly make the 
sun, the things in the heavens, the earth, yourself, the other animals, manufactured items, 
plants, and everything else mentioned just now. (Resp. 596 d-e) 
 
As seen at different stages of this dissertation, the ability of producing the eidola of many 
things is equivalent to not being able to produce anything specifically (in virtue of a lack 
of techne). Also, by not deciding what to reproduce and how to reproduce it, the mirror 
is extremely powerful as it replicates the mimetic mechanism without intermediation: 
suddenly, unintentionally and without taking any responsibility for it. The mirror is the 
material exemplification of the mimetic mechanism, it is like the gears of a clock which 
gives back the time, but it is not necessarily the right time (and surely, it is not the time). 
The mirror exhibits and reveals the tricks of mimesis. 
The second reason has to do with the partiality of the eidola made by the mirror. In the 
Greek literary tradition and conventionally, the mirror is considered a tool which gives 
back a correct and faithful image. Plato seems to deny this convention. Keeping in mind 
that, according to Plato, the only positive form of mimesis is the one which respects the 
proportions (eikastike mimesis), it follows that the mirror cannot be trustworthy because 
it can only give back a partial image which depends on the perspective and the positioning 
both of the mirror and of the person or object reflected into the mirror. The mirror, as the 
platonic mimesis in general, “can give back only a small part of each thing and a part that 
is itself only an image. And that, it seems, is why it can produce everything.”245 
Every image reproduced by a mirror is always partial; furthermore, it has not an 
independent life, it is always dependent on the original (while, instead, a painting, once 
created keeps existing without the model) – pretty much like the shadows are stitched to 
everything and everyone. The existential relations between eidos and eidolon are stronger 
in this type of mechanical mimesis. This makes the eidola that come out from this form 
of mimesis more innocent in some ways, primarily because are not intentional, but also 
because they can never replace the eidos as they need to exist at the same time, along with 
it. 
 
245 Resp. 598b. 
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This last point is quite relevant in relation to the mimesis implied both in the criticisms of 
writing and in the criticism of orality. In fact, one of the problematic aspects of mimesis, 
detected also by Derrida,246 is that, once created, the eidola could aim to substitute the 
original and live independently from it. This is where, again, the mimesis can get 
dangerous: in withdrawing the ontological web of its mechanism. Written words can exist 
independently, abandoned on paper, as orphans without genealogy hence, without 
responsibility; as well as a speech, once learned by heart, can exist independently from 
its source. Consequently, the analogy of the mirror cannot be taken extensively to explain 
the complexity of the mimetic mechanism, but surely can be taken as a paradigm to 
exhibit the mechanism itself and its undeniable partiality.  
Considering all these elements, it can be held that Plato, most likely, aimed to protect the 
unity and the integrity of the eide more than denigrating the eidola. The eidola in 
themselves are not meant to be seriously problematic; indeed, they are not serious at all. 
The risk though, is that they might substitute the eide and so interweave, in a confuse 
way, the ontological web. This is also a reason for compromising in favour of the eikasia 
(similarity), but never in favour of the homoiotetes (identity) of the eidolon in relation to 
the eidos – the eidos is identical only to the eidos247 as explicated by this example in the 
Cratylus: 
 
SOCRATES: […]Would there be two things—Cratylus and an image of Cratylus—in the 
following circumstances? Suppose some god didn’t just represent your color and shape the 
way painters do, but made all the inner parts like yours, with the same warmth and softness, 
and put motion, soul, and wisdom like yours into them—in a word, suppose he made a 
duplicate of everything you have and put it beside you. Would there then be two Cratyluses 
or Cratylus and an image of Cratylus? 
CRATYLUS: It seems to me, Socrates, that there would be two Cratyluses. 
SOCRATES: So don’t you see that we must look for some other kind of correctness in images 
and in the names we’ve been discussing, and not insist that if a detail is added to an image or 
 
246 Particularly in the essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Derrida, 1981. 
247 This argument is in line with the interpretation given by Lidia Palumbo. She points out that one of the 
main claims in the Sophist is that the images exist in virtue of their eikaisia (similarity) and this is not 
negative in itself; the falsity and the deception of the image take place only when the image wants to 
substitute and become identical to the original. Palumbo, 2008, pp. 50-63. 
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omitted from it, it’s no longer an image at all. Or haven’t you noticed how far images are 
from having the same features as the things of which they are images? 
CRATYLUS: Yes, I have. 
SOCRATES: At any rate, Cratylus, names would have an absurd effect on the things they 
name, if they resembled them in every respect, since all of them would then be duplicated, 
and no one would be able to say which was the thing and which was the name. (Crat. 432b-
d) 
 
An image is an image (eidolon), it could never be identical (homoios), and it cannot be a 
clone. This is a matter of ontology; it is the entire sense of mimesis both for the images 
and for the words. 
Hence, the mirror, at a first glance, may scare off and challenge the logic of ontology 
presenting something like a homoios, but the image that it offers, does not contain any 
structural geometry in what represents, it does not have any intentionality, it does not 
have an inner structure of sense, it is an unanimated, merely superficial (on the level of 
the surface) appearance. Although, in other relevant circumstances of the dialogues, the 
mirror is considered as an analogy of the identity accessible only through a relational 
alterity.248 
In the light of the above, it can be connected the charge of scarce earnestness of the eidola 
which recurs often in different places of the platonic dialogues. The lack of earnestness 
is actually imputed to the mimesis itself as if it is a joke (paidia)249 which works in virtue 
of its similarity with reality, but then the pseusdos contained in it reveals that it cannot be 
taken seriously. This is generically valid for any form of mimesis: 
 
VISITOR: Do you know of any game250 that involves more expertise than imitation does, 
and is more engaging? 
THEAETETUS: No, not at all, since you’ve collected everything together and designated a 
very broad, extremely diverse type. (Soph. 234b) 
 
248 Alc. I 132e-133a; Phaedr. 255d. 
249 I would rather suggest to translate paidia as “joke”, instead of “game” or “play”. In fact, a game and the 
act of playing are something to be taken seriously in their performance, even if they have a fictitious and 
imitative character. Plato refers often to paidia as something that cannot be taken seriously, this is why the 
term “joke” would work better. 
250 Paidia. 
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About this passage, Stanley Rosen251 argues that this “type” just designated is the paidia 
and that it falls under the category of the mimesis. Nevertheless, claims Rosen, this is 
problematic because this type of paidia seems to include both a negative mimesis (that of 
the sophist) and a potentially good form of mimesis (that of the philosopher). Seemingly, 
the Visitor and Theaetetus are saying that any form of mimesis is a joke. Even admitting 
that this is true, it is nevertheless partial. In fact, after a few lines in the dialogue, it follows 
the distinction between the two types of image-making (eikastike mimesis; phantastike 
mimesis). In this way, the distinction between the mimesis of the philosopher and the 
mimesis of the sophist gets clarified. 
Rosen’s point seems quite weak, especially if compared with other occurrences of the 
association between mimesis and paidia. Most of the passages in which Plato considers 
mimesis as a paidia are related with the arts, specifically poetry and painting. This is 
stated in the Republic, as clearly as possible: 
 
It seems, then, that we’re fairly well agreed that an imitator has no worthwhile knowledge of 
the things he imitates, that imitation is a kind of game and not something to be taken seriously, 
and that all the tragic poets, whether they write in iambics or hexameters, are as imitative as 
they could possibly be. (Resp. 602b)252 
 
Quite in line with this, there is also a passage from the Statesman: 
 
VISITOR: Would we want to put down as a fifth class things to do with decoration, painting, 
and those representations253 that are completed by the use of painting, and of music, which 
have been executed solely to give us pleasures, and which would appropriately be embraced 
by a single name? 
YOUNG SOCRATES: What name? 
VISITOR: I think we talk about something we call a ‘plaything’ […] this one name will be 
fittingly given to all of them; for not one of them is for the sake of a serious purpose, but all 
are done for amusement. (Pol. 288c) 
 
251 Rosen, 1983, pp. 166-sgg. 
252 About mimetic art as a joke cf. also Resp. 606c 
253 Mimeseis. 
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Hence, if there is a commonality in the conception of mimesis as a joke, this is not between 
the philosopher and the sophist – as Rosen claims; rather, the commonality is between 
the artist and the sophist. Furthermore, these passages have been quoted in sequence to 
show that, at least in regard to this critical aspect of mimesis, there is quite a homogeneity 
in Plato’s works.254  Consequently, there is not much room to doubt about this analogy 
which implies that some types of mimesis, those that create phantasmata – as many arts 
do, are like the type of mimesis that rules a joke. A joke is not something intrinsically bad, 
but its outcomes are not serious, nor worth discussing. This is probably the most adequate 
interpretation of this vast analogy which finds evidence in a determinant passage from 
Plato’s latest work, the Laws:255 
 
ATHENIAN: Yes, and it is precisely this that I call ‘play’ (paidia), when it has no particular 
good or bad effect that deserves serious discussion. […] And we could conclude from all this 
that no imitation at all should be judged by reference to incorrect opinions about it or by the 
criterion of the pleasure it gives. This is particularly so in the case of every sort of equality. 
What is equal is equal and what is proportional is proportional, and this does not depend on 
anyone’s opinion that it is so, nor does it cease to be true if someone is displeased at the fact. 
Accuracy, and nothing else whatever, is the only permissible criterion. 
CLINIAS: Yes, that is emphatically true. 
ATHENIAN: So do we hold that all music is a matter of representation and imitation? 
CLINIAS: Of course. 
ATHENIAN: So when someone says that music is judged by the criterion of pleasure, we 
should reject his argument out of hand, and absolutely refuse to go in for such music (if any 
 
254 Another relevant passage in line with the previous passages can be found in the Epinomis. However, it 
has been decided not to quote it as a main source in the dissertation as the authenticity of the Epinomis is 
quite questionable. According to Diogenes Laertius (Vitae philosophorum, III, 37) the Epinomis was added 
by a Plato’s student, Philip of Opus as a last book to conclude the Laws. 
The passage is the following: Next in order is a kind of play, which is mostly imitative and in no way serious. 
Its practitioners make use of many instruments and many bodily gestures—and not wholly becoming ones 
at that. This includes skills that employ words, all the arts of the Muses, and the genres of visual 
representation, which are responsible for producing many varied figures in many media, both wet and dry. 
But the imitative art makes no one wise in any of these things, even those who practice their craft with the 
utmost seriousness. (Epin. 975d) 
255 According to the tradition Plato found his death while trying to complete his last work the Laws. Quite 
symbolically in his last work the character of Socrates is completely absent. In this work Plato shows a 
more concrete and complete (including also a cosmological level) vision of politics if compared to the 
Republic or even to the Statesman. 
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were ever produced) as a serious genre. The music we ought to cultivate is the kind that bears 
a resemblance to its model, beauty. (Leg. 667e-668b) 
 
This passage is relevant on many levels. It is worth pointing to a preliminary level that is 
central also in the passage from the Statesman quoted above. It is about the pleasure and 
amusements provoked by jokes and by the mimetic arts. Pleasure, as an effect of mimesis, 
is not denied nor denigrated; nevertheless, it should be rejected as a criterion of judgment. 
This is the very same point that, with other arguments and in another context, Plato makes 
against the mimetic arts in the Republic: the mimetic arts are delightful, their pleasure is 
undeniable, but they are not bearers of truth. They do not have an epistemological value; 
hence, they cannot have an educational role. Even worst, they are dangerous for the souls 
of the young ones as well as for the souls of the well-rounded citizens. 
It can be said that the antidote necessary to cure the souls poisoned by the mimetic poetry, 
is outlined in a clearer way in the Laws. In the Republic Plato affirms that “such poetry is 
likely to distort the thought of anyone who hears it, unless he has the knowledge of what 
it is really like, as a drug to counteract it.”256 In the Laws there seems to be a valid 
counteracting drug which is accuracy (aletheia – usually translated as truth), as the only 
criterion valid to judge the products of mimesis. A criterion of objectivity for the mimetic 
arts has been found, but this would have not been possible if not by the distinction 
between eikastike mimesis and phantastike mimesis in the Sophist. In fact, accuracy 
means that the mimetic mechanism between the eidos and the eidolon is ruled by equality 
(isotes) and proportion (symmetria); these are indeed the criteria of the eikastike mimesis. 
A mimesis that respects the geometry intrinsic in the eidos and makes the eidolon 
proportionated seems to be the only acceptable form of mimesis. This strict conception of 
mimesis is not based on a rejection of pleasure, but on the acknowledgment that mimesis 
does not simply relates to the senses, but it informs too. Hence, even artistic mimesis 
involves knowledge and human judgment which ultimately consists in the capability of 
discerning between truth and falsity, and between wrong and right: 
You have hit the nail on the head. So anyone who is going to be a sensible judge of any 
representation—in painting and music and every other field—should be able to assess three 
points: he must know, first, what has been represented; second, how correctly it has been 
 
256 Resp. 595b. 
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copied; and then, third, the moral value of this or that representation produced by language, 
tunes and rhythms. (Leg. 669a-b) 
 
This brief and not exhaustive parenthesis on the pleasure of the arts, serves only to prepare 
the ground for the consideration of another relevant aspect in that passage from the Laws. 
Earlier it has been argued that in the Sophist there is a redemption of eidolon also in its 
ontological status. The patricide of Parmenides, although hurtful, allows to the genres of 
being and of not-being to interweave themselves in order to admit the existence of the 
similarity which is the specific trait of the image. Similarity does not exist as an 
independent genre in the Sophist,257 but it comes to existence every time that the genre of 
diversity partakes to the genre of identity. Similarity could have never existed as an 
independent genre; it is dependent in the same way as eidolon is dependent from the eidos 
– no eidola could exist without an eidos. 
If this is taken to its consequences, it comes out that everything, in the human condition 
of life, is a matter of mimesis. Everything that comes into being springs out from a poiesis 
and necessarily partakes to the genres of being and of identity. Subsequently, since it is 
the only genre which partakes to all the other genres, the genre of difference partakes also 
to being and to identity producing eidola of everything. The philosopher, living himself 
in the realm of mimesis, is affected by this too and he knows it. The full awareness of 
living in the realm of mimesis makes the philosopher in charge for distinguishing between 
good and bad mimesis, between jokes and good music, between eikasia and phantasia, 
and so he does. Nevertheless, by judging correctly every form of mimesis the philosopher 
cannot escape his own participation to the realm of mimesis. The philosopher is a mimetes 
too, but a good mimetes, who invites to cultivate the best type of music, that one which is 
a proportionated eidolon of the eidos of beauty. 
The passage from the Laws clarifies retrospectively also a seemingly autobiographical 
episode narrated by Socrates in the Phaedo: 
 
 
257 The five genres in the Sophist are: being; identity; difference; stillness; movement. Every genre is 
independent, but the genre of difference participates to all the other genres. Cf. Soph. 255e-sgg. 
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The same dream often came to me in the past, now in one shape now in another, but saying 
the same thing: “Socrates,” it said, “practice and cultivate the arts.”258 In the past I imagined 
that it was instructing and advising me to do what I was doing, such as those who encourage 
runners in a race, that the dream was thus bidding me do the very thing I was doing, namely, 
to practice the art of philosophy, this being the highest kind of art, and I was doing that.  
(Phaed. 60e-61a) 
 
The art of the philosopher is to encourage other people in cultivate his same art. However, 
in what consists this art? Once again, this art consists primarily in being able to distinguish 
(diairein). 
 
3.4. Shadows and dialectic 
It is possible to understand the art of the philosopher and its ontological collocation 
quoting a sample of this art itself. The passage below is the initial part of the conclusive 
movement of diairesis and synagoge in the Sophist. The beginning of the last and 
exhaustive attempt to define the sophist: 
 
VISITOR: I’ll assume divine expertise produces the things that come about by so-called 
nature, and that human expertise produces the things that humans compound those things 
into. According to this account there are two kinds of production, human and divine. […] 
Since there are two of them, cut each of them in two again. […] That way there are four parts 
of it all together, two human ones related to us and two divine ones related to the gods. […] 
Then if we take the division we made the first way, one part of each of those parts is the 
production of originals. Just about the best thing to call the two parts that are left might be 
“copy-making.” That way, production is divided in two again. […] We know that we human 
beings and the other living things, and also fire, water, and things like that, which natural 
things come from, are each generated and produced by a god. Is that right? […] And there 
are copies of each of these things, as opposed to the things themselves, that also come about 
by divine workmanship. 
THEAETETUS: What kinds of things? 
 
258 “The arts” is a translation for the term mousike which, literally, means “the arts of the Muses”. 
Sometimes this passage is translated as “practice and cultivate music” so that it ends up saying that 
philosophy is the highest kind of music. 
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VISITOR: Things in dreams, and appearances that arise by themselves during the day. 
They’re shadows when darkness appears in firelight, and they’re reflections when a thing’s 
own light and the light of something else come together around bright, smooth surfaces and 
produce an appearance that looks the reverse of the way the thing looks from straight ahead. 
[…] And what about human expertise? We say housebuilding makes a house itself and 
drawing makes a different one, like a human dream made for people who are awake. 
THEAETETUS: Of course. (Soph. 665e-666e) 
 
The distinction continues for a while in an articulated way, from one passage to another, 
the Visitor takes a breath to express a personal evaluation: “Some imitators know what 
they’re imitating and some don’t. And what division is more important than the one 
between ignorance and knowledge?” The philosopher and the sophist, once again, fall 
under a same general category (human production as opposed to divine production) and 
live in the same realm of the mimesis. However, with his activity, the philosopher proves 
his own capability and his own art: he knows what he is imitating, he is on the side of 
knowledge; the sophist, instead, is on the other side, deliberately. This means that the 
sophist knows that his art is deceiving. Both the philosopher and the sophist know that 
they do not know. They know they live among the eidola, but if this, on one side, pushes 
the philosopher to undertake a quest towards the truth of the eide; on the other side, this 
same ignorance is where the sophist decides to dwell and to perform his art. 
The conclusive definition of the sophist does not have the flavour of the victory in a hunt; 
it rather has a bitter and dramatic tone. The eidola spring out with any creative act, not 
only in the poiesis of human beings, but also in the demiourgia of the gods. The real 
difference consists in deciding to know this or to ignore this. 
This extremely complicated way to articulate the ontology of the image has to be 
considered in the most serious way. Plato is the aware and intentional bearer of a cultural 
revolution which shook the roots of the Greek Archaic thought and posited the basis of 
our western conception of the ontology of the image and co-extensively of the ontology 
itself. That, among the divine production there are eidola and that these eidola do exist, 
could have not be said straight forwardly, it needed a slow and complicated path. 
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The eidola produced by divine creation, says the Visitor, are things in dreams (ta en tois 
hypnois), shadows (skia), reflections (diploi).259 According to Jean-Pierre Vernant, these 
three types of eidola correspond to the three ways Archaic Greek culture identified the 
eidolon. In the Archaic thought the eidolon could present itself as a dream (onar), or as 
an apparition caused by a god (phasma), or else as the ghost of a defunct (psyche).260 The 
correspondence seems to work, but with Plato, the concept of eidolon changes its 
ontological status. 
In Archaic thought, the eidolon was intended as a double which at the same time existed 
(for the eyes) and did not exist (materially). Some example of this can be taken by some 
episodes in the Odyssey when the souls of the dead appeared to the alive ones, but when 
these last tried to hug or touch the appearing souls, these simply vanished revealing their 
real non-existence in the humans’ world.261 It can be said that the Archaic eidola belonged 
to another world, nevertheless they could appear in the humans’ world almost like 
hallucinations. The realms from where these eidola derive are “elsewhere” and parallel, 
such as the realm of dreams, the realm of the gods, and the realm of the dead. 
For Plato instead, the eidola do not derive from parallel realms, they are inevitable 
outcomes of any form of production, because everything that exists is somehow 
subjugated by the mimetic mechanism. The humans’ world is itself the realm of mimesis 
and, inevitably, it contains eidola. To include the eidola in the human world is the only 
way to pose them under the surveillance and the judgment of philosophy, although this 
opens space to a risk which is the manipulation of the sophist. 
The recurrent platonic analogy of the shadows is what exemplifies this the most. To 
believe that the shadows truly exist, cannot be a wrong thing; but, to believe that only 
shadows exist is a mistake derived from a deception. The allegory of the cave is probably 
the most famous and clear way to detect the relevance of this mistake. In fact, the 
prisoners in the cave truly believe that the shadows of the things they see at the bottom of 
the cave are the reality – indeed, that is the only reality they know. This false belief is the 
result of a biased and forced view. The prisoners in the cave are chained since childhood 
 
259 Literally “the doubled things” meaning all the reflections in mirrors and in other types of reflecting 
surfaces. 
260 Vernant, Milano, 1982, pp. 124-125. About the souls of the dead people as eidola in the Archaic 
culture, cf. also Vernant, 2006, p. 325-326 and Carchia, 2003, pp. 131-132. 
261 Cf. also Men. 100a. 
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and their faces are immobilised in a way that they can only look in front of them. If they 
can turn their backs towards the wall behind them, they could see the statues which 
forecast the shadows at the bottom of the cave and reveal the deception of the mimesis. 
Simply, they would not think straight away that shadows are not real (they would not 
deny their own reality), rather they would understand that there are “truer things”262 than 
shadows, as in fact shadows are derivations and not independent entities; in this way, and 
this is what counts the most, they would also understand the tricks of the mimetic 
mechanism. Instead, the prisoners are forced in a portion of the realm of mimesis, in the 
portion of the eidola. They do not seem to have access even to the most basic of the human 
intuitions which is the mimetic mechanism, because their full reality is exposed in front 
of them, plane and readable, without derivation. 
With the allegory of the cave, Plato means to exemplify the effect of a good education, 
which would consist in unchaining the prisoners and leading them out of the cave. For 
this reason, it is not the case to take the entire analogy extensively here; although, it would 
still be highly beneficial to do so, as the many details of the allegory would reinforce the 
claim held throughout this dissertation. Nevertheless, at this stage, it should be clear 
enough that Plato’s analogies need to be taken more seriously for their structure than for 
the precise correspondence of their terms of analogy. 
When finally freed, the first prisoner learns the first exemplum of mimesis, that the 
shadows (his own reality) derive from some statues placed on a wall, thanks to the light 
of a fire behind the wall. This exemplum is all the prisoners would need to learn in order 
to make their way out of the cave. This does not mean that the way out is an easy one, it 
actually gets more and more difficult upward and it needs to be walked slowly, but 
everything the prisoner encounters on this path is based on the same mechanism as that 
one from which the shadows at the bottom of the cave derived: the mimetic mechanism. 
Significantly, when Glaucon expresses his very first reaction to this story told by Socrates, 
Socrates points to the mimetic mechanism again: this story may present a weird image 
(atopon eikona) and weird (atopous) prisoners as Glaucon claims, however these 
prisoners are alike Socrates and Glaucon (homoious hemin).263 With the weird images of 
this allegory, Socrates is making a mimesis of his own status. In fact, he is forced to look 
 
262 Resp. 515d. 
263 Resp. 515a. 
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at eidola and to be deceived by them, however he has been freed (supposedly by his 
daimon),264 hence he has obviously acknowledged the mimetic mechanism – in fact he is 
using it by means of the allegory, and is willing to walk the entire path until out of the 
cave and farther. The state of deception in which Socrates admits to be along with 
Glaucon is that one caused by the attempt to define justice (the Republic originated with 
this intent). The dialogue represents a difficult progression towards the eidos of justice 
where mimesis presents its deception on different ontological and subtle levels that 
requires revisions, steps back and mainly the bitter awareness to dwell among eidola most 
of the time. In the allegory, the path of the prisoner is resumed in a few passages: from 
the shadows in the cave the prisoner goes upward to the statues and the fire; from the 
statues the prisoner goes upward to living entities, their shadows and the sun; then, he 
goes from the reflection of the sun to the sun itself; lastly from the sun itself to the 
understanding of how the sun sheds light on everything and gives structure and variation 
to the natural world. The path that Socrates and Glaucon kept walking is more articulated, 
but similar in its outcomes: 
 
This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said before. The visible 
realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power 
of the sun. And if you interpret the upward journey and the study of things above as the 
upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you’ll grasp what I hope to convey, since 
that is what you wanted to hear about. Whether it’s true or not, only the god knows. But this 
is how I see it: In the knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it 
is reached only with difficulty. Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude that it is 
the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it produces both light and its 
source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and 
understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it. (Resp. 
517 b-c) 
 
The form of the good to which the form of justice is strictly linked, is like the sun. 
However, the human condition is to dwell in the realm of mimesis, and even if the forms 
 
264 Cf. Apol. 29d-31a. Keeping the analogy proposed by the allegory, Socrates can be compared to that first 
prisoner who makes himself free (it is not clarified how) and then tries to convince the other prisoners to 
come out of the cave (out of their state of ignorance). The reaction of the prisoners is not very positive, they 
would not believe him to the point that they desire to kill him (Resp. 517a). Somehow, this resembles 
Socrates’ destiny. 
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can be grasped, that could be only for a moment of clarity and not the normal condition 
of the human sight as this would be unbearable for it. Nevertheless, in the realm of 
mimesis human beings are not abandoned to the eidola only, the eide are accessible and 
create the condition for the visibility of the eidola, even though the eyes cannot stare 
constantly at them. What matters the most for the philosopher is that he is always able to 
distinguish the eidolon from the eidos and that he is always on the path towards something 
truer using the dialectical method. 
This same analogy is used in a similar way in the Phaedo, one of the most biographical 
dialogue by Plato, narrating the last days of Socrates and declaring the sense (and the 
defence) of his philosophical enterprise: 
 
After this, he said, when I had wearied of investigating things, I thought that I must be careful 
to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their 
eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed 
my mind, and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my 
eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in 
discussions and investigate the truth of things by means of words. However, perhaps this 
analogy is inadequate, for I certainly do not admit that one who investigates things by means 
of words is dealing with images any more than one who looks at facts. (Phaed. 99d-100a) 
 
 
By means of logoi the philosopher progresses on the path towards the truth; but, as already 
discussed, the logoi are weak and it is anyway impossible to fully overcome the 
impeachment of the eidola. The mimetic mechanism is intrinsic in the logoi which are 
the tools of the philosopher, reason why any attempt to grasp an eidos by means of logoi, 
although extremely refined and approximated to truth with the flexibility of the dialectic 
method, is always posing a distance with the eidos itself. It could be said that logoi are 
the instruments through which the philosopher tries to perform his own mimesis which is 
an eikastike mimesis aiming to dissect and reveal the inner geometry that constitutes the 
eide.  
If on one side the logoi are a refuge for the philosopher, on the other side this refuge does 
not protect the philosopher from the exposition to the mimetic mechanism, hence does 
not protect him from the risks of the eidola. 
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Ironically enough, the way through which the logoi can get approximated to the eide is 
with more logoi, by adding up more and more diairesis and synagoge at each stage, hence 
by making the dialectic path as long and as articulated as possible. The advantage that the 
logoi have in opposition to the visual eidola is that they are not as immediate, 
consequently not immediately deceptive, they require a great work and they can be 
worked as tools towards the truth. In addition, even though with a high degree of 
difficulty, the logoi work best in a common enterprise. Before to deepen this aspect of 
commonality of the logoi, it is worth to underline, once again, one of the main issues of 
this dissertation. In fact, at this stage enough elements have been gathered to reassess the 
position about the orality/writing opposition in Plato in a more complete way. 
As discussed at different stages, both the critique of writing and the critique of orality in 
Plato’s works prove to be inessential if taken literally, also for this reason they are not to 
be considered in opposition to each other. This alleged opposition, in virtue of which one 
should affirm its own superiority over the other, is not sustainable because the weakness 
of the logoi affects both the written speech and the oral speech. The reason for Plato to 
criticise the logoi is not primarily related to their being written nor being orally exposed; 
it has to do mainly with the mimetic mechanism intrinsic in the use of them. In other 
terms, it has to do with the weakness of the logoi themselves and their close connection 
to the ontology of the image. The place where the critique of writing and the critique of 
orality resolve their supposed conflict is the critique of the deceptive image which, in 
turn, has been integrated in the platonic philosophical system as well. The Sophist stands 
also for a philosophical redemption of the deception: even the deception, when carefully 
identified and regulated, can be an integrative part of a philosophical system. This 
operation of inclusion and regulation of the deception is only partially deliberate, mostly 
is inevitable, as it depends on the limited nature of the human soul.265 Since the human 
beings are limited also in the way they can gain, express and transmit knowledge, 
philosophy – although aware of this limitedness266 –  remains itself a limited tool and has 
to avail of images. The images are not always used to vehicle contents, however the 
 
265 As Jill Gordon expresses it with a clear sentence: That human beings are inherently limited, that 
philosophy is the appropriate medium for human inquiry due to our limitations, and that philosophy needs 
therefore to be carried out to some extent through images, are pervasive ideas in the Platonic corpus. In 
Scott, ed. by, 2007, p. 220. 
266 Drew Hyland, in his book Finitude and Transcendence, analyses the Republic as a model to interpret 
the entire platonic production. He convincingly argues that Plato’s philosophy represents a general attempt 
to transcend the human limitedness/finitude through philosophy. Cf. Hyland, 1994. 
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mechanism which vehicles contents itself is based on the ontology of the image discussed 
in this chapter. The entire human world is an expression of this mimetic relation 
exemplified by the ontology of the image. This aspect, which has been analysed on 
different levels so far, should still be considered on the cosmological level as interpreted 
by Plato. 
Some of the platonic works of the maturity deal with cosmology, mainly the Philebus and 
the Timaeus. In these works, the platonic arguments on the creation of the kosmos are 
nurtured by a complex ontology along with some geometrical and mathematical 
theories.267 The mimetic mechanism persists as a neat element of continuity also in this 
period of the platonic production and it is still based on the ontology of the image. To 
show this legacy, it suffices to quote an explicative passage from the Timaeus in which 
the intrinsic human limitedness and its dependence on the ontology of the image emerge 
in the attempt to give an account of creation the human world itself.  
 
Since these things are so, it follows by unquestionable necessity that this world is an image 
of something. Now in every subject it is of utmost importance to begin at the natural 
beginning, and so, on the subject of an image and its model,268 we must make the following 
specification: the accounts we give of things have the same character as the subjects they set 
forth. […] Don’t be surprised then, Socrates, if it turns out repeatedly that we won’t be able 
to produce accounts on a great many subjects—on gods or the coming to be of the universe—
that are completely and perfectly consistent and accurate. Instead, if we can come up with 
accounts no less likely than any, we ought to be content, keeping in mind that both I, the 
speaker, and you, the judges, are only human. So we should accept the likely tale on these 
matters. It behoves us not to look for anything beyond this. (Tim. 29b-d) 
 
The only way humans have for understanding what they have around is by means of the 
eidola. This does not necessarily imply that the mimetic mechanism affects everything; 
it simply means that the way human beings can know is based on this mechanism. Moving 
upwards, out of the cave, the philosopher tries to transcend his condition and to grasp 
those things which are subjugated by the mimesis, the eide. The philosopher can reach 
that level of understanding, but he cannot dwell there. Keeping on the analogy of the cave, 
 
267 Cf. Trabattoni, 2015, 159-178. 
268 Eidolon-eidos. 
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the philosopher can walk all the way out of the cave to look into the sun, but he would 
not be able to stare at it eternally, that vision would let him understand the nature of vision 
itself, but then, his destiny is to back down and divulge his partial knowledge in the realm 
of mimesis. This movement upward and then downward is mimetically reproduced in the 
movement of the dialectic method by the philosopher.269 
The eide, as said, can be grasped, but only temporarily and with a lot of effort: “For this 
knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; but after long-
continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, 
like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightaway 
nourishes itself.”270 
This quotation, already analysed in a different context in Chapter I, here offers a brilliant 
image of Plato’s theory of human knowledge and brings the analysis back to where it was 
put aside, at the commonality of the logoi. The logoi, although limited, can work better if 
the enterprise towards the truth is brought forward commonly. It is quite evident that Plato 
considers the process of knowing strictly related to an educative relation, subsequently, 
on a higher level of access to the eide, the process of knowledge is grounded on an erotic 
relation.271 
This need of relationality emerges in the dialogues mainly through the dialectic method 
of research and through the dialogic narrative structure of the dialogues themselves. The 
dialectical method implies the presence of at least another interlocutor; bearer of a point 
of divergence and/or convergence; as well as the dialogue is a literary device which 
represents an exchange at least between two people. The path towards the truth needs to 
be walked and to be integrated reciprocally. The dialectical exchange is what respects 
mostly the vitality, the fluidity and the desire of transcendence typical of the human soul. 
 
269 About the path that leads the prisoner out of the cave Socrates comments: And what about this journey? 
Don’t you call it dialectic? (Resp. 532b) and shortly after continues: Therefore, dialectic is the only inquiry 
that travels this road, doing away with hypotheses and proceeding to the first principle itself, so as to be 
secure. And when the eye of the soul is really buried in a sort of barbaric bog, dialectic gently pulls it out 
and leads it upwards, using the crafts we described to help it and cooperate with it in turning the soul 
around. (Resp. 533 c-d) 
270 Ep. VII, 341c. 
271 Both the Symposium and the Phaedrus, the two main dialogues about the theme of eros, describe the 
erotic relation as a form of relational dialectic through which the soul can reach the eide and become able 
to generate in the most authentic way. 
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The dialectic method is a path towards the truth as a constant movement272 that even when 
it reaches the eidos then backs down and renews the quest. In this context, it might be 
recalled the antithetic model of knowledge presented by the sophist. The sophist 
accomplishes his research by dwelling among the eidola, he is aware of the mimetic 
mechanism, but he chooses the apparent stability and solidity of what is immediately 
reachable and knowable in the human condition, in other terms he prefers the finitude to 
the transcendence. The analogy of the petrification here shows all its power: this type of 
sophistic knowledge petrifies the logoi with the logoi (either written or oral) and makes 
them empty, as they are not able to transcend and nurture the soul. The sophist, like the 
philosopher, performs a sort of mimesis of the reality with the tool of the logoi, but the 
sophistic mimesis is deceptive and does not respect the vitality of the human soul as it is 
resigned to one aspect of the reality while takes it for the whole – a synecdoche, as argued 
earlier. The philosopher, instead, uses the logoi as tools, but he transcends them; his 
mimesis, although eikastike – hence rightly proportioned, is never exhaustive; it is always 
subject to failure and passible of integration, revisions. In this way, the dialectic method 
and the dialogic style do not, and cannot, aim to mirror the truth, but they rather aim to 
keep alive the authentic desire of the soul for the truth.273 As if the truth is not the reaching 
point of the path, but it is the path itself.274 Just to mention a concrete example of this, it 
can be considered the conclusive definition of the sophist in the homonymous dialogue. 
The definition of the sophist was a resume of the entire path walked by the Visitor and 
Theaetetus; this path was articulated (it was stuck in aporiai many times), difficult (they 
even had to commit a patricide) and provoked changes and growth in the souls of the two 
philosophers. This example, among many others, shows how dialectics can be the most 
realistic way to interpret the realm of mimesis as it does not deny the multiplicity and 
partiality of the human world. Dialectics contemplates and includes organically the 
differences intrinsic into being. This, once again, is a conceptual revolution brought 
forward by Plato’s philosophy. 
 
272 In the Cratylus (439e-440c) Plato expressed the impossibility of knowing anything that is in a constant 
movement, unless by posing the existence of stable eide. On the stability of the eide it is possible to ground 
the human knowledge which, due to the limited human nature, is constantly changeable and fluid.  
273 Cf. Candiotto, 2013. 
274 About the reciprocal and dialectic nature of the platonic dialogues, Pierre Hadot writes relevant pages 
(Hadot, 1995, pp. 89-93). Just to quote an example: A dialogue is an itinerary of the thought, whose route 
is traced by the constantly maintained accord between questioner and respondent. Hadot, 1995, p. 91. 
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Plato does not simply identify oppositions in the genres of being, he also finds a way to 
integrate them in a system of thought and in a way to express them. The dialectic method 
raises from an aporia in the logic of being (the problem of contradiction): to solve the 
aporia of the human condition, the philosopher, instead of denying his own finitude and 
limitedness, creates a model which resembles it. If on one side, the human soul strives for 
transcendence and for the knowledge of the eide, on the other side this same soul is 
embedded in a realm of mimesis. The acceptance of this status does not prevent the 
philosopher from keeping on transcending it, although this transcendence is possible only 
relationally (the identity nurtured by the difference). As the allegory of the cave 
exemplifies, without the external intervention of “someone else”, no one would be able 
to discover different levels of reality.275 The relation with another human being does not 
only permit to access the divine core of own’s soul,276 but it also permits to generate and 
hence to partake to immortality. On this merit, the following passage from the 
Symposium, while describing the drama of human limitedness, subject to constant change, 
reveals also the way humans can partake to immortality: 
 
Even while each living thing is said to be alive and to be the same—as a person is said to be 
the same from childhood till he turns into an old man—even then he never consists of the 
same things, though he is called the same, but he is always being renewed and in other 
respects passing away, in his hair and flesh and bones and blood and his entire body. And it’s 
not just in his body, but in his soul, too, for none of his manners, customs, opinions, desires, 
pleasures, pains, or fears ever remains the same, but some are coming to be in him while 
others are passing away. And what is still far stranger than that is that not only does one 
branch of knowledge come to be in us while another passes away and that we are never the 
same even in respect of our knowledge, but that each single piece of knowledge has the same 
fate. […] And in that way everything mortal is preserved, not, like the divine, by always 
being the same in every way, but because what is departing and aging leaves behind 
something new, something such as it had been. By this device, Socrates,” she said, “what is 
mortal shares in immortality, whether it is a body or anything else, while the immortal has 
another way. So don’t be surprised if everything naturally values its own offspring, because 
it is for the sake of immortality that everything shows this zeal, which is Love.” […] “Now, 
some people are pregnant in body, and for this reason turn more to women and pursue love 
in that way, providing themselves through childbirth with immortality and remembrance and 
 
275 Cf. Fronterotta, 2001, p. 85. 
276 Alc. I 132e-133a, Phaedr. 255d. 
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happiness, as they think, for all time to come; while others are pregnant in soul—because 
there surely are those who are even more pregnant in their souls than in their bodies, and 
these are pregnant with what is fitting for a soul to bear and bring to birth. And what is fitting? 
Wisdom and the rest of virtue, which all poets beget, as well as all the craftsmen who are said 
to be creative.” (Symp. 207d-209a) 
 
 
Dialectics and relationality (educative and erotic) have the same structure: systematic and 
progressive; these both lead, after a long and articulated course, to a generative truth 
which, as said, rather than being a reaching point is an evolving path.277 
 
3.5. Beauty and wonderment 
The aporiai with which the philosopher is forced to be confronted are due to the weakness 
and limitedness of the human condition itself, but he is characterised by having the desire 
to look for a resource. This dialectic between misery (penia) and resource (poros) is the 
dialectic which generates Eros. In the Symposium, the priestess Diotima recalls the myth 
of the birth of the daimon Eros278 who, being generated by the god Poros (father) and the 
mortal Penia (mother) is the embodiment of the metaxy (in-between). Eros is a daimon 
in between a god and a human: he is in between mortality and divinity; he is in between 
knowledge and ignorance; he is always in movement between opposites which are co-
dependent. In fact, no one would look for a resource (poros) if not in a state of need 
(penia), this is a perfect dialectic movement brought forward by the generation of Eros 
who, in his turn, spreads the desire to generate among the humans.  
The authentic philosopher is guided by an authentic erotic desire and this is testified by 
Socrates himself who notoriously professes many times to know nothing…but one thing: 
ta erotika, the love issues.279 
In the realm of mimesis, the power generated by the erotic desire is necessarily kindled 
by an eidolon. This is the only eidolon which eludes the mimetic mechanism: 
 
277 About dialectics and erotic relationality intended as methods of truth cf. Robin, 1908, p. 213, pp. 223-
226, p. 251. However, Robin believes that in the platonic system eros is an inferior method of truth if 
compared to the dialectic method. The reason to hold this position are well grounded, nevertheless I would 
not hold it myself. I would rather say that the two methods work analogically in their structure and co-
dependently in their striving. 
278 Symp. 203b-204c. 
279 Cf. Symp. 177d, 193e, 198d, 201d, 212b; Lys. 204b-c; Phaedr. 227c, 257a. 
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Now beauty, as I said, was radiant among the other objects; and now that we have come down 
here we grasp it sparkling through the clearest of our senses. Vision, of course, is the sharpest 
of our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom. It would awaken a terribly powerful 
love if an image280 of wisdom came through our sight as clearly as beauty does, and the same 
goes for the other objects of inspired love. But now beauty alone has this privilege, to be the 
most clearly visible and the most loved. Of course a man who was initiated long ago or who 
has become defiled is not to be moved abruptly from here to a vision of Beauty itself when 
he sees what we call beauty here; so instead of gazing at the latter reverently, he surrenders 
to pleasure and sets out in the manner of a four-footed beast, eager to make babies; and, 
wallowing in vice, he goes after unnatural pleasure too, without a trace of fear or shame. A 
recent initiate, however, one who has seen much in heaven—when he sees a godlike face or 
bodily form that has captured Beauty well, first he shudders and a fear comes over him like 
those he felt at the earlier time; then he gazes at him with the reverence due a god, and if he 
weren’t afraid people would think him completely mad, he’d even sacrifice to his boy as if 
he were the image of a god. Once he has looked at him, his chill gives way to sweating and 
a high fever, because the stream of beauty that pours into him through his eyes warms him 
up and waters the growth of his wings. Meanwhile, the heat warms him and melts the places 
where the wings once grew, places that were long ago closed off with hard scabs to keep the 
sprouts from coming back; but as nourishment flows in, the feather shafts swell and rush to 
grow from their roots beneath every part of the soul (long ago, you see, the entire soul had 
wings). (Phaedr. 250d-251b) 
 
This passage from the Phaedrus is slightly out of context here as it refers to some aspects 
of the platonic psychology and the platonic theory of love which are not dealt with in this 
dissertation, such as the immortality of the soul and the platonic theory of 
metempsychosis,281 but also the homoerotism and the traditional code of behaviour 
between lovers.282 However, the relevance of this passage and the impact it had on the 
ongoing western conception of love and beauty is that strong that it is possible to 
understand it and feel all its power even if it is quoted out of context. It seemed relevant, 
at this stage, to expose it without too much of an introduction to leave intact its emotional 
effect. 
 
280 Eidolon. 
281 Cf. Long, 1948. 
282 In regard to these last aspects cf. Foucault, 1990, Vol. II, pp. 185-245. 
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On a second and more rigorous approach to this passage, what is relevant to highlight in 
regard to this dissertation is the special status of the eidolon of beauty among the other 
eidola. Unless used in a manipulative way – as the sophist does, the eidola would not be 
able to stand and respond for themselves without the eide, this means that in each and 
every eidolon it is possible to glimpse its correspondent eidos. That is particularly 
effective for the eidola of beauty. Due to its specific visibility, the eidos of beauty shines 
forth frequently through the eidola in the realm of mimesis and kindle the erotic desire in 
the human beings: 
 
All of us are pregnant, Socrates, both in body and in soul, and, as soon as we come to a certain 
age, we naturally desire to give birth. Now no one can possibly give birth in anything ugly; 
only in something beautiful. That’s because when a man and a woman come together in order 
to give birth, this is a godly affair. Pregnancy, reproduction—this is an immortal thing for a 
mortal animal […] 
“What Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is.” 
“Well, what is it, then?” 
“Reproduction and birth in beauty.” (Symp. 206 c-d) 
 
This reproduction has somehow to do with poiesis hence with mimesis – as learned, but 
there is an enormous difference here. What is reproduced in love (eros), through beauty, 
is alive and responsible as it always bears with it the creative energy of its eidos. It can 
be a human being, a work of art, a set of rules but it bears with it the creative energy that 
made it exists and that, in this way, makes it partake to the eternity over the finitude of its 
producer. However, the main specificity of the eidola of beauty lies in their unique 
relation with the eidos of beauty itself. As anticipated, the eidola of beauty seem to elude 
the mimetic mechanism because in this case the relation between eidos and eidolon, 
although truly based on a distinction (diairesis), it is more based on collection (synagoge). 
The eidola of beauty do not simply derive from the eidos of beauty; they partake in it as 
it comes out also in the following passage from the Phaedo: 
 
If there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason 
than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. […] I no longer understand 
or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful 
145 
 
 
because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all 
these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else 
makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in,283 or however you may 
describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise 
nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I 
think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. And if I stick to this I think I 
shall never fall into error. This is the safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that 
it is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful. (Phaed. 100 c-e) 
 
This type of relation entertained by eidola of beauty with the eidos of beauty does not 
have the characteristics of a mimesis, it can rather be named methexis (participation). 
The eidola of beauty in their visibility show also their eidos. To explain the structure of 
this relation leads to one of the most delicate areas to explore within platonic philosophy. 
In this regard, this dissertation avoids to venture in an explanation based on a principle of 
causality,284 primarily because just to set correctly this type of analysis it would be 
necessary both to analyse and articulate the entire platonic theory of the ideas, and to 
define the status of the empiric objects within Plato’s philosophy. 
To unroot the criticism of writing and the criticism of orality in Plato, it suffices to refer 
to the mimetic mechanism and the visual model to which it depends. However, the 
ontology intrinsic in the mimetic mechanism arises issues related to the visibility and 
understandability of the whole reality (both in its finitude and in its transcendence). As 
far as the analysis dwells in the realm of mimesis, among the eidola and their asymmetric 
resemblance, the ontology of this derivation/separation is easier to grasp. When it comes 
to reconnect the eidolon to its source and to understand the nature of this participation, 
the analysis gets more complicated. On the stable level of the eide, the main difficulty 
consists in understanding how these eternal and self-identical entities partake in the 
eidola. 
What is undeniable is the unique and exceptional nature of the beauty which is the only 
eidos visible itself in its eidola. This does not mean that the distance between the eidos 
 
283 The term used to mean this sharing is koinonia which is semantically interchangeable with methexis 
(used in a verbal expression a few lines above) and metalepsis. Plato himself seems to use these terms in 
an equivalent way, meaning a general sense of participation of the eidola to the eidos. Cf. Fronterotta, 2001, 
p. 149. 
284 For this type of analysis cf. Vlastos, 1969. 
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and the eidolon is cancelled in beauty, there is still a distinction between the multiple 
beautiful things and the “Beautiful itself, absolute, pure, unmixed”.285 The eidos and the 
eidolon are clearly distinct also in beauty and the philosopher is always about to remark 
this distinction.286 
Differently from a mimetic relation between eidos and eidolon, in beauty the reconnection 
between eidolon and eidos is made accessible intuitively with the sense of vision, almost 
aesthetically – in etymological sense. 
The vision of something or someone beautiful happens suddenly and rouses 
wonderment.287 On the first instance, it is something completely reliant on the sensorial 
experience: beauty relies on the eidola, as to say that without the ephemeral impact of the 
eidola of beauty on the human senses, there would not be any access to the eidos of 
beauty. Although this does not sound like the conventional reading of the platonic theory 
of love, it is indeed what the Symposium shows throughout the dialogue and it is 
exemplified by the levels of the love-ladder that Diotima describes in the Symposium.288 
The first, inevitable step to access the path that leads to the great sea of Beauty is the love 
for one body – argues Diotima. In other words, it is the love for the embodiment of beauty: 
after and only after this wonderous impact with beauty, a human wants to step forward as 
it is much more worth to love the beauty in its eidos289 than multiple, equivalent, eidola 
of beauty.290  
 
285 Cf. Symp. 211d-e. 
286 Cf. Resp. 476b-d. 
287 Along the entire exchange between Diotima and Socrates, the priestess warns him often to not express 
an easy wonderment (thaumasia) for things which are quite logical nor for simple truths. Thaumasia is a 
condition which originates from a sudden vision (And the man who made Iris the child of Thaumas was 
perhaps no bad genealogist. Theaet. 155d) and it raises both the desire to love and the desire to know 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b)  
The moment when wonderment can be correctly aroused is all of a sudden, after a long course, in front of 
the vision of something beautiful: the man who has been thus far guided in matters of Love, who has beheld 
beautiful things in the right order and correctly, is coming now to the goal of Loving: all of a sudden he 
will catch sight of something wonderfully beautiful in its nature; that, Socrates, is the reason for all his 
earlier labors (Symp. 210e). 
288 In the Symposium, another example of the relevance of the sensorial experience of beauty comes with a 
narrative event in the dialogue, and not through the exposition of a theory, that is the arrival of Alcibiades 
at the Symposium. Alcibiades, famous for his beauty, arrives at Agathon’s house drunk but still handsome. 
The description of his apparition is full of sensorial details: noises, colors, good smells, ornaments, plastic 
poses etc. Cf. Symp. 212c-213a. 
289 Symp. 210b. 
290 The central place given to Diotima’s speech on love does not imply that Plato denies or diminishes the 
relevance of individuality in an erotic relation. On this regard, Martha Nussbaum has elaborated a 
confutation of Gregory Vlastos’ who claimed that platonic love is a form of neglection of the individuality 
and of the affection. Cf. Nussbaum, 2001, p. 166-173 and Vlastos, 1973, p. 31. 
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The special status of beauty represents a turning point and an occasion both to make clear, 
once again, a determinant aspect about the ontology of the image in Plato, and to redefine 
the mimetic mechanism by a comparison with the methexis. 
Concerning the ontology of the image, it should be even clearer now that the fact that the 
eide have a visible side – as eidola – and hence they are graspable by the human 
perception, does not make the eidola less real or wrong in their essence, it rather makes 
them intelligible. What can be seen can be also known and, mostly, can be put under the 
surveillance of the philosophical judgment. This is a determinant and innovative aspect 
of Plato’s philosophy and is the philosophical substratum on which, still nowadays, is 
grounded the epistemological and ontological value we give to the image. 
Concerning the mimetic mechanism, in comparison with the methexis, the main 
difference is determined by eros. If on one side, mimesis is a pure mechanism which 
reveals its functioning in a mirror; on the other side methexis is a generation. 
To contextualise this comparison, it can be said that best expression of the mimetic 
mechanism consists in the eikastike mimesis, that type of reproduction which respects the 
proportions (rigorously based on mathematics and geometry) of the articulation of the 
eidos. The platonic logos with its articulations is a clear example of eikastike mimesis. 
With its complex integration of the pseudos, actualised in the Sophist, the logos represents 
a mediation between the triggering opposition of identity and difference in being. 
While, the best expression of the methexis is indeed in the platonic theory of love. 
Through an erotic relation and an erotic generation, it is possible to partake to that eternity 
that shines forth in some eidola as a promise of happiness291 – that is mostly visible in the 
eidola of beauty. The manifestations of beauty have the power to kindle the erotic desire 
into human beings, the erotic madness drives the souls of the human beings to the eide 
without the mediation of the logos, and hence without that weakness of the logoi that 
constantly reminds the human limitedness. 
These further evaluations on the methexis of beauty are not simply meant to show other 
aspects of the relation between eidos and eidolon. The model of the methexis clarifies in 
a more complete way the firm axiological rejection that Plato has towards most of the 
eidola. The eidolon is rejected not because it contains deception, but because it stands for 
 
291 Symp. 205d, 208e.  
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the eidos and may aim to substitute it as in the manipulative use of the sophists. The 
eidolon stands for the eidos not in a generative way, but in a lifeless way, rigid and mute 
like a double or a statue without a soul. 
On these last notes, it seems relevant to reconnect a theme left aside earlier which is the 
petrifying power of the manipulated logoi. As discussed, the Sophistics does with the 
logos what the Gorgon does with the gaze, turns a live body into a stone. The eidolon of 
beauty transcends the risk of the mimesis as beauty is the spark of the erotic desire. The 
erotic desire is the generative power that brings forth life in the human production, giving 
birth to a new-born human life or even to logoi292 and in this way allows human beings 
to partake to immortality. The manipulation of the logoi instead, is the most dangerous 
outcome of the mimetic mechanism and leads to the annihilation of being, to relativism 
and to mortality – as seen with Gorgias. 
The sophist plays with the eidola as if they are the (only) reality, as if the multiplicity and 
the finitude of the eidola are all that exists. For a sophist, behind the transient apparitions 
there is no sending back to a unifying and immobile eidos. According to this view, 
everything is a matter of perspective and interpretation: the logoi do no serve to reach the 
eide, but to build a variable account of a variable reality; also, the logoi are not weak at 
all for the sophist, logos is actually an incredibly powerful seducer (a peculiar eros).293 
On this ridge of the realm of mimesis, human life is nothing, it is an eidolon itself, a bearer 
of mortality and finitude. 
The philosopher, instead, suggests that every human being strives for immortality and the 
evidence for this relies in that strong passion that arises in him/her at the “methexic” view 
of beauty. On this basis, Plato grounds his theory of recollection and metempsychosis 
which finds its best expression both in the myth of the winged horses and the charioteer 
in the Phaedrus and in the myth of Er in the Republic. Unfortunately, as anticipated, a 
discussion on these themes does not find adequate space in this dissertation. 
 
292 […] the lover is turned to the great sea of beauty, and, gazing upon this, he gives birth to many gloriously 
beautiful ideas and theories (logous), in unstinting love of wisdom. (Symp. 210e) 
293 Inspired incantation through speeches (logōn) are inducers of pleasure and reducers of sorrow; by 
intercourse with the mind’s belief the power of the incantation enchants and persuades and moves it by 
sorcery. Two arts of sorcery and magic have been invented. They are deceptions of mind and deviations of 
belief. How many have persuaded and do persuade, how many on how many subjects by fabricating false 
speech (pseudes logos). Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, 10-11. 
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Coming back to the analogy of the stone in the Symposium, the lapsus (Gorgias/Gorgon) 
in the quotation from the Odyssey294 should be considered as an intentional platonic 
allusion. 
The association between the stone and the realm of death was codified in the archaic 
culture and was made explicit by the ritual use of some types of statues. Death itself was 
considered as a petrification of human beings.295 To remain within the frame traced by 
the Homeric (modified) quote, the context of the original verse narrates about Ulysses 
descending into the Hades (the realm of dead people). The verses recalled by Socrates tell 
about the moment when Ulysses runs away scared by Persephone, the virgin abducted in 
the underworld by Hades (the homonymous king of his own realm) who married her and 
made her the queen of the Hades. Persephone guards the entrance of the Hades holding 
in her hand the head of Medusa, the most terrific of the three gorgons, but also the only 
mortal of the three sisters – decapitated by Perseus after a cunning use of his shield as a 
mirror.296 Persephone stands there to petrify, with the help of Medusa’s gaze, any alive 
person who might descend in the Hades. 
In the Symposium, the analogy of the stone recurs in different circumstances,297 mainly 
referring to the incapability of entering in a relational dialectic. By definition, the stone 
is aporetic298 and interestingly, some specific types of statues were standing as substitutes 
for the souls of dead persons such as the kolossoi.299 The main characteristic of these 
statues is that for the archaic culture they were not considered as representative images, 
but as real “doubles”. Their existence was derived from an original (the soul of the dead 
person) but once created it was considered independent, having its own parallel existence. 
 
294 Symp. 198c. 
295 Cf. Vernant, 2006, p. 328. 
296 The character of Perseus, his use of the mirror, the deadly petrification in the gaze of Medusa are part 
of one of the most emblematic and relevant episodes of Greek mythology. Unfortunately, this dissertation 
does not offer the occasion to deepen the important philosophical implication of this myth within Plato’s 
Symposium. This can easily be material for an independent research. 
297 Most emblematically when Alcibiades compares Socrates to a statue of a Silenus: Look at him! Isn’t he 
just like a statue of Silenus? You know the kind of statue I mean; you’ll find them in any shop in town. It’s 
a Silenus sitting, his flute or his pipes in his hands, and it’s hollow. It’s split right down the middle, and 
inside it’s full of tiny statues of the gods. Now look at him again! Isn’t he also just like the satyr Marsyas? 
Nobody, not even you, Socrates, can deny that you look like them. But the resemblance goes beyond 
appearance, as you’re about to hear. (Symp. 215a-b) This passage is quite poignant and contains many 
symbolic philosophical elements which would deserve an independent research. 
298 Without poroi (exits) from which derives the English term “pore(s)”. 
299 Cf. the two studies by Jean-Pierre Vernant one on the kolossos and on the other one on the theme of 
visual presentification, Vernant, 2006, pp. 321-349. 
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As argued, to consider the eidola fully existent and independent in their own existence 
was a specific trait of  Archaic culture which resembles also the structure of the 
parmenidean ontology: what exists, is, and it cannot be said that it does not exist. Hence, 
the kolossoi too exist as doubles of human beings, although they have not movement and 
no life, simply no soul – hence no way back to the eide. 
Plato, to avert the possibility of the unanimated “double” and the risks of petrification 
(primarily the loss of logos, but also the impossibility to see), articulates an ontology of 
the image capable of integrating not-being as a relational aspect of being and does it with 
the only available tool, the logoi. This allows the eidola to exist but never independently, 
in fact, the human world is the realm of mimesis in which eidos and eidolon both exist 
but dialectically and never independently. The mission of the philosopher is to give 
account of this dialectic, being merged in the finitude and transcending it. 
In conclusion, it is worth to bring to completion the analogy of the stone repeating that 
the statue cannot be a self-standing ontological being has the stone lacks sound, view, 
warmth, resource, beauty.  The lack of beauty is not an aesthetic problem of the stone as 
such, in fact, beauty is defined by eros and not vice-versa300 and this is one of the reasons 
why it is still impossible to talk about “platonic Aesthetics” as something related to arts 
and image-making. If there is something like a “platonic Aesthetics” this is related to eros 
and beauty and not to art-making. It is related to methexis and not to mimesis. Although 
limited in a realm of mimesis, human beings thanks to the liveliness of their souls can see 
beauty and consequently they can experience eros as a desire and a generative power to 
bring forth life over the human finitude. 
These last reflections on the theme of eros in connection with Aesthetics, beauty and 
immortality of the soul are not exhaustive and, as preannounced, they represent an open-
ended conclusion which, in virtue of its openness can serve as a starting ground for further 
enquiries in the liminal territory of “platonic Aesthetics”. A correct and complete 
understanding of beauty in Plato should take into account also the theory of 
metempsychosis and the role of the anamnesis in the process of knowledge.301 In this 
dissertation, these themes have not found adequate space. The main reason for the 
 
300 Carchia, 2003, p. 136. 
301 Daniele Guastini holds that eros and anamnesis have a substantial connection and a determinant role in 
the platonic theory of knowledge. Cf. Guastini, 2003, pp. 52-61. 
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exclusion of these themes is due to the necessity of restraining the field of research to the 
precise platonic opposition (orality/writing) which, rather than being a side aspect has 
revealed to be a preliminary and grounding aspect to set a possible theory of “platonic 
Aesthetics”. To analyse this specific platonic opposition, it has been relevant to include 
many aspects of contemporary interpretation and this implied the exclusion of many 
exquisitely platonic aspects which relevance was not meant to be denied. 
For these last reasons, it is still worth recalling, as a final note to this work, the power of 
the wonderment aroused by the eidola of beauty in the soul. The wonderment provoked 
by the view of something or someone beautiful reconnects the soul with the eidos of 
beauty itself. For a brief, but powerful moment, the soul is brought back to its undefinable 
past in the hyperuranion and through a process of anamnesis it remembers the eide, 
specifically, the eidos of beauty: 
 
This is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by god can take for anyone who 
has it or is connected to it, and when someone who loves beautiful boys is touched by this 
madness he is called a lover. As I said, nature requires that the soul of every human being 
has seen reality; otherwise, no soul could have entered this sort of living thing. But not every 
soul is easily reminded of the reality there by what it finds here—not souls that got only a 
brief glance at the reality there, not souls who had such bad luck when they fell down here 
that they were twisted by bad company into lives of injustice so that they forgot the sacred 
objects they had seen before. Only a few remain whose memory is good enough; and they 
are startled when they see an image of what they saw up there. Then they are beside 
themselves, and their experience is beyond their comprehension because they cannot fully 
grasp what it is that they are seeing. (Phaedr. 249e-250a) 
 
The shining forth of beauty is able to reconciliate the best human souls.
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AFTERWORD 
On the contemporary relatability of this study 
 
This work, although focuses on specific themes of Ancient Philosophy, does not intend 
to be a purely autoreferential academic exercise. The desire to investigate these aspects 
of the platonic thought originated – as said – from some Aesthetics interests; nevertheless, 
the research has been nurtured by an authentic desire to challenge, philosophically, the 
understanding of some of the most influential traits of contemporary communication and 
of the perception of the image nowadays. 
This work offers a philosophical, although immediate, application to the understanding 
of some of the most popular contemporary phenomena which puzzle our inherited sense 
of the self as single beings and also as human species. To explain this in generical terms, 
I believe that focusing on the implication of the ancient issue of orality/writing, could 
help to live our present with more awareness. We live in an age of transition as much as 
Plato in his own time. The transition that we experience is from literate communication 
to telematic communication. The implications of this contemporary shift are wider and 
more articulated compared to those that occurred through the shift from orality to 
literacy302 which Plato witnessed with his own work. 
In this dissertation, the analysis of relevant contemporary themes has not found adequate 
space; nevertheless, this study can serve as a theoretical tool to frame the philosophical 
ground on which these themes should be correctly discussed and analysed – with the wish 
of having further occasions to develop these investigations. 
Just to offer a few examples of the relevance of this study for interpreting some puzzling 
issues of our times, I shall mention two of the most contemporary relatable phaenomena. 
The first, is the phenomenon of the “fake news”. The web represents a sort of unmaterial, 
although visual, mirrored world of the real word. On the internet, there are channels for 
the exhibition and the exchange of information of any sort, such as websites and social 
 
302 As Walter Ong noted more than thirty years ago: Most persons are surprised, and many distressed, to 
learn that essentially the same objections commonly urged today against computers were urged by Plato 
in the Phaedrus (274–7) and in the Seventh Letter against writing. Writing, as Socrates says in the Phaedrus, 
is inhuman, pretending to establish outside the mind what in reality can be only in the mind. It is a thing, a 
manufactured product. The same of course is said of computers. Ong, 1982, p. 80. 
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media. The validation of what is written on websites and of what is exchanged on social 
media is based on the simple “presentification” of such information. The fact that the 
information is present (visible) seems enough to consider it real. The visibility of the 
information and of pictures (they can both be manipulated and deceptive) on the web 
alters the perception of truth and cancels the distinction of different degrees of truth: 
everything is equally true hence everything is equally (un)questionable. Moving an entire 
world on the visual level makes the distinction between eidos and eidolon almost 
impossible to see.303 As argued at different stages in this dissertation, the major risk of 
confusing an eidolon with its eidos is the annihilation of truth as the manipulative use of 
logoi by the sophists does. Considering this, it can be better understood the parallel and 
co-dependent contemporary phaenomena of the “fake-news” and of the “conspiracy 
theories”. In more exemplative terms, the information about Donald Trump ending school 
shootings by banning schools304 and the “flat earth theory” which questions scientific 
data, are equally valid in the “post-truth world”.305 If this is possible is also in virtue of a 
problem – dealt with in this thesis – which is implicit in the relation between eidos and 
eidolon and has been pointed by Plato as a risk-factor. This problem concerns the issue 
of responsibility. What appears on a screen is unresponsive, it means that it cannot speak, 
but also that is not responsible for what it stands for.306 This phenomenon is so dangerous 
on an epistemological and ethical level, that a group of well know intellectuals and 
scientists gathered together to found a group of research in Italy to contrast the 
phenomenon of pseudoscientific divulgation.307 Their criticism and active work recalls in 
 
303 I am not establishing a relation of effect-cause between the “fake news”, the “conspiracy theories” and 
the visual nature of the web. However, the structure of ontology of the image is one the factors – frequently 
underestimated – which increases this type of intellectual dystopia. 
304 This news was spread on the basis of an article published on online journal The Yew Norker on 
07/10/2018 by Paul Zies. The article attempts to be trustworthy, reporting some declarations made by the 
President Trump; however, the title of the article “President Trump to Ban Schools in Order to Stop School 
Shootings” is approximated and incomplete, although catching. Also, the name of the journal (mocking and 
imitating a famous and established journal) and the design of its logo are very deceptive and might convince 
an inattentive reader about the authenticity of the information. On the basis of this catching title it has been 
built and spread a series of incorrect information or fake news. 
305 Scepticism about common-sense things has been on the agenda of philosophers for centuries, but only 
as a plaything confined to the study. It does not spill into everyday life. So, what on earth do people mean 
when they say we are living in a “post-truth” world? Blackburn, 18/02/2019. 
306 Now in an age of global internet connectivity, social media offers impressionable teenagers and 
innumerable troll factories an unprecedented opportunity for mischief and immunity to its consequences. 
As a result, we begin to live in a world in which more and more people are untrustworthy more of the time. 
Ibidem. 
307 This group was founded first in 1989 under the acronym CICAP (Italian Committee for the Investigation 
of Claims on the Pseudoscience) with intent of contrasting the divulgation of distorted information on 
paranormal episodes. Since 2013 the group focuses mainly on the wrong claims of pseudoscience, its main 
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some ways the criticism that Plato developed both against writing and orality. Even some 
of the contradictions are quite similar, in fact these intellectuals criticise also some uses 
of the tool that they use to express their criticism (web and media). 
The other example is related to a recent scientific event which had a world-wide echo: “A 
global team of astronomers, led by Harvard scientists, has for the first time captured an 
image of a black hole”.308 
Sagittarius A* is the scientific name of the black hole at the centre of the Milky Way 
galaxy and, to be precise, the picture taken shows its horizon of event. In fact, notoriously, 
a black hole is invisible; but, before to consider other scientific explanations, a 
philosophical question arises: how is it possible to take a visible picture of something 
invisible? This is an original philosophical question comparable only to the platonic 
question of how would it be possible to see one’s own source of the view (hence, the pupil 
of the eye). Plato’s answer was: 
 
I’m sure you’ve noticed that when a man looks into an eye his face appears in it, like in a 
mirror. We call this the ‘pupil’, for it’s a sort of miniature of the man who’s looking. […] 
Then an eye will see itself if it observes an eye and looks at the best part of it, the part with 
which it can see. […] But it won’t see itself if it looks at anything else in a man, or anything 
else at all, unless it’s similar to the eye. […] So if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an 
eye, and at that region of it in which the good activity of an eye actually occurs, and this, I 
presume, is seeing. (Alc. 133a-b) 
 
The scientific answer about taking a picture of a black hole is pretty much the same: 
 
But the only way to detect black holes, Doeleman said, was through VLBI, or very long 
baseline interferometry. The process involves collecting data from multiple radio telescopes 
around the globe, then using algorithms and supercomputers to analyze that data, effectively 
creating a “virtual telescope” the size of the Earth itself, turning the planet into a giant radio 
telescope.309 
 
intent is to verify the sources and the scientific validity of some pseudoscientific claims. Cf. 
https://www.cicap.org/n/index.php  
308 Reuell, 10/04/2019. 
309 Ibidem. 
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A telescope, in fact works like the pupil of a human eye, reflecting and mirroring. By 
turning the planet in a big enough eye, then it was possible to obtain this paradoxical 
image. However, the black hole itself remains invisible, and what the many radio 
telescopes could picture is just photons: 
 
Doeleman and his colleagues were hoping the giant flashlight would reveal a ring of light 
known as the last photon orbit. The closest light can get to a black hole without being “eaten,” 
that orbit is the result of photons being flung off from the super-heated material around the 
black hole. Some of those photons are redirected by the extreme gravity and come to Earth, 
where they could be detected by EHT researchers.310 
 
The fact that technology and science have somehow allowed us to “see the unseeable” 
should not lead to believe that that picture is actually Sagittarius A*. Indeed, that picture 
represents – without denying at all its success and the utmost enthusiasm which derived 
from it – the perfect example of what Plato meant with the term eidolon: a collection of 
perspectives of a thing and not the thing itself. 
Although their technical perfectibility, human logoi remain weak. This does not mean 
that our human research should give up, on the contrary, to keep examine is the entire 
point of a human life;311 it rather means that human research should not stop because no 
eidolon can ever be exhaustive enough to satisfy the authentic desire of human 
knowledge. We do live in the realm of mimesis and our visibility can keep the eye stable 
only on the eidola, while eide can be grasped only temporarily. It is a matter of finitude. 
The most dangerous mistake would be to confuse an eidolon with its eidos, because this 
would disclose the realm of death and annihilate the incessant life of the eide. To protect 
not only our knowledge, but also the creative power of our soul, we should train in the art 
of distinction and carefully apply it to the visual which, willingly or not, is the territory 
 
310 Ibidem. 
311 On the other hand, if I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those 
other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is 
not worth living for men, you will believe me even less. (Apol. 38a) 
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on which human knowledge and human relations have progressively grounded 
themselves. 
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